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Despite its surface appearance of precision, the 
establishment of accounting principles is an ongoing 
political process. This is because they affect different 
factions of the constituency in different ways. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was structured 
so as to minimize potential undue influence by lobbyists. 
But is this independence illusory? 
Vll 
The present study replicates and extends prior work 
done by Brown (1981). "Influence attempts" was 
operationalized as comment letters written to nine FASB 
Discussion Memos (DMs). Two subsets of policy questions 
comprised the cues. 
Letter writers were stratified into two subsamples. 
The "accounting group" contained the Big-Eight CPA firms 
plus five professional reporting societies. 
"Special-interest subjects" were drawn from Fortune-500 
and specialized sampling frames. 
Subjects' positions on each policy issue were 
obtained from their comment letters. The FASB's 
corresponding rulings were drawn from its Official 
Pronouncements. 
A multidimensional scaling (MDS) was performed on 
each issue subset. Clusters of respondents holding 
similar positions were identified. A number of issues 
were discernible as dimensions in the perceptual spaces. 
Several overall follow-up tests were performed. A 
Mann-Whitney U test was performed on the pairwise relative 
distances to the FASB. This was done for the accounting 
vs. special-interest subjects, and for Brown's vs. the 
additional policy issues. 
vi 11 
There was no overall difference in average FASB 
alignment between accounting and non-accounting subjects. 
However, a marginal difference was evident between the two 
sets of policy issues. As a result, the Mann-Whitney U 
was rerun within each DM, with "issue subset" as a 
blocking factor. FASB alignment was closer to the 
accounting subjects for five sets, and to special-interest 
subjects for two sets. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The responsiveness of rule-making bodies to outside 
influence attempts is a frequently recurring political 
question. Any legislative procedure is bound to cover a 
constituency of varied—and often competing—interests. 
There is a natural incentive to attempt to gain the 
policy-maker's ear in order to structure these rules to 
one's own advantage. Frequently, though, individual 
lobbyists find that it pays to join forces in their 
persuasive activities. We have come to label these as 
"special-interest groups." 
The structure of the primary rule-making body in 
accounting has undergone several dramatic changes in its 
history. The most recent restructuring occurred in 1973, 
with the collapse of the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB), and the subsequent establishment of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
The APB's demise was traced in large measure to its 
inability to take into account the input of various 
factions of its constituency. In particular, there was 
some concern that accounting representatives (especially 
1 
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the Big-8 CPA firms) exercised disproportionate control 
over the policy-making process. 
As a result of such criticisms/ the FASB was 
carefully restructured. In contrast to the APB, its 
members were required to sever all prior employment ties. 
During the past decade, the FASB has also incorporated a 
number of procedural reforms, designed to increase public 
input prior to issuance of its pronouncements. These 
include soliciting written comments to both Discussion 
Memos and Exposure Drafts; public hearings; and Board 
meetings which are open to all interested parties. All of 
these changes, it was originally hoped, would provide more 
balanced and complete input into the rule-making process. 
But has the FASB in fact been able to achieve a 
position of neutrality in its activities? Given the 
current widespread interest in economic consequences of 
accounting policy rulings, and the differential impact of 
these rules upon affected parties, the activities of the 
FASB have triggered substantial public involvement. Has 
the FASB struck effective compromises among diverse 
preferences in its final rulings on hotly contested 
issues? Or does it end up siding with one group to the 
detriment of others? 
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Some prior research has been done on these sorts of 
questions, in the context of both the APB and the FASB. 
These studies will be briefly reviewed in the following 
section. 
The present study focuses on FASB alignment with 
respect to two sub-samples: accounting-oriented subjects 
and special-interest subjects. The design of the study 
will be elaborated in the methodology chapter. 
Execution of the research study will proceed in two 
stages. A series of multidimensional scalings will be 
performed, plotting these subjects' positions vis-a-vis 
those of the FASB on certain subsets of accounting issues. 
Each of these scalings will be interpreted in a separate 
section. 
Next, some overall tests will be done to determine 
relative differences in FASB alignment between the 
accounting and corporate subjects. Specific sets of 
issues for which a significant difference exists are 
identified. 
Conclusions, limitations and directions for future 
research are outlined in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Introduction 
The process of deriving ideal workable rules in 
accounting is by no means a straightforward matter. Those 
who naively believed that standard setting can be reduced 
to an academic exercise of "the one correct way" soon 
discovered that they were guilty of a critical error of 
omission: the consent of the governed. As in politics, 
feedback and cooperation from the constituency is vital to 
legislative survival. By most accounts/ the demise of the 
old Accounting Principles Board (APB) can be traced in 
large measure to its unresponsiveness. Likewise, the 
history of its more pluralistic successor, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), is filled with examples 
of advance-and-retreat policy making. 
But when does constituent involvement overstep its 
feedback bounds and turn into a power play? Wolk, Francis 
and Tierney (1984) characterize an overt attempt to co-opt 
the standard-setting agency as "policy capturing." Has 
the FASB consistently sided with any special-interest 
4 
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coalition(s) to the exclusion of others, despite the 
avowed structural reforms for independence? If so, there 
is a clear threat to the retention of standard setting in 
the private sector, especially since the FASB is the third 
such attempt. 
This section will begin with a brief outline of the 
impossibility of attacking policy-making from a pristine 
stance of macroeconomic optimality. The inevitability of 
socio-political involvement in standard setting is 
examined next. As a result the policy-making agency must 
display more than technical accounting competence; it must 
effectively "sell" its "product" to the public in the same 
way that other goods are marketed. Finally, the tendency 
of constituents to form coalitions in their lobbying 
efforts is -noted. But have policy makers yielded 
measurably to any special interests? Several studies to 
date have treated this research question in various forms 
and with various statistical tools. Their conclusions are 
summarized as a prelude to the present study. 
Optimality Is Impossible 
The initial temptation to "sanitize" the accounting 
standard-setting process is perhaps understandable. After 
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all, accounting goes hand in hand with economic theory, 
providing as its goal information which is useful for 
economic decisions. Why shouldn't the measurement process 
(with its implicit notions of precision) be subject to the 
same theoretical search for optimality and social welfare 
as its subject matter? By firmly grounding the 
rule-making process in "theory," perhaps the dangers of 
"politicking" and "corruption" could be neatly 
sidestepped. 
However, researchers soon discovered serious flaws in 
this ivory-tower ideal. Demski (1974) proved that no 
single set of accounting principles will ever rank 
individual preferences completely and transitively. 
Despite the widely held democratic belief that individual 
user tastes should count, both Demski and May and Sundem 
(1976) conclude that individual tastes cannot be 
consistently summed into a neat, aggregate social 
preference function. 
Why does this democratically admirable principle fail 
in practice? Some elements of human nature simply elude 
precise quantification. For one thing, most surveys and 
voting mechanisms fail to take preference intensity into 
account. Demski cites the hypothetical scenario of 50% of 
a population which prefers lease capitalization—but only 
7 
slightly—while 45% strongly opposes it. Furthermore, 
people often have incentives to distort their actual 
preferences. Division managers may agree that 
current-value reporting is more relevant, yet vote against 
supplying it, because of their reluctance to commit to 
admittedly more subjective figures. 
Other reasons for the failure of optimality are more 
pedagogic in nature. Beaver, Kennelly and Voss (1968) 
refer to the supposedly straightforward example of 
predicting bankruptcy from the "best" form of the 
debt-equity ratio. Why is the discovery of this "best" 
ratio such an elusive goal? The ratio itself is a summary 
of a list of asset and liability accounts; thus, it is 
subject to both their functional form and their individual 
operational definitions. In other words, according to 
these authors, the effects of the model and the measure 
cannot be disentangled. The model may also be conditional 
on the individual event being predicted, as well as other 
factors (e.g., the type of industry, the number of years 
the firm has been in business, etc.). But perhaps most 
importantly, the evolutionary nature of the research 
process is an inescapable fact of policy-making life. 
There could always be a better measure and/or model out 
there, just waiting to be discovered. Therefore, the 
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notion of "best" method is destined to be a relative 
thing. 
Does this mean that accounting standard setters are 
forced to abandon all hope for a collective-choice rule? 
Not at all, according to several researchers. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1979) suggest that "accounting theory" should 
simply be treated like any other economic good. That is, 
its "possession" can result in potential transfers of 
wealth among affected parties. As a result, each specific 
policy issue can be viewed through the self-interest lens 
of numerous theories, none of which is necessarily 
superior to any other. 
In line with the example cited by Beaver, Kennelly 
and Voss, Demski argues that theory development ought to 
be a search for relevant conditions under which a given 
accounting prescription may or may not work. The 
substantive and ownership tests set forth in Statement 13 
to decide whether a lease should be capitalized or 
expensed represent one example. Another illustration is 
the FASB's definition of "functional currency," to help 
users choose the proper unit of reporting for foreign 
currency translation. 
Similarly, May and Sundem suggest that the focus of 
attention ought to be shifted from ethereal accounting 
9 
concepts to the policy-making decision process itself. 
This includes in particular the inevitable tradeoffs and 
compromises needed to reach a consensus. 
Likewise, the elusiveness of a precise summation of 
individual preferences is not necessarily a stumbling 
block. Cushing (1977) advises that the concept of 
"complete diversity" has not been empirically supported. 
Perhaps all users of financial statements could agree on 
some minimum set of characteristics which they ought to 
possess, such as reliability and comparability, for 
example. Complete optimality may still be unattainable; 
however, stepwise departures from it could, at a minimum, 
be detected (e.g., a proposed key ratio subject to wide 
swings in variability). 
What this means, according to Cushing and Demski, is 
that a pristine textbookish rule for attaining 
"optimality," per Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, is 
unworkable. All methods of collective choice will violate 
it. However, other social choice mechanisms do exist. 
They must take into account multiple, competing 
preferences as well as individual perceptions regarding 
the consequences of any given accounting prescription. 
10 
Standard Setting As a Sociopolitical Choice Process 
The inevitability of tradeoffs in any legislative 
process should have probably occurred to accounting 
researchers at the outset. As Solomons (1978) reminds his 
readers, the concept of "neutrality" does not imply that 
"no one gets hurt." The process of arriving at common 
ground generally requires the forfeiting of some competing 
interests. 
One way of arriving at the most widely acceptable 
alternative, as just noted, is Cushing's agreement of 
minimum characteristics. One example of this is found in 
reporting for pensions. APB No. 8 required calculation 
of pension expense via an existing acceptable actuarial 
funding method. Now, the actual pension plan could be 
funded in a variety of ways. But use of a formula 
effectively encouraged consistency and comparabi1ity among 
these various companies. Another desirable user 
characteristic evident in pension standards was the 
accrual basis of accounting. This is because a portion of 
future employee benefits necessarily accumulates each 
working period, regardless of their actual funding in 
cash. Comparability was further enhanced by the reporting 
requirements of Statement 36. It required separate 
11 
disclosure of certain significant events which affect the 
pension plan. These include changes in actuarial 
assumptions, funding procedures, and/or accounting 
methods. Such lists of minimally desired user 
characteristics obviously steer the standard-setting 
process away from socially undesirable reporting effects. 
Clearly, this approach suggests some commona1ities in 
individual users' utility functions. Bromwich (1980) 
suggests that such "additive separability" of preferences 
might pave the way for (at a minimum) some sort of partial 
equilibrium analysis. Looking at it from the opposite 
extreme, the possible scope of disagreement within the 
constituency could be bounded by first partialling out 
this common ground. 
In order to do this correctly, however, a piecemeal 
approach to standard setting must be avoided. It is 
admittedly tempting to circumscribe a given issue by 
defining it in very precise, operational terms. Doing so 
helps move along the legislative process; in the short 
term, consensus can more easily be reached in small steps- 
But there is a clear danger in losing sight of the fact 
that some key issues are interdependent. The whole set 
could easily collapse from any inconsistency which 
results. 
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Accounting policy offers many examples of such 
interdependency. The disposition of changes in the 
exchange rate, within the issue of foreign currency 
translation, brings to mind the treatment of holding gains 
in constant-dollar reporting. Alternative valuation 
schemes also come into play in the proposed 
reserve-recognition and discovery-value accounting for oil 
and gas industries. Both leasing and oil and gas 
accounting deal with the issue of proper asset 
recognition. Restructuring of troubled debt, as well as 
lease accounting, touch upon the concept of net realizable 
value. The possibility of such overlap is virtually 
limitless. It must be carefully identified, as well as 
consistently dealt with, in the policy-making process. As 
Demski points out, constituents' awareness of such common 
ground may help them articulate their common preferences, 
so that both internally sound and socially acceptable 
partial equilibria can be attained. May and Sundem refer 
to this as the "dimensionality problem," or selecting the 
proper level of analysis. 
If such a "least-common-denominator" approach 
sacrifices too many special interests, then what about the 
opposite approach: an assortment of tailor-made, 
individualized alternatives? According to Demski, this 
13 
too will rarely be socially optimal in the purest sense. 
The tradeoffs may be fewer, and more subtle; yet they'll 
still be there. In other words, one group is bound to be 
helped while another is hurt—a clear movement away from 
so-called Pareto optimality. Segment reporting provides a 
case in point. CPA firms and investment analysts eagerly 
demanded product-line disclosures as being in the public 
interest. Yet marketing managers worried about a possible 
loss of competitive advantage as a result of such 
disclosures. As Demski sees it, the impossibility of 
"netting out" individual costs and benefits invariably 
leads to "imposing" some prescribed tradeoffs in a 
socially acceptable manner. This is just what the FASB 
attempts to do through its lengthy deliberation process: 
from task force, to public hearing, to discussion memo, to 
exposure draft, to final pronouncement. This process 
acknowledges that no single robust optimal policy 
prescription exists; yet it attempts at a minimum to 
identify the costs and benefits of each possible approach. 
In fact, Demski spelled out the objectives of 
social-choice theory research more specifically. As just 
mentioned, all possible tradeoffs must be carefully 
delineated. These include, for example, the familiar 
"objectivity-vs.-relevance" dilemma in comparing 
14 
historical cost to alternative valuation schemes. Another 
conflict arises with respect to additional disclosures 
such as segment reporting: completeness (more information) 
vs. timeliness (need to get it out promptly). One final 
illustration is the conflict between relevance and 
reliability inherent in the choice of an essentially 
arbitrary actuarial funding method to calculate periodic 
pension expense. 
Parallel to this, Demski recommends identification of 
built-in biases of certain constituencies in lobbying for 
or against a given standard. Some of these are relatively 
easy to pinpoint; but others take unexpected motivational 
twists. As an example of the latter. Watts and Zimmerman 
cite the competing pressures on managers. Their goal is 
seemingly straightforward: maximization of their own 
utility through increased wage and stock-option 
compensation. This takes a tangible form through 
increased share prices and cash bonuses. However, the 
avenue to success may not be so obvious: e.g., managers' 
incentive to minimize reported earnings. This is due to 
the effects of the significant moderating variables of tax 
and regulatory effects. Other potentially significant 
factors include information-production costs, specific 
management-compensation plans, and political costs such as 
15 
involvement in antitrust litigation. 
This brings us to Demski's second set of suggestions: 
ongoing positive research with respect to the economic 
consequences of accounting standard-setting. This 
includes the impact of processing costs on individual 
consumption decisions, and continual evaluation of their 
reflection within the capital markets. 
There are many ways in which economic consequences 
manifest themselves in the lobbying process. One of these 
has to do with a sort of "functional fixation" on the 
level and/or volatility of key accounting ratios. 
Borrowing restrictions in debt covenants quite naturally 
fuel corporate opposition to additional recognition of 
liabilities. Hence, the staunch opposition to the 
labelling of unfunded guaranteed vested pension benefits 
as a bona fide liability. The same holds true for 
including leased property rights in the balance sheet. Of 
course, as Wolk, et. al., point out, this presumes that 
the capital market is fooled by the accounting form of a 
transaction and cannot see through to its true economic 
substance. (This is perhaps why Demski recommends the 
aforementioned "reality testing" of capital-market 
reactions to accounting policy changes.) 
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In line with Wyatt's (1977) contention that too 
little attention is paid to economic consequences/ 
consider yet another ripple effect of putting pension 
liability in the balance sheet. Wolk contends it might 
actually lead to such austere cost-cutting measures as 
cutbacks in future pension benefits and/or tightening of 
eligibility requirements. Thus, one must do considerable 
brainstorming in order to identify fully all possible 
socfial consequences of a given policy directive. 
Incidentally, Wyatt blames an excessive preoccupation with 
technical measurement issues for this neglect of economic 
consequences. He advises policy-making bodies like the 
FASB to devote considerable time to "what-if" scenarios 
and their full range of economic, social and political 
consequences. These are at least as important, if not 
more so, than strictly measurement or definitional 
considerations. 
Though far less likely, the opposite extreme must be 
avoided as well. Solomons warns that there is a big 
difference between taking economic consequences into 
consideration, and allowing them to determine the proper 
accounting rules to follow. Given the previous neglect of 
economic consequences, however, it is probably better to 
err on the side of too much concern. 
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May and Sundem suggest a three-pronged approach to 
the assessment of consequences. With respect to the 
overall criterion of "social usefulness," policy 
consequences should be judged not only in the aggregate, 
but also with respect to individual costs and benefits, 
including individual preferences. The last of these 
requires special scrutiny, given the deeply ingrained 
nature of accounting standards. Demski notes that some 
accounting rules remain in place more out of custom or 
habit than social usefulness. This certainly helps 
explain the survival of historical cost as the unit of 
measure of financial statements, even in the face of rapid 
deterioration in the purchasing power of the dollar. 
Continued scrutiny of existing practice is imperative in 
order to assess how well it mirrors the preferences of its 
constituency. 
Coupled with this ongoing evaluation is the need to 
cultivate a bit more patience. Standard setters' tendency 
to over-fragmentize complex issues in search of a 
quick-fix consensus was noted earlier. But Wolk, et. 
al., caution that the study of a problem, as well as the 
evaluation of alternative approaches, is by nature a 
lengthy process in a pluralistic society. In fact, they 
refer to the phenomenon as "democratic paralysis. 
II 
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Policy-making bodies soon acknowledged the inherent 
long-term nature of this process. Note, for instance, the 
generous four-year phase-in period for the leasing 
guidelines established by Statement 13. 
Now that the search for the "ultimate" method has 
been demonstrated to be fruitless, perhaps standard 
setting can be characterized in a much more realistic 
manner. Horngren (1972) suggested that policymaking 
amounts to advance and retreat—pushing the rather 
nebulous constraints to see what's acceptable and what 
isn't. A prime example of this evolutionary approach is 
the series of twists and turns in legislating accounting 
for the oil and gas industries. It all started in 1964 
with support for the successful-efforts approach within 
ARS No. 11. This position was more strongly reiterated by 
the FASB 13 years later in Statement 19. However, public 
lobbying resulted in a contrary stand by the FASB's 
"overseer" organization, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Not only did it commit itself to 
studying alternative valuation schemes such as Reserve 
Recognition Accounting; it also decided that full costing 
was acceptable in certain circumstances. Other powerful 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission also opposed 
the across-the-board requirement of successful efforts. 
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Based on such widespread (and in the case of the SEC, 
highly placed) opposition, the FASB had no choice except 
to reverse its original stand. In Statement 25, it 
suspended the mandatory use of successful efforts. Such 
flip-flops of position illustrate Horngren's warning that 
accounting policy is of necessity subject to continual 
"popularity testing." 
In a corresponding vein, the political nature of 
standard setting is now openly acknowledged. Both Watts 
and Zimmerman and Zeff state that lobbyists used to 
legitimize their positions by claiming that they were more 
"theoretically correct," "in the public interest," etc. 
Now, however, motives of self-interest are openly cited, 
as will be seen in the discussion of comment letters 
written to the FASB. Recall that corporate lobbyists 
opposed to extensive segment disclosures freely cited 
"loss of competitive advantage" at least as often as, say, 
"unreliability of projected figures." 
This open politicization of accounting standard 
setting hardly comes as a surprise to economists. 
According to Gerboth (1973), they long ago recognized the 
multidimensional—and thus user-dependent—nature of the 
"income" concept, for example. Therefore, accounting 
should openly acknowledge the importance of value 
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judgments in the financial reporting process. Compromise 
is an inevitable part of the process; as a result/ 
multiple sources of feedback and public education are at 
least as important as sheer technical competence. In 
other words, standard setting is not a one-way, top-down 
legislative activity. For the sequestered, ivory-tower 
approach could result in "producing a product nobody 
wants," according to Kirk (1978). 
This by no means implies that technical proficiency 
is unimportant. Solomons (1978) points out that the 
"usefulness" of financial output depends critically upon 
both the perceived relevance and reliability thereof. The 
retention of standard setting in the private sector is 
severely threatened by a hit-or-miss approach without a 
sound conceptual framework in place to buttress the 
conclusions, according to Wyatt. Ongoing technical and 
conceptual advances will invariably help quantification of 
currently elusive economic consequences —thus, a more 
complete statement of the research problem emerges. 
But in order to acknowledge properly the two-way 
nature of standard setting, the agency must for its part 
resort to virtual "marketing" of its product. In a 1973 
article, Horngren advised the policy-making agency of the 
critical need to do some lobbying of its own. It needs to 
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convince its constituency that it possesses the necessary 
technical expertise to set reporting standards, and that 
it is the most cost-effective means of doing so. In its 
reality testing of its perceived impact, the FASB must 
avoid the dual extremes of being viewed as either too 
dictatorial or too wishy-washy. Neither of these images 
bodes well for the retention of standard setting in the 
private sector, particularly since (as was pointed out at 
the start) the FASB represents the third such agency. 
How has the present policy-making body, the FASB, 
incorporated respondent feedback into its procedural 
structure? Discussion Memos (DMs) are neutral and much 
more detailed, according to Zeff. They must now include 
an explicit "economic impact analysis" section. DM 
summaries are also simplified in nature, directly setting 
forth in question form the policy implications of each 
alternative accounting treatment. FASB task forces, which 
work on the technical considerations of each issue, have 
increased both in size and in cross-sectional 
representation. The FASB technical staff is required to 
make public a detailed plan of its activities each 
quarter. Significantly, the FASB membership base itself 
has been enlarged as well. The days of the narrow 
technical "specialist" are over; four out of seven Board 
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members need no longer be CPAs. The FASB now has in place 
a formal self-audit process of its own activities: it must 
conduct a "post-enactment review" of all statements which 
have been in effect for at least two years. Finally/ the 
public may now attend advisory-council/ task-force, and 
trustee meetings. This "in the sunshine" policy has been 
in effect since 1978. 
Now that the standard-setter's responsiveness to 
outside parties has been established, it is reasonable to 
ask whether such parties act in concert to gain the 
policy-maker's ear. Are there natural tendencies —as 
well as incentives—to form coalitions? This possibility 
is likely, given the aforementioned impossibility of 
maximizing all individuals' utilities simultaneously, plus 
the commonalities in separate utility functions for 
financial information. Before asking whether the FASB 
aligns itself with so-called "special-interest groups," it 
is necessary to discuss why they might arise in the first 
place. A significant basis of influence, as well as its 
total effects on the standard-setting process, will be 
stressed. This is because the former variable will play 
an important role in the selection of sample subjects for 
the present study. 
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Special-Interest Involvement in Standard Setting: 
A Review of the Research to Date 
It should come as no surprise that affected parties 
will attempt to bend rule-making to their own advantage. 
As was noted earlier, even the arguments themselves have 
increasingly taken on more self-interest, and less 
pseudo-pedagogic, content. Likewise, Wolk's "capture 
theory" phenomenon was used to characterize a gradual 
convergence of the governing body and the governed 
population. In fact, Gerboth observed that such capture 
is easier to accomplish in the case of a highly 
concentrated policy-making body such as the FASB. 
Lobbying efforts and resources can be targeted more 
efficiently than they would for a more dispersed, 
checks-and-balances type of legislative mechanism. 
But there are also distinct advantages for 
individuals to pool their lobbying efforts and form 
special-interest groups. Lobbying efforts must be 
preceded by significant information gathering: that is, 
how the proposed acounting rules will work, and more 
importantly, how they will affect the reporting entity. 
Watts and Zimmerman have observed significant economies of 
scale in this preliminary research. They also cite clear 
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advantages to block lobbying efforts. 
Although the possible bases of special-intrest 
coalition are seemingly infinite. Watts and Zimmerman have 
isolated one variable as significant: size. In their 1978 
study, they present evidence that the present value of a 
cost-benefit stream is a directly proportional function of 
firm size. For instance, the magnitude of any income 
change resulting from a proposed accounting standard is 
expected to be larger for larger firms. Given the 
previously cited importance of the income figure in both 
management-compensation and external capital-raising 
activities, it is not hard to predict that this variable 
will drive lobbying activities. 
Watts and Zimmerman proceed to analyze the 
complementary effects of industry. They admit that surface 
differences in activity do exist, observing that just one 
steel company (as opposed to seven oil companies) 
submitted opinions on the issue of general price level 
reporting. However, they conclude that the overall 
functional relationship between "firm size" and 
"managerial lobbying behavior" is not materially altered, 
even when industry is included as a moderating variable 
(and controlling for the direction of earnings change). 
As a result, the size variable will play a key role in the 
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selection of cases for the present study. This will be 
discussed further in the methodology chapter. 
The preceding discussion makes clear that 
special-interest groups exert a marked influence on the 
demand for alternative accounting theories and policies. 
But what may not be so immediately obvious is the way they 
influence supply as well. Not only will lobbyists eagerly 
quote those particular research results which support 
their own preferred positions; they will often enhance the 
reputations of the respective authors in the process 
through their financial support (e.g., industry grants and 
subsidies). Therefore, according to Watts and Zimmerman's 
"survival bias" hypothesis, the favored ideas gain even 
wider publicity and support. This invariably leads to 
increased perceived credibility and probably a flurry of 
like-minded secondary studies. As a result, the potential 
impact of special-interest groups permeates the entire 
pure-to-applied research spectrum. 
This supply-side influence, plus the pluralistic 
nature of the constituency, virtually rule out any hope of 
discovering the "ultimate" set of generally accepted 
accounting principles. Watts and Zimmerman conclude that 
opposing special-interest factions will pick and choose 
different methods for different purposes. Furthermore, 
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the FASB can show different patterns of alignment with 
special-interest groups, depending upon the specific issue 
at hand. In other words, it may be far too simplistic to 
hypothesize that the Board is expected to side with, say, 
accounting firms, or professional societies. The context 
of the policy questions embedded within a given issue may 
make a critical difference in explaining shifts of 
decision alignment. 
Before examining this question within the setting of 
the present research study, however, the results of prior 
work on FASB/constituent alignment will be reviewed. 
Previous Research 
The question of undue respondent influence in the 
accounting standard-setting process has been addressed in 
several studies. The basis for such a priori clustering 
was specified in alternative ways. 
Meyer (1974) hypothesized that APB members' 
employment category was the primary factor explaining 
differences in job—related interests and thus in voting 
behavior. He discovered a distinct association between 
both factors when voting records on all APB Opinions were 
analyzed. However, when these Opinions were regrouped 
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into a smaller set of 'topic areas',this association 
disappeared. Similarly, Rockness and Nikolai (1977) 
failed to uncover systematic clusterings of respondent by 
job category. Patton later replicated these studies 
within the framework of the FASB, to see whether changes 
in the form of the regulatory agency would have an effect. 
Using two distinct statistical methodologies, he found no 
association between voters' job affiliation and voting 
pattern for either sub-topic or "controversial-issue" 
(more than one dissent) aggregation. 
Despite these overall results, one employment-related 
category of respondents deserves special attention because 
of its self-evident "special-interest" nature: the "Big-8" 
accounting firms. Newman (1981) compared a specially 
calculated power index for the Big-8 and non-Big-8 
respondents, as manifest in voting behavior. He was 
particularly concerned with the effect of majority-vote 
rules and other structural changes on the perceived 
influence of Big-8 respondents. Contrary to popular 
opinion, Newman found that the change in policy-making 
body from the APB to the supposedly 'independent' FASB 
(with members' prior employment ties severed) did not 
result in a reduction of the Big-8 power index. In fact, 
its power index actually exceeded its employment-related 
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proportional representation after the change. However, 
there also turned out to be little actual difference 
between the values of this power index when calculated for 
Big-8 and non-Big-8 subjects. Thus, the perceived 
disproportionate influence of the Big 8 was not supported 
by this study. 
Hussein and Ketz (1980) hypothesized that Big-8 firms 
comprise a so-called "ruling elite" in the policy-setting 
process of the FASB. They defined this term as being 
composed of two parts: inter-firm agreement on issues 
("unity") and agreement of FASB with the positions 
advocated by these firms ("control"). Opinions were drawn 
from reactions to a set of eight Exposure Drafts (EDs), 
while FASB rulings were traced to corresponding 
statements. The relative frequency of agreement on the 
selected issues was calculated for each pairwise 
combination of Big-8 firms. Likewise, a specially defined 
"power coefficient" showed the proportion of firms' 
opinions which matched the ultimate FASB rulings. Neither 
of these tests revealed significant inter-firm or 
Big-8/FASB agreement, however. In other words, the notion 
of pluralistic input into standard setting could not be 
rejected on the basis of this study. 
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If "employment group" did not explain significant 
differences in either lobbying or voting behavior, were 
there any other systematic groupings that emerged? 
Meyer's study pointed out some interesting coalitions. 
His across-Opinion analysis revealed similar voting 
behavior patterns for Big-8 and academic members. 
Inasmuch as the former group was most likely to be exposed 
to pressure from external constituents, and the latter 
group least likely, this finding was a surprise. In the 
second part of his study (votes analyzed by issues instead 
of across all Opinions), this cluster was replaced by an 
industry-academe voting pattern. 
Rockness and Nikolai, on the other hand, uncovered a 
conceptual-pragmatic dimension, with practitioners on one 
side and theori-sts on the other. Two isolated cases of 
respondent similarities emerged: one cluster comprising a 
Big-8 firm and its audit client in the steel industry, and 
a second Big-8-auto-industry-client proximity for an 
unrelated issue. These groupings may perhaps be explained 
by the relative stability of audit-client-industry 
concentrations over time, as studied by Rhode,Whitsell and 
Kelsey (1974),with possible attendant similarities in 
positions on certain accounting issues. 
• ~v~ 
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Brown (1981) searched for similar systematic 
groupings in his analysis of comment letters written to 
the FASB for selected issues. He uncovered a 
preparer-attestor dimension, with public accountants as 
the latter and primarily large corporations as the former. 
Brown also directly positioned the FASB's ultimate 
decision with respect to these respondents. This was done 
to see whether the FASB sided with any particular subject 
or group on a given issue. In all cases, the interpoint 
distances between the FASB and most of the respondents 
exceeded pairwise respondent distances. This 
FASB-"outlier" position suggests no systematic Board 
alignment with any group of respondents. Brown concludes 
that the Board either attempted to balance out diverse 
views, or else it simply ignored them, in its eventual 
pronouncements. 
Interestingly enough, a virtual carbon copy of 
Brown's research question occurred in an offshoot of the 
policy-making process. Pearson, Lindgren and Myers (1977) 
asked whether Big-8 firms exhibited block voting patterns 
in the formation of auditing standards. Rulings on these 
are made within the Auditing Standards Committee (AudSEC) 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Its voting members include not only Big-8 firms, but also 
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regional accounting firms and academicians. The authors 
obtained voting records of a sample of these members for 
19 Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). They scaled 
and clustered these respondents by generating pairwise 
dissimilarities with a coding scheme identical to Brown's. 
Then, as a follow-up step, they performed an ANOVA on the 
three clusters which emerged, to test for differences in 
mean voting patterns. The results showed that the Big-8 
subjects were scattered throughout all four quadrants. 
Furthermore, the three categories of AudSEC members 
(Big-8; regional; and academe) showed no tendency to 
cluster by subgroup, as well as no significant difference 
in average voting patterns. 
One possible confounding variable which was 
discovered by Rockness and Nikolai deserves mention at 
this point. The standard-setting process appears to 
possess a distinct "life cycle," or time dimension. They 
found the extent of respondent clustering decreased 
throughout the life of the APB,with a large, somewhat 
fluid centralized group emerging during its early 
existence. Oddly enough, this grouping began to dissolve 
just as the APB started to solicit outside reaction to its 
activities. By the end of its life, only a weak 
accountants-vs.-industry separation of respondents was 
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discernible. Patton found a parallel life-cycle effect 
for the FASB, as measured by an acceleration of both the 
rate of statement issuance and the dissent rate of voting. 
Brown examined only a small portion of final 
Statements which might have been insufficient in number 
for meaningful timewise segmentation. He created just one 
historical split: pre- and post-l/l/76 maps. He arrived 
at this date by reference to the occurrence of the Moss 
and Metcalf congressional hearings. Brown asserts that 
the standard setting agency did not experience significant 
environmental changes within each of these sub-periods. 
However, the effect of FASB life cycle on respondent 
groupings could not be directly determined from his study. 
The foregoing results suggest that respondents' 
potential influence in the standard-setting process 
probably extends beyond the bounds of mere employment 
affiliation. Rockness and Nikolai have suggested that 
similar-preference groupings, if any, should be described 
as mainly "political" in nature. Moreover, such 
disproportionate influence should not be ascribed solely 
to Big-8 accounting firms, as both Newman's and Meyer's 
conclusions show no apparent power advantage for these 
subjects. Perhaps other categories of potentially 
influential respondents have been neglected. Finally, the 
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agency life-cycle studies show the dependence of opinion 
clustering (if any) upon the volume and nature of the 
particular issues under debate. Any study of outside 
influences in the accounting standard-setting process 
should therefore take these factors explicitly into 
consideration. 
The present study attempts to incorporate some of 
these important variables. Both accounting and 
"special-interest" subjects' written opinions will be 
analyzed across a variety of broad financial-reporting 
topics. Their positions will be evaluated with respect to 
those of the FASB. In this manner, a preliminary 
indication of opinion clustering and relative alignment on 
policy issues is obtained. 
More detailed information relative to the design of 
the study is presented in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Problem Statement 
The primary objective of this study is the detection 
of differential FASB alignment with two potentially 
influential groups of its constituency: accounting 
subjects and non-accounting, "special-interest" subjects. 
This underlying goal will be approached via a number of 
initial, preliminary research questions. For one thing, 
can we identify clusters of subjects which take similar 
positions on certain accounting policy issues? Do such 
clusters represent a mix of both accounting and 
non-accounting lobbyists? Or are they homogeneous? If 
so, how can their composition be characterized (e.g., CPA 
firms? professional associations? same-industry firms? 
audit-client pairings?)? 
Related to these issues is the FASB1s ultimate 
position with respect to such groupings of like-minded 
constituents. Does it end up adopting the arguments of 
one group, as opposed to another? Or does it take an 
"outlier" stance, siding with no one? Are there any 
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issues for which the FASB opts for a "neutral" 
position—that is, by centralizing itself among diverse, 
extreme arguments? 
A secondary but related objective is to identify 
those issues which are most "controversial"; e.g. which 
produce especially polarized clusters, or widely differing 
opinions. Keep in mind that the history of accounting 
policy-making is characterized by a number of legislative 
reversals in response to public protest over initial 
rulings. Identification of those issues which produce 
notable differences in opinion and alignment is 
undoubtedly a useful first step in gauging public reaction 
and possibly heading off such lengthy and inefficient 
circularity of rulings in the first place. 
All of the above research interests are grounded in 
the setting of specific accounting policy questions. But 
it would also be desirable to make some overall comments 
regarding the extent of aggregate FASB alignment with one 
subgroup of subjects vs. another: namely, accounting and 
corporate subjects. Do overall differences in average 
alignment exist? Are such effects, whatever their 
magnitude, significantly moderated by such factors as a 
given subset of accounting policy issues? 
36 
The following section describes how these various 
factors will be operationalized in the context of this 
study. 
Selection of Sample Subjects 
The problem of defining both "influence attempts" and 
"special- interest subjects" is rooted in the 
policy-making process of the FASB. A brief description of 
the stages which comprise this process is therefore 
appropriate at this point. 
According to the general schematic depicted in Figure 
1, the policy mechanism is triggered by the emergence, or 
re-emergence, of some general issue of interest. As 
illustrated in the specific example in Figure 2, this 
might constitute an unmet need for users of financial 
information, such as the desirability of reporting items 
in dollars of current purchasing power. 
Such an issue is typically elaborated in the form of 
a neutral document which is known as a Discussion Memo 
(DM). It sets forth the particular, detailed implications 
of the broad issue for financial reporting. These may 
involve the usefulness, feasibility, and mode of 
presentation of this financial item. Sample questions for 
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general price level reporting are shown in Figure 2. 
Once the issue has been crystallized in this manner, 
the Board solicits opinions from its "constituency." This 
population includes business entities who might be 
affected by proposed compliance procedures, as well as CPA 
firms which could conceivably be required to certify such 
disclosures. 
Public response typically takes the form of letters 
of comment. These usually come from various 
representatives of industry, academe, accounting 
practitioners, and representatives of professional 
associations (both financial and industry-specific). 
These letters vary in length from one page to a veritable 
monograph. 
Each DM clearly lists in boldface the policy 
questions emanating from a given issue. These questions 
thereby provide a natural framework for the expression of 
opinion in the letters of comment. (Naturally, a given 
respondent need not comment on all the issues contained 
within any one DM. Nor is his letter necessarily confined 
to those particular issues.) 
The FASB prepares an "index," or table of contents, 
of those letters corresponding to each DM. The index 
lists all the letters received in chronological order. 
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identifying the respondent and his professional 
affiliation, if any. This index is bound together with 
the letters. 
A second vehicle for constituent response is the 
public hearing. Here, respondents from the same 
professional categories are asked to present their 
thoughts verbally. 
This forum of opinion is much more limited in nature 
than the letter-writing activity, however. The latter is 
(theoretically, at least) a much more accessible channel 
of communication. The agendas, allotted speaking time, 
number of presenters, etc., are presumably limited for 
public hearings. In contrast, anyone is free to write a 
letter of comments—with no such externally imposed 
constraints as to its length or content. 
There is a third mechanism for public input. Letter 
writing also occurs in response to Exposure Drafts (EDs). 
These typically follow DMs and sometimes public hearings 
as well. However, the ED is not a "neutral document" in 
the same sense as the DM. The FASB supposedly has 
evaluated its input to the above two processes and may 
attempt to elicit comments corresponding to its own 
predetermined preferences... along the lines of "tell me 
what I want to hear." On the other hand, the policy 
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questions contained in each DM may be taken at face value. 
No outside direction is apparent from any of these lists 
to date. 
After due consideration of the public's input, the 
logical next step is the declaration of the FASB's final 
decision with respect to the various issues raised. The 
Board's rulings appear in the form of a "Statement," or 
Statements. These address the initial policy questions 
and mandate proper accounting methods to be followed for 
each one. Usually some rationale is also given for the 
Board's decisions in a supplementary section, which 
responds point-by-point to recurring arguments raised in 
letters and speeches by the constituency. 
The simplest, ideal scenario would be a 1:1 match 
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between DMs and Statements. But three distinct variations 
are possible. First, a DM might result in more than one 
Statement. Note the profusion emanating from DM 2 in 
Figure 2, for example. As is the case in this instance, 
the multiplicity of Statements may correspond to 
applications of the "issue" at hand (e.g., 
"inflation-adjusted financial reporting") to various 
specific settings or industries. 
Secondly, there may be no Statements following a 
given DM. The topic may be dropped from consideration for 
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various reasons, or deferred to an as-yet-unrealized later 
point in time. Certain DMs, such as the two dealing with 
the "Conceptual Framework of Financial Reporting," may be 
too broad in scope to produce rulings in the same manner 
as, say, the "appropriate" way to adjust for inflation in 
the financial statements. 
Finally, a given Statement may correspond to more 
than one DM. Statement 39^, on general price-level 
adjustments in the oil-and-gas industry, is a fine example 
of such a hybrid. It can be classified with both the 
General Price Level Adjustments DM and with the Extractive 
Industries DM. 
These illustrations are really exceptions to the 
rule, however. For most policy decisions. Figure 1 
represents a reasonably accurate depiction of the process. 
Furthermore, the rather detailed titles of both DMs and 
Statements enable a fairly reliable matching of both sets 
of documents, in terms of the issues addressed therein. 
Nine DMs were identified in this manner; they are listed 
in Figure 3. 
Now that the basic framework has been established, 
the selection of subjects will be described. The first 
sub-sample consists of accounting-oriented subjects: the 
Big-8 CPA firms, plus five professional reporting 
41 
societies. These were also included in Brown's study? 
they appear in Appendix 1. [1] 
Stepwise identification of subjects as 
"special-interest groups," however, is a bit more 
complicated. An initial attempt was made to select them 
in the following manner. A cross-classification matrix 
was generated by hand from the aforementioned DM indices. 
As shown in Figure 4, the individual respondents were 
listed as row elements of this matrix; and all of the 
included DMs comprised the columns. Check marks were 
placed in the cells to indicate those DMs to which each 
subject in the population of letter-writers responded. It 
was hoped that visual inspection of this matrix (that is, 
tallying the row totals) would enable quick identification 
of those who wrote letters to four or fewer DMs—a 
reasonable approximation to a working definition of 
"special-interest subjects." 
This method of sample selection unfortunately proved 
to be unworkable. A number of DM indices (in particular, 
leases and debt restructuring) turned out to be composed 
of subjects which only addressed that particular DM? and 
[1] Throughout this study, the wo^d "sample" will refer to 
the •judgmental cross-matching procedure to be 
described. Tt does not in any case imply a simple 
random sample. 
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no other. Under the "four-or-fewer" definition just 
proposed, this would have meant including over 700 
subjects for DM 7 and over 800 for DM 10 (please refer 
back to Figure 3 for totals)—clearly an unmanageable 
number. 
However, an alternative method was theoretically 
sound and more easily operationalized too. Given the 
prior work done by Watts and Zimmerman (outlined in the 
literature-review chapter), there was published precedent 
for using "size" as a surrogate for "extent of lobbying 
activity." 
The Fortune 500 list of April 30, 1984 was obtained. 
Companies in the top 200 were cross-matched to each 
corresponding DM index (except for four, to be discussed 
shortly). If they also wrote a letter of response to a 
particular DM, then they were included in its 
special-interest sub-sample. 
Suppose there were insufficient special-interest 
subjects which qualified for inclusion as a result of 
applying this method (e.g., both on the Fortune 500 list 
and the DM index). It was decided to keep the overall 
sample at the same size as Brown's: 27 subjects and the 
FASB. This was done so as not to introduce an additional 
source of difference into the present study. In other 
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words, the only desired changes with respect to Brown were 
the coding scheme and the special-interest sub-sample. But 
keep in mind that the stability of the MDS solution can be 
increased simply by increasing sample size. To prevent 
this from being a confounder, the overall sample was kept 
at 27 (13 accounting and 14 special-interest subjects). 
Therefore, if cross-matching did not produce 14 of the 
latter, the balance of special-interest respondents was 
drawn at random from each affected DM index. 
Also,it was noted that special-interest subjects have 
their own professional associations, just as accounting 
and finance do. These are not corporate entities, and so 
would not appear on the Fortune 500 list. But by leaving 
them off, we would be ignoring a potentially powerful 
source of influence (akin to, say, the AICPA, Financial 
Executives Institute, or the National Association of 
Accountants). Thus, such associations were included in 
the overall sampling frames automatically if they appeared 
in any given DM index. 
In the case of four particular DMs, more specialized 
sampling frames happened to be available. The first of 
these was the Fortune 500 International list for August 
20, 1984. This was used for DM 3, Foreign Currency 
Translation, as it was a more focused attempt at 
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identifying "large multinationals" as special-interest 
subjects. 
For DM 7 (Leases), a very useful list of subjects was 
available in Abdel-khalik's research report to the FASB 
(1981). This frame was already stratified on both "size 
of company" (large vs. small) and "amount of 
non-capitalized leased property employed" (high vs. low). 
The same cross-matching procedure was followed. 
Standard and Poor1s Index for 1984 contains a list of 
commercial banks in descending order of the dollar amount 
of deposits controlled by each. This was used in the same 
manner for DM 10 (Debt Restructuring). 
Finally, there were several research studies done to 
test the capital market's reaction to Statement 19. This 
pronouncement emanated from DM 13, Oil and Gas 
Disclosures. Sampling frames developed by Collins and 
Dent (1979) and Dyckman and Smith (1979) were already 
conveniently stratified into full-cost and 
successful-efforts sub-samples. 
This means that the accounting subjects were constant 
across all nine included DMs. The special-interest 
subjects, however, were unique to each DM. All of the 
subjects are listed in Table 1 and identified by code. 
This labelling will aid interpretation of the graphical 
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output of the statistical methods employed (Chapter IV). 
Now that the selection procedure for subjects has 
been discussed, the next topic of interest is the set of 
variables ("cues") to be utilized. These subjects' 
positions on policy issues will be extracted from their 
comment letters addressed to particular DMs. As mentioned 
earlier, each DM has a special section listing in boldface 
all of its associated policy questions. Between four and 
eight of these questions will be listed for each DM. 
(Please see Figure 2 for three such policy questions 
corresponding to DM 2.) 
Because these DMs vary widely as to general topic 
area, the list of policy questions contained within each 
one also varies in length. There may be as few as four, 
or as many as thirty-plus, questions. However, the latter 
may be too fine a partition of the underlying issues. 
Brown was able to condense these successfully into four to 
eight questions in most instances. Furthermore, these 
longer lists are comprised of many detailed "sub-points," 
most of which will probably be disregarded by respondents 
in their comments addressed to basic issues. A secondary 
list of policy issues will be independently generated and 
will contain no more than ten questions for each DM. In 
cases of divergence from Brown's questions, the former 
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will be separately analyzed if each list contains more 
than one additional question. Otherwise, the complete set 
(Brown's, plus the one additional question) will be 
analyzed as a follow-up step. The entire list of 
questions appears in Appendix 2. 
One last point must be made regarding the format of 
these policy questions. In order to compare a 
respondent's position with that of the FASB (e.g., "Did 
they agree? Did they disagree?11), these questions must be 
in yes-no form. This parallels directly the 
classification scheme of Brown's 1981 study. Some, but 
certainly not all, of the boldface questions appearing 
within each DM are in yes-no form. (Those which are not/ 
but which deal with basic underlying issues, can generally 
be restated so as to conform.) 
The letters of comment written by sample subjects 
(e.g., those identified as "special-interest respondents" 
from the aforementioned selection procedure will then be 
obtained. These are contained within binders 
corresponding to each DM within the FASB Department of 
Public Records. Copies of these letters are available to 
interested parties upon request. 
From these letters, the respondent's position on each 
of the listed policy questions will be determined. The 
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FASB's corresponding position, on the other hand, must be 
drawn from the associated Statement(s) containing its 
pronouncements. (This flow was illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2.) 
The extent of agreement or disagreement on a given 
policy question will be recorded by referring to a 
paired-comparison matrix coding scheme. Brown's matrix is 
shown in Figure 5. Note that the diagonal of this 
symmetric matrix represents perfect agreement between both 
respondents on the issue at hand. Similarly, 
diametrically opposed views are coded as 9. 
One sticky point, though, is the meaning of the 
middle category, which Brown calls "neutral or no 
response." According to this title, two quite distinct 
types of respondents could fall in this classification. 
Suppose a subject has both positive and negative feelings 
about aspects of a given question. Theoretically, then, 
he is "neutral" on the question when it is considered a£ a 
whole. However, Brown also placed repondents who avoided 
mentioning a given question at all in this category; note 
the second part of his title. 
When interpreted in this light. Brown's central 
category is no longer necessarily unidimensional. It is 
impossible to determine from Brown's study how many 
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"positive-negatives," as opposed to "no-comment 
respondents," he actually encountered in the letters which 
he analyzed. (Recall, too, that his study was confined to 
a different subset of accounting topics and differently 
defined subjects.) 
Figure 6 illustrates the paired-comparison matrix 
which will be used to compare and code each pairwise 
combination of subjects' opinions. Note that the two 
categories, "neutral" and "no response," have been 
disaggregated. As will be seen in Chapter IV, the two 
categories did in fact produce notably different 
groupings. Thus, the distinction appears to have been 
important in interpreting the graphical results contained 
therein. 
A further explanation of the technique to be used to 
analyze this data is provided in the following section. 
In addition, a simple hypothetical example will be 
provided to help the reader understand the methodology 
more fully. 
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Research Methodology 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is an especially 
convenient technique for analyzing the extent of 
agreement, or disagreement, between the FASB and 
special-interest respondents on policy questions. The 
objectives of MDS are twofold: to identify the underlying 
dimensions which provide the best separation of "objects" 
(here, the FASB and selected respondents); and to place 
these objects in a space of N dimensions or less (Aaker, 
1980). 
The goal of MDS is to represent the totality of 
perceived similarities and dissimilarities spatially. 
Intuitively, two subjects who hold similar positions on a 
given question should plot close together in the space; 
those holding diametrically opposed views, in contrast, 
should be widely separated on the map. In other words, 
MDS will be taking these "proximities" (for n subjects, 
including the FASB, n(n-l)/2 of these proximities exist) 
and converting them to "fitted distances" by moving the 
configuration of points around in N-dimensional space, in 
a stepwise manner. Ideally there should be a perfect 
inverse match between these proximities and fitted 
distances, according to the monotonicity property ("more 
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similar" implies "smaller distance"). Shepard diagrams 
show the extent to which the order relationship has been 
preserved at a given step (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). 
Recall that the goal of this study is the "extent of 
separation" (agreement or disagreement) between the FASB 
and special-interest respondents on selected 
financial-reporting issues. Through its stepwise fitting 
procedure, MDS graphs these subjects with respect to 
dimensions in space. The objective, as with other 
multivariate techniques, is parsimony. That is, we want 
to find the smallest possible number of dimensions for 
which there is a reasonably good match-up between the 
input similarity rankings and the resulting distances in 
the Euclidean space, according to Aaker. 
What constitutes a "good fit"? Obviously,an 
"important dimension" is one which "separates the objects 
well" (e.g., preserves the aforementioned monotonic 
relationship between proximities and distances to a great 
degree). With (n-1) dimensions, we could place the n 
objects perfectly. But such a large space is, of course, 
impossible to depict pictorially. Perhaps some of the 
higher-order dimensions can be dropped without materially 
violating the rank-order constraint. 
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Now as with several other quantitative techniques, 
MDS does not have associated with it a test statistic 
whose distribution is known and tabulated, akin to t,F,or 
chi-square. Therefore, "hypothesis testing" in the strict 
sense of the term is not possible. But an overall 
goodness-of-fit measure is available which is known as 
"Kruskal's stress." It assesses the extent to which the 
monotone relationship has been preserved; e.g., the 
closeness between observed similarities and fitted 
distances. 
The goal, then, is to minimize stress with as few 
dimensions as possible. General guidelines exist with 
respect to "good" levels of stress. There are also 
several graphical methods. One can plot stress vs. the 
number of dimensions and look for an elbow in the curve, 
akin to Horn's method for principal components. 
Split-half sample cross-validation can also be performed, 
according to Dillon and Goldstein. The two-dimensional 
solution, if "best," is of course ideal in terms of visual 
presentation of the results. 
At this point, a look at a sample MDS example is in 
order. Suppose that comment letters in response to DM 1 
(R and D) have been obtained for the ten respondents shown 
in Figure 7. The FASB's corresponding position has been 
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drawn from Statement 2. This contains its final rulings 
with respect to the R and D issues which it initially- 
listed within the DM for public consideration. 
Let us assume that the scaling produces the 
two-dimensional map shown in Figure 7. Its associated 
value of Kruskal's stress is 0.0300. This goodness of fit 
tells us that excellent correspondence between the 
original similarities of subjects' positions and their 
mathematically fitted distances in space has been attained 
with just two axes. Adding additional dimensions would 
probably not improve the fit to any great extent. 
Therefore, we may proceed to interpret this 
two-dimensional solution. 
Our first objective is to try and identify clusters 
of respondents which have plotted together in this 
perceptual space. This graphical proximity reflects 
similarity of position. If we wish, we may draw 
concentric circles, or iso-contours, around such points to 
aid in their location on the graph. 
Several distinct groupings are apparent from Figure 
7. At the leftmost extreme of Dimension 1 (horizontal 
axis), we find Earnest Products plotting very close to 
Impressive Labs. (The extent of this closeness may be 
determined by obtaining the Euclidean distance between 
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these two points.) Two other subjects are located in 
relatively close proximity to this pair: Hi-Tech and Alpha 
Computers. No other subjects plot as closely together as 
this foursome. This proximity is pictorially represented 
by the contour lines surrounding these points. 
This process is repeated for the balance of the point 
scatter. A second pairing is evident near the origin of 
the space: Realist, Inc., and Jones Mfg. In like manner, 
the extreme right-hand side of Dimension 1 contains a 
cluster of four respondents: Omega Society? Hard-Liners, 
Ltd.; Smith and Co., CPAs; and the FASB. 
Keep in mind that subjects which plot together hold 
similar positions; and vice versa. The obvious retort to 
this statement is: "Similar positions on what?" The next 
step, then, is to locate (if possible) that individual 
question (or questions) for which all the subjects in 
Cluster 1 held identical positions. But in addition, the 
subjects in Cluster 1 must hold diametrically opposed 
positions to those in Cluster 2. This is because these 
two clusters anchor opposite ends of the horizontal axis. 
Suppose that all the subjects in Cluster 1 argued for 
across-the-board capitalization for R and D charges in 
their letters. Perhaps each of them felt that there are 
some initial outlays which may not pay off immediately. 
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but which are still necessary in order to fine-tune an 
eventually marketable product. (For Earnest Products/ 
this could be test-marketing of an item which ended up 
being altered radically in response to suggestions from 
consumer focus groups.) The essence of such arguments is 
that these initial outlays should be deferred and attached 
to those of the ultimate successful end product. In 
short: all the subjects in Cluster 1 answered "yes" to the 
policy question, "Should research and development outlays 
be capitalized?" 
In contrast. Omega, Hard-Liners and Smith and Co. 
all forcefully defended immediate expensing instead. In 
other words, they answered "no" to the question posed 
above. They felt that this accounting treatment was in 
keeping with both conservatism and the matching principle. 
This is because such charges do not lead to clearly 
definable future economic benefits. 
As Figure 7 shows, the FASB also plots with the trio 
in Cluster 3. This exactly corresponds to its final 
ruling. In Statement 2, it stated that all R and D 
outlays must be expensed as incurred. 
What about the centrally located duo in Cluster 2? 
Assume that both of their responses were a bit more 
complicated than "yes" or "no." For instance. Realist 
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might have said, “Direct start-up costs related to 
identifiable contracts should definitely be deferred. But 
other joint costs assignable to the totality of the 
research lab should be written off right away." Upon 
careful reading of such a reply, we might properly 
classify it as “neutral" with regard to the issue at hand. 
This is because the response basically boils down to, 
"'Yes' for some types of costs; but 'no* for others." 
Thus, we can see that the graphical output of MDS has 
faithfully reproduced the correspondence between 
similarity of original opinions and fitted" spatial 
distances. The "yes" subjects have indeed plotted 
together (Cluster 1), as have the "no" subjects (Cluster 
2). But these two opposing clusters are maximally 
separated by the horizontal dimension. Likewise, the 
"neutral" subjects occupy a central position with respect 
to this axis. 
Based on this pattern, we may label the horizontal 
axis as a "capitalize-vs.-expense" dimension. Also, as we 
scan the axis from left to right, we may observe a 
corporate-to-accounting continuum in general. This makes 
intuitive sense; corporate entities would probably argue 
against lump-sum expensing because of the resulting 
impairment of their reported profits. Accounting 
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entities, on the other hand, can "afford" to support more 
theoretical concerns, such as conservatism and 
matching—both of which would dictate immediate expensing. 
MDS has no assumptions in place with respect to 
required minimum sample sizes. Thus a scaling could in 
fact be performed with just these ten subjects. But the 
larger the overall sample size, the greater the stability 
of the derived solution. 
The actual dimensions will also vary with regard to 
how well they separate the points according to the 
monotonicity constraint. Referring back to Figure 7, we 
may observe that Dimension 1 does a much better job in 
this regard than Dimension 2. 
A few comments are now in order concerning which 
particular MDS computer package to use. Basically there 
are six popular versions of the algorithm used to perform 
the iterative minimization procedure between observed and 
fitted distances. Schiffman, Reynolds and Young (1981) 
have published an excellent chart to help users decide 
which package would be best for any given research design. 
Brown used ALSCAL for his study and extensively discussed 
the similarity of results obtained thereby to those of 
INDSCAL. 
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In the present study# the KYST-2 package (Kruskal, 
Young and Seery, 1978) was used# after confirming that it 
produces essentially the same results as ALSCAL. For one 
thing, Schiffman, et. al., point out that for non-metric 
scalings, the resultant stimulus spaces are highly similar 
under KYST, ALSCAL and POLYCON. In fact, according to 
these authors, the only advantage of ALSCAL is that it 
allows both metric and non-metric scaling. But our 
purpose here is simply to preserve the rank orders of the 
original data via the categorical coding scheme of 
pairwise comparisons. This "metric" advantage of ALSCAL is 
thus irrelevant in the present context. 
The authors go on to assert that for "Classical 
Multidimensional Scaling" (CMDS), the output from KYST is 
no different from that of ALSCAL or POLYCON. CMDS is the 
most basic type of scaling, whereby all possible pairs of 
stimuli (here, the FASB and its constituents) are compared 
and plotted in a single perceptual space. That is, the 
input data (pairwise codes for all respondents) takes the 
form of a square or triangular matrix. (The alternative 
• 
is a rectangular matrix, for more complex multiway 
comparisons among stimuli.) The former two options are 
exactly the mode of data aggregation used in the present 
study. Therefore, KYST-2 should perform at least as well 
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for our purposes as any other package. 
In fact, this equivalence was demonstrated by 
replicating Brown's results for his original sample, DM 1, 
using KYST-2 instead of ALSCAL. Except for rotation, both 
configurations were identical. As a result of these 
theoretical assurances and the replicational success, 
KYST-2 was used for the balance of this research study. 
A couple of comments are necessary regarding the 
options contained in this package. First of all, keep in 
mind the meaning of "non-metric" in the context of MDS: 
only the rank order of the data is being preserved. But 
KYST-2 needs to know the direction of this ranking as 
well. Looking back at the pairwise-comparison matrix in 
Figure 6, we see that the more dissimilar any two subjects 
are, the higher the code assigned. (The largest possible 
difference, "yes-vs.-no," gets a code of 9.) Thus, the 
correct regression option for KYST-2 here is monotone 
ascending. 
The other decision to be made is what to do with ties 
in the data. (A large number is expected in this case, 
given the limited number of coding input variables.) If 
we allow ties to be broken, we could generate a good 
mathematical fit artificially. This is because the 
constraint on preserving tied original proximities is 
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being arbitrarily overridden. It will be ignored by the 
program as it rearranges the configuration of points at 
each step. To prevent this, the ties will be kept tied in 
this study. 
KYST-2 provides a wide variety of output. Here, the 
Euclidean distances and the elbow curves will be obtained 
for each DM which is analyzed. 
Before proceeding to the actual statistical analysis, 
one final point needs to be raised: the issue of 
interjudge reliability. Ideally more than one person 
should read these comment letters and classify the 
respondents' positions. In this manner, the extent of 
rating agreement can be directly determined. This is 
especially important because the individual who selects 
the list of policy issues to be included is considered 
"biased" if he is the only one coding the opinions on 
these issues as well. 
Several statistical reliability measures exist for 
determining the extent of convergence of judges' 
decisions. For instance, a number of variants of Cohen's 
kappa may be calculated in the case of two raters. For 
more than two judges, a probabilistic model of interjudge 
reliability has been developed (Dillon and Madden, 1983). 
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However, the reliability of this study is virtually 
self-evident, due to the identical set-up of most 
respondents' letters in directly addressing each question. 
These letters are typically divided into two sections: a 
general discussion of the authors' philosophy concerning 
the broad accounting topic under consideration; and a 
point-by-point reply to at least some of the questions 
which appeared in the front of the DM. For the latter, 
the author usually reprints each question verbatim and 
then responds directly below. There could be a 
"yes";"no"; and/or a short rationale which may indicate a 
"neutral" response. As a result, the correct code was 
readily discernible in the vast majority of letters read. 
This format of responses implies a high interjudge 
reliability by its very nature. Rather than 
mathematically reproduce such obvious results, attention 
was focused instead on the more basic follow-up tests of 
subgroup-FASB alignment. 
The following chapter presents the MDS results and 
interpretation for the nine included DMs. The Euclidean 
distances between the FASB and each subject are obtained 
from all these scalings. They, in turn, will become the 
primary basis of testing for the differences in 
sub-group/FASB alignment just described. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Introductory Comments 
The previous chapter described two research 
objectives which deal with the relative placement of 
sample subjects. First of all, we wish to identify 
clusters of respondents (accounting and corporate) who 
hold similar positions on select accounting policy issues. 
Next, we wish to locate the corresponding position of the 
FASB, relative to these subjects, by comparing its 
ultimate decision to the written suggestions of the 
former. Finally, we would like to be able to identify 
those issues which generate notable spread or polarization 
among these various subjects. 
Multidimensional scaling can be used to provide 
graphical answers to research questions such as these. 
The following nine sub-sections of this chapter consist of 
scalings performed within nine DM topic areas. Brown's 
policy questions will be scaled separately for all DMs in 
which the additional list contains more than just a single 
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question. (The only exceptions turned out to be DM 1 and 
DM 3. For these, the entire set will be scaled as a 
secondary step.) Because there are nine essentially 
"different" topics, each set of graphical results will be 
immediately followed by an interpretation section. These 
nine sections, in turn, will be followed by a series of 
aggregate tests. 
Discussion Memo 1^ 
Research and development costs. The first issue to be 
analyzed, DM 1, concerns the proper accounting treatment 
for research and development (R and D) expenditures. This 
question touches upon a far more basic accounting dilemma: 
when exactly does a bona fide "asset" come into being? 
Large sums of money may be routinely spent on basic and 
applied research projects. Yet, their exact relationship 
to a clearly definable 'end product' is often 
unpredictable. Should these groundwork expenditures be 
deferred and capitalized, in the hope that they will 
eventually lead to something profitable? Or should they 
instead be expensed as incurred, in keeping with the 
principle of conservatism? 
Furthermore, R and D is highly susceptible to virtual 
overnight obsolescence. Yesterday's highly touted 
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scientific breakthrough can easily be displaced by today's 
more modern technology. How should this be recognized in 
the financial statements? Separate disclosure? 
Guidelines for ultimate write-off? Special asset 
category? Some/all of the above? 
R and D is therefore subject to the pervasive and 
often contradictory forces of three prominent accounting 
principles: cost, matching, and conservatism. We shall 
return to these issues in quite a few other forms, among 
them leasing and accounting for the extractive industries. 
In the first part of the analysis. Brown's original 
four questions will be scaled. As it turns out, the 
independently generated list of issues contained one 
additional question. This will be added to the original 
set in a follow-up scaling, to see if it emerges as an 
interpretable dimension. 
Figure 8 contains the point scatter which corresponds 
to the first pairwise combination of axes. Dimensions 1 
and 2. The associated stress value is 
0.0410—good-to-excellent, according to Kruskal. Subjects 
which plot relatively close together are grouped by 
contour lines. These groupings often reveal 
similar-interest clusterings of respondents. Also, their 
dispersion throughout the surface may yield clues as to 
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the interpretability of their underlying dimensions. 
The contours identified in Figure 8 contain several 
notable groupings. Perhaps the most prominent of these is 
located in the northeast (first) quadrant. Here we see 
the FASB overlapping with three accounting subjects: the 
Big 8 firms of Touche Ross and Peat Marwick, as well as 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA). Note that all of these points have coordinate 
values of (0.495,0.646). In addition, three corporate 
subjects plot in the exact same position: Eli Lilly* 
Masonite, and International Harvester. In relatively 
close proximity, we find the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA). Thus, this is a tight but 
heterogeneous cluster, made up of roughly equal numbers of 
accounting and non-accounting subjects. 
To its south, we can observe a second overlapping 
contingent of points. Six respondents share the (0.752, 
-0.328) spot: Arthur Andersen, Price Waterhouse, Coopers 
and Lybrand, the Financial Executives Institute, Edison 
Electric and G.D.Searle. The outer contour contains one 
accounting and one corporate subject: Haskins and Sells 
and Rockwell, respectively. This cluster, though somewhat 
larger than the first, appears to be nearly as mixed in 
terms of subjects' affiliations. 
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The subjects in the left half of the space, in 
contrast, are fewer in number and more scattered. 
Quadrant 3 contains one overlapping corporate pair: 
Marriott and Trans America. Directly above it we see the 
assorted trio of Arthur Young, the American Accounting 
Association (AAA), and TRW. (No coincident points may be 
found in the fourth quadrant.) 
What can such heterogeneous clusterings tell us about 
alignment on policy issues? Subjects' opinions evidently 
did not split along lines of affiliation. That is, there 
are at least three distinct subgroups in this sample: 
Big-8 accounting firms; professional financial reporting 
societies; and industrial representatives. Yet, most 
clusters contained a balanced mix of all these types. 
Note, for example, that three of the four quadrants 
contained at least two of the Big 8. The professional 
reporting associations, too, are scattered throughout all 
four quadrants. 
This results differs from one of Brown's key findings 
with respect to DM 1. Recall that he discovered a clear 
accounting/non-accounting separation along the horizontal 
axis of his two-dimensional solution. The same cannot be 
said of this study, as the above comments illustrate. 
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Now that the overall scatter has been evaluated, can 
anything be said about the dimensions themselves? Which 
issue(s) appear to underlie the separation of respondents 
which has been observed? 
A glance at the space reveals that the vertical axis 
(Dimension 2) provides the greater spread. Inland Steel 
and Ernst and Ernst are extreme values in the bottom 
portion of the map. Directly opposite subjects at the 
other end include A.T.and T., 3M, and the FASB cluster 
noted earlier. The objective, then, is to identify the 
question(s), if any, on which these two camps took 
diametrically opposed positions. 
As it turns out, this axis seems to capture the very 
first policy issue. It asks whether the FASB ought to be 
content with very broad guidelines for R and D, as opposed 
to prescribing piecemeal, per-industry rulings. 
Those subjects who favored broad guidelines cited the 
virtually limitless types of R and D outlays which could 
occur. According to them, it would be impossible for the 
Board to come up with an exhaustive catalog of all such 
possibilities. In their opinion, there ought to be room 
for the exercise of individual judgment. General rules 
should suffice for this purpose, and above all should 
promote consistency in expense classification (a goal 
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repeatedly cited by the Big 8). Subjects who answered 
"yes" to this question include A.T. and T., 3M, Eli 
Lilly# Touche Ross, and the AICPA. Note that all these 
points appear in the top half of the space. 
However, the letter of Inland Steel stands out in 
marked contrast from the rest. It called for the 
development of explicit, industry-specific guidelines. 
Though admittedly time-consuming, this approach above all 
others helps insure consistency among company statements. 
But just as importantly, such detailed rules would provide 
sorely needed guidance to industries struggling to comply 
with reporting rules. Broad guidelines, on the other 
hand, could be too vague to apply easily. As can be seen. 
Inland Steel occupies an exteme position in the bottom 
half of the space. 
Another subject plotting in close proximity is the 
Big-8 firm of Ernst and Ernst. In its letter, it 
cautioned that the setting of guidelines inevitably 
touches off a conflict between flexibility and possible 
loss of credibility to the profession. That is, general 
guidelines do permit individual discretion, as noted 
earlier. Yet by implicitly tolerating too many 
alternative ways of reporting, the ability of the 
policy-making body to make rules is called into question. 
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Though Ernst and Ernst grudgingly acknowledged the 
impracticality of too many individual rules, its position 
is far less extreme than that of its accounting 
colleagues. 
Recall the FASB's position in the top half of the 
space. It clusters along with certain accounting and 
industrial subjects who voted for general guidelines. As 
it turned out, the Board ended up agreeing that broad 
rules would suffice. Paragraph 8 of Statement 2 
("Accounting for Research and Development Costs") sets 
forth all-encompassing, abstract definitions of both 
"research" and "development" activities. (Examples of 
each are also provided for purely illustrative purposes.) 
This explains the FASB's plot with respect to the vertical 
axis. 
The next pairwise space depicts the same sort of 
heterogeneous clusters. In this map. Dimension 3 appears 
as the y-axis. Once again, we find several overlapping 
groups which contain both accounting and industrial 
subjects (Quadrants 1 and 2). In fact, the cluster which 
is just to the right of the origin contains half of all 
the Big-8 firms, as well as the AICPA and the FASB. But, 
as before, these accounting subjects are joined by 
corporate colleagues: Masonite, Eli Lilly, and 
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International Harvester, in this case. The same mixing 
characterizes the other contours identified on the map. 
Thus, this pairwise-axis scatter also fails to reveal 
Brown's hypothesized accounting/non-accounting subdivision 
of the space. 
Although both axes provided reasonably good spread in 
this case, no additional policy issues were discernible as 
underlying dimensions. The vertical axis seems to be a 
nothing more than a rotated version of the "guidelines" 
question—especially since Inland Steel once more emerges 
as an extremist. 
At this point, a second difference with respect to 
Brown's results needs to be noted. Brown identified 
another issue as a dimension: the rather pivotal question 
of whether R and D costs should be expensed as incurred. 
However, this question failed to emerge in the present 
analysis. 
The reason for this is relatively straightforward: 
the issue was simply not "controversial" in terms of MDS. 
T^iat is, every single respondent said either "yes" or 
"maybe" (my special "neutral" category). No one supported 
unequivocal capitalization; thus, not a single "no" 
response was coded. As a result, the issue did not 
provide enough inter-subject separation to constitute an 
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axis in its own right. 
Despite its apparent lack of statistical import, this 
central accounting question will be briefly discussed. A 
few common themes were evident in the letters of subjects 
who favored immediate expensing. They focused on the 
notion of "future economic benefits," a theoretical 
prerequisite to asset recognition. At the time many R and 
D outlays occur, it is simply impossible to tell whether 
or not they will eventually culminate in a usable product 
or service. Under such circumstances, the principle of 
conservatism dictates that these outlays should be treated 
as "period costs"; e.g., written off. 
Another way to look at the argument is in terms of 
the desirable accounting goals of comparability and 
consistency. Attempting to forecast the ultimate success 
of basic, generalized R and D outlays results in 
unreliable and subjective estimates at best. Given the 
variety of ways in which such projections might be made, 
the financial statements of different companies in the 
same industry might not be directly comparable. But by 
narrowing down the possible choices of accounting 
treatment (in the case of expensing, to just one 
alternative), users may have much more confidence in the 
process of evaluating one set of financial results against 
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another. An important source of "noise," or variability, 
has in effect been partialled out. Better (that is, more 
internally valid) financial decisions could well result. 
Some accounting and corporate respondents became a 
bit paranoid about one hypothetical side effect of a 
capitalization policy. They noted that current tax law 
allows deductibility of R and D expenditures. But if the 
FASB were to allow deferral instead, they feared that tax 
accounting would soon follow suit by disallowing this 
lucrative deduction. The end result, in their opinion, 
would surely be a drastic cutback in research activities; 
and, therefore, a slowdown in technological advances. 
Other respondents, while agreeing with the above 
arguments, also thought there were situations which 
clearly called for cost deferral. They supported a 
"selective capitalization" policy for outlays which were 
clearly linked to identifiable products, services, and/or 
customers' orders. Several of the Big 8 recommended 
classification of such costs in the balance sheet as 
"deferred charges" with periodic amortization to cost of 
goods sold. The Financial Executives Institute cited 
"engineering development charges" as one example of 
inventoriable claims, while Trans America mentioned 
start-up costs. The latter subject suggested that 
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deferral would also be more in line with product 
management activities. That is, pricing policies would be 
more likely to include an adequate cushion of return on 
investment if such necessary outlays did not "disappear" 
from the divisional contribution-margin reports via a 
one-shot write-off. 
The FASB weighed these opinions but opted for the 
conservative and expedient approach. Paragraph 12 of 
Statement 2 requires that R and D costs be expensed as 
incurred. 
The last two of Brown's questions likewise failed to 
generate much controversy. The first asked whether R and 
D should include only direct costs. Subjects were 
virtually unanimous in suggesting that R and D also 
include a "reasonable allocation" of such traceable 
indirect charges as factory overhead. Precedent was 
apparently on their minds: they reminded the FASB that 
such practice is followed in cost accounting for 
inventory. However, nearly all were opposed to the 
allocation of general and administrative charges. As 
Coopers and Lybrand put it, current generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) do not provide sufficient 
guidance to overcome the arbitrariness of such 
allocations. Furthermore, these costs were typically 
73 
reported as a lump sum, rather than being broken down, in 
conventional reporting by segments (an issue to be 
discussed in more detail in the analysis of DM 5). 
Therefore, they should not be commingled with R and D, in 
the interests of sheer consistency. The FASB 
wholeheartedly agreed and approved the inclusion of only 
direct and prorated indirect costs. 
The remaining policy issue produced a similar 
consensus of opinion. It asked whether R and D should be 
separately disclosed in the financial statement. 
All the accounting subjects favored not just separate 
disclosure, but also its segregation into capitalized (if 
permitted) and expensed subtotals. A number of subjects 
referred specifically to the existing disclosure criteria 
set forth in APB No, 22, suggesting that they also be 
extended to R and D. If feasible, outlays should be 
reported per product line or project. 
A few corporate subjects chose to address only the 
capitalize-vs.-expense issue in their letters of comment. 
Thus, they omitted the secondary issue of mode of 
disclosure. However, those which did address the latter 
basically reiterated the above suggestions. They did not 
agree on the precise nature of the disclosure. Their 
comments ranged from separate line item (if total is 
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material), all the way to simple footnoting. 
Only one special-interest respondent hedged its 
opinion on this issue. General Mills felt that the 
decision to disclose R and D outlays should be left 
entirely to management's discretion. Its reason: 
"competitive advantage" might be lost if the company were 
compelled to give detailed descriptions of its R and D 
activities. (This particular argument cropped up much 
more frequently with respect to segment disclosures, 
however. This will be elaborated in the forthcoming 
analysis of DM 5.) 
The FASB stated that R and D disclosures are to be 
made for each reporting period. These of course refer to 
expensed amounts, as deferral was not permitted by 
Statement 2^. 
Thus far, the scaling of Brown's questions has 
produced a couple of significant results. The question on 
policy guidelines for research and development costs 
provided the best separation among respondents. We also 
noted the emergence of some highly concentrated, yet quite 
heterogeneous, clusters. Accounting firms, reporting 
societies, and industrial subjects were rather uniformly 
scattered throughout the perceptual spaces which were 
examined. The FASB appeared to group with such mixed 
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clusters in all cases. That is, it showed no propensity 
to side with any one subgroup over the rest for this 
issue. 
The extra policy list contained one additional, 
somewhat hypothetical, question. It asks whether 
capitalized R and D costs should in effect be treated in 
the exact manner as other long-lived assets, and therefore 
periodically amortized. Because there was only one 
additional question, and because the original set produced 
relatively little issue-by-issue separation, the entire 
set will be scaled as a follow-up step. 
Turning now to the first sub-space (Dimension 2 vs. 
Dimension 1, Figure 10), several distinguishing 
observations can be made about the point scatter. For one 
thing, the overlapping-point clusters are a bit smaller, 
more numerous, and more separated than before. Perhaps 
more importantly, these mini-clusters are slightly more 
homogeneous as well. 
The trio in the northeast corner, for instance, is 
entirely corporate in nature. Eli Lilly, Masonite and 
International Harvester all share the (0.840, 0.921) 
coordinate position. The central set of contours jointly 
contains six accounting-oriented subjects (including 
professional societies), as well as the FASB. Rockwell 
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and Edison Electric are the sole representatives from 
industry. Immediately to its left, we see a trio of Big-8 
firms overlapping with G.D. Searle in the (-0.751, 0.363) 
spot. The duo of Trans America and Marriott plots 
directly on the y-axis. About the only truly 
"heterogeneous" cluster is the rather spread-out grouping 
found in Quadrant 2. 
The horizontal axis (Dimension 1) seems to capture 
the question of whether deferred R and D charges should be 
systematically amortized. Though admittedly hypothetical 
in nature, this scenario in effect gently reminds the 
subjects of the reporting burdens associated with 
deferral. Chief among them is the necessity of coming up 
with a 'logical and reasonable' amortization schedule 
which 'properly' matches expired asset costs to their 
associated distinct time periods. As with other 
intangible assets, it is no easy matter to do this. 
All the Big-8 firms, as well as Inland Steel, 
answered "yes" to this question. In fact, most of them 
took this opportunity to reiterate their previous 
positions against arbitrary capitalization. They referred 
generally to the existence of future economic benefits 
and/or linkage to a specific productive output as 
prerequisites for R and D deferral. 
77 
Many of these respondents simply advised the "use of 
the matching principle" in their letters, without being 
more specific. However, a few of them produced more 
concrete examples as to how it should be implemented. 
Price Waterhouse suggested "volume of products 
manufactured or services offered" as a base, akin to 
units-of-output depreciation for plant assets. The AICPA 
advised making an estimate of the useful life of the 
end-result of the R and D expenditure; e.g., an improved 
machine or perhaps a patent. 
But perhaps the most futuristic approach came from 
Peat Marwick. It rejected unitized methods, such as the 
two above, as ignoring the time value of money. Instead, 
it proposed estimating the present value of future cash 
inflows expected to result from technological advances. 
The associated R and D costs should be periodically 
written down by some fraction of the remaining unamortized 
balance, divided by the total present value of cash flows. 
(The latter should, of course, be updated as estimates are 
revised.) 
Obviously, this suggestion digs deeper than the mere 
classification of R and D expenditures. Peat Marwick 
appears instead to be challenging the unit of measure used 
in the financial statements, particularly the 
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appropriateness of historical-cost dollars. (This issue 
will be examined more fully in the analysis of DM 2: 
"General Price Level Changes.") 
Despite their advocacy of amortization plans for 
deferred R and D charges, most respondents also urged 
immediate write-off of such costs upon obsolescence. This 
makes sense in terms of both the matching and conservatism 
principles, for at such a point, no future economic 
benefits are expected. All of these subjects can be found 
in the left-hand side of the space. 
They are balanced, however, by some "no" votes. 
Among the latter we find Eli Lilly, 3M, International 
Harvester, and Masonite—all of whom plot in the right 
half of the map. 
A couple of these "no's" are simply an echo of the 
blanket opposition to deferral mentioned before: most 
notably. Masonite and International Harvester. In fact, 
the latter respondent referred to the difficulty in having 
auditors certify such deferrals and write-offs. 3M 
specifically mentioned the practical difficulty in 
matching costs to benefits precisely. It also 
re—expressed its fear of losing the R and D tax deduction 
because of a possible FASB approval of deferral. Eli 
Lilly agreed that amortization schedules for such 
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intangibles would probably be arbitrary at best. 
As noted before, the FASB effectively sidestepped 
this whole thorny issue by requiring expensing across the 
board. This explains its somewhat middle position with 
respect to the x-axis. 
At long last, one of Brown's key results emerges with 
respect to the next pair of axes. Figure 11 shows 
Dimension 3 vs. Dimension 1. 
An accounting-to-industry separation is somewhat 
discernible in scanning this space from left to right. 
Note, for example, that five of the Big-8 firms cluster 
together in the central contour on the left. Three 
professional societies may also be found in the left half. 
In contrast, it contains only three corporate subjects. 
But the right side appears to be composed mainly of 
industrial representatives. The only exceptions are two 
professional societies (the Financial Analysts Federation 
and the American Accounting Association), plus the sole 
accounting firm of Arthur Young. While the FASB is also 
in the right half of the map, it is very near the origin 
(x-coordinate value of 0.141). Thus, there appears to be 
a common-interest type of continuum. 
The analysis of DM 1 may be summarized in the 
following manner. Initial scaling of Brown's questions 
80 
produced tight but heterogeneous subject clusters. No 
common-interest segregation was evident, either in the 
groupings themselves or their relative positions on the 
maps. 
A second indicator of this mix of respondents is 
their relatively close agreement on most of Brown’s 
questions. The only issue to yield graphically 
significant separation was the question of scope of R and 
D guidelines. Even here, however, only two subjects (one 
from accounting and the other from industry) differed 
noticeably from the rest of the sample. 
The key accounting question of whether R and D should 
be expensed did not emerge as a distinct dimension, unlike 
Brown's results. The present study utilizes a more 
refined categorical coding scheme (a distinct neutral 
category). This may explain the difference, as most 
respondents had mixed opinions on this particular issue. 
They either favored capitalization only under certain 
well-defined conditions, or not at all. As a result, 
inter-subject distances on this question were relatively 
small or nonexistent. 
One additional policy issue was coded in the second 
phase of the analysis. It dealt with the desirability of 
amortizing deferred R and D charges. This issue was 
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discernible as an MDS dimension, as was just shown. In 
one sense, it taps a facet of the pivotal 
capitalize-vs.-expense question above. This is because it 
deals with the follow-up disposition of those R and D 
costs which are not immediately written off. Indeed, 
quite a few respondents reinterpreted the broader issue at 
this point, in particular those who answered "no." 
Finally, the expanded set of issues produced slightly 
less concentrated but more homogeneous respondent 
groupings. An accounting/industry separation of one 
particular sub-space was also identified. 
Discussion Memo 2 
Accounting for general price level changes. The analysis 
of Discussion Memo 2 ("General Price Level Changes") will 
be done in three phases. In the first two parts. Brown's 
original policy questions will be analyzed. A distinct 
ambiguity in the first (and perhaps most basic) of these 
questions will be identified. This problem will be linked 
to the rather marginal fit obtained in Part One. While 
purely mathematical measures to improve the fit are taken 
in Part Two, the fundamental theoretical confusion in this 
policy question of course remains unresolved. Lastly, the 
analysis will be re-run using a more precise wording of 
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this basic policy issue. The results show not only an 
improvement in stress over the Brown list, but a clearer 
interpretation of the map in terms of this question as 
well. 
A "fair" level of stress (0.1173) is attained in 
three dimensions. While certainly acceptable, this fit is 
notably worse than its three-dimensional counterpart in 
Discussion Memo 1 (0.0679). 
What can account for this problem? For one thing, a 
greater number of policy issues were scaled for the 
general price level Discussion Memo than for research and 
development costs (seven vs. four, respectively). This 
is entirely appropriate, given the nature of the two topic 
areas. Certainly, the impact of inflation on the 
purchasing power of the dollar is a more pervasive issue 
than the proper disposition of research costs. As a 
result, the problem of reporting for general price level 
changes invariably generates more controversy from a wider 
cross-section of respondents. 
The basic difficulty, however, is compounded by 
Brown's very first policy issue. The exact wording of 
this question is as follows: "Should reporting of the 
effects of general price level changes be required as 
supplemental information to the conventional 
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historical-cost financial statements?" 
This question is not only premature; it confounds two 
distinct financial-reporting issues as well. For one 
thing, it seems meaningless to ask constituents what form 
general price level (GPL) accounting should take, before 
asking them if they would find such accounting information 
useful to begin with. Indeed, several letter-writers 
commented on this very problem. It also resulted in a 
coding dilemma. That is, a handful of subjects who for 
various reasons stated that GPL information was "not 
useful" (to be discussed later) simply ignored the balance 
of Brown's questions. (This was especially true of the 
special-interest sub-sample.) This plethora of missing 
values further contributed to the mediocre fit. However, 
the three-dimensional solution did produce some 
interesting outcomes and so will be briefly discussed. 
Finally, the question, as originally stated, seems to 
be addressing two different policy questions; e.g., 
1. Should GPL information be required? 
2. Should GPL disclosures, if required, be 
supplementary in nature (as opposed to integrated 
into the body of the financial statements)? 
An examination of the letters of comment revealed 
that responses varied widely, depending on the way in 
which subjects interpreted this question. Adding this to 
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the above "usefulness" dilemma, it is easy to see how the 
hodgepodge of answers could become incomparable. 
The vertical axis of Figure 12 (Dimension 2) contains 
the FASB at one extreme, and two 
financial-reporting-oriented respondents (Touche Ross and 
the Financial Executives Institute) at the other. This 
dimension seems to capture the question of whether GPL 
reporting should apply to all entities. Both Touche Ross 
and the FEI felt that inflation adjustments must be made 
by all preparers of financial statements. The FASB, 
however, restricted the reporting requirement to public 
enterprises meeting certain rigid "size" tests with 
respect to property, plant, and equipment or other assets 
(see Statement 33). Three years later, in Statement 54, 
the Board also specifically exempted investment companies 
from the GPL reporting requirement. 
Other special-interest subjects proposed their own 
restrictions for GPL reporting. These include SEC filers; 
non-government entities; and those companies which are not 
closely held. 
The National Association of Accountants, in contrast, 
chose to express no opinion, as its task force was 
deadlocked on the entire issue. This corresponds to its 
dead-center position on the y-axis. 
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Do the clusters of respondents themselves possess any 
distinct patterns? The horizontal axis (Dimension 1) of 
Figure 13 reveals a noteworthy grouping similar to 
Brown's. Note that the left-hand cluster contains six of 
the Big-8 accounting firms. along with two professional 
societies (the AICPA and the American Accounting 
Association). 
The only private-industry respondent in this grouping 
is Commonwealth Edison. In contrast, its mirror-image 
right-hand cluster is comprised of seven corporate 
subjects, plus one Big-8 respondent (Touche Ross). Also 
in close proximity, and near the origin, we see the FASB 
and the National Association of Accountants. 
These results parallel Brown's recurrent 
attestor-preparer clusters, respectively. Furthermore, 
the FASB-NAA proximity supports his theory that the Board 
is likely to reflect the supposedly user-oriented 
preferences of this professional organization. (Note, in 
general, the preponderance of corporate members in the 
NAA.) A somewhat similar pattern of separation—perhaps 
not as clear-cut—can be seen on the horizontal dimension 
of Figure 12. 
Unfortunately, though, this dimension eludes the 
distinct interpretability of the axis which was just 
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discussed. Recall that the rather borderline stress of 
the three-dimensional fit is a hint of a poor 
correspondence between proximities and fitted distances. 
This may be due to the inherent ambiguity in Brown's first 
question, as was discussed earlier. Subjects essentially 
interpreted this question in one of three alternative 
ways; thus, the response patterns themselves were equally 
diverse. As a third and final step, this question will be 
disaggregated into these three components, and the letters 
re-coded. 
However, before overhauling Brown's policy list in 
this manner, a simpler mathematical remedy will be 
attempted. Recall that goodness of fit should increase 
with the number of dimensions retained. Would an 
additional dimension provide a more interpretable scatter 
of inter-respondent distances? 
The stress value is nearly halved (0.1174 to 0.0683) 
when a fourth axis is retained. The fit is now within 
Kruskal's "good" range. This solution will be examined to 
see if it yields any additional insights. 
In fact, the vertical axis in Figure 14 taps an 
important question in GPL implementation: the "proper" 
choice of inflation index to be applied to the 
historical-cost accounting figures. Touche Ross (top half 
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of the space) favored the Gross National Product (GNP) 
deflator, as did a number of other respondents. 
Primarily, it was perceived as a familiar, commonly used 
index of U.S. macro-economic activity. 
However, the broad-based nature of the GNP Deflator 
proved to be both a blessing and a curse. The copious 
"market-basket" assortment of goods and services included 
in its calculation makes it appropriate for a wide variety 
of U.S. businesses. This dovetails nicely with the 
accounting principle of comparability in 
financial-statement analysis. Diverse businesses can be 
more readily evaluated side-by-side if their statements 
have been adjusted by the same all-purpose index. 
On the other hand, there is a clear danger in 
"over-averaging" such as that used to generate the GNP 
Deflator. Specific price movements can, in effect, cancel 
each other out in the process of arriving at the net 
adjustment for inflation. Yet it is just such "micro" 
price movements which might be of primary interest to 
users of financial statements, especially if they are 
contained within specific industries and do not move 
lockstep with the general level of prices. This 
"averaging" problem, by definition, plagues all price 
indices to a greater or lesser degree, naturally. In any 
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event, some respondents which opposed the GNP Deflator 
also argued for the desirability of alternative forms of 
reporting, such as "current value" or "replacement cost." 
The FASB's "outlier" position (bottom portion of the 
vertical axis in Figure 14) may be explained by its 
outright rejection of the GNP Deflator. In Statement 33, 
it required the use of the Consumer Price Index for Urban 
Consumers (CPI-C). And recognizing the growing 
multinational nature of many corporate entities, it 
established separate adjustment procedures in Statement 70 
for those foreign-based operations whose functional 
currency happens to be something other than the U.S. 
dollar. (More on this issue in the discussion of DM 3: 
Foreign Currency Translation.) 
A few final comments about the composition of the 
clusters are in order. The right-most cluster contains 
four of the Big-8 accounting firms, with a fifth (Arthur 
Young) in close proximity. Adjacent to this is a trio of 
private-industry respondents: A.T. and T., Rockwell, and 
Gulf. And a fourth, Commonwealth Edison, is once again 
close by. Two overlapping subjects in the second quadrant 
are Texaco and the Financial Analysts Federation. A more 
homogeneous pairing in the upper right is Peat Marwick (a 
Big-8 firm) and the AICPA Once again, NAA lies near the 
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origin; recall its abstention from comment due to a 
divided task force. 
Any evidence of an "attestor-preparer" dimension 
appears somewhat weaker in this solution. Each quadrant 
contains at least one Big-8 firm and/or financial society. 
Also, the respondents are far more scattered than they 
were in Figure 13. 
In like manner, a search for similar-industry 
groupings among the special-interest respondents proved 
fruitless. The four oil-company subjects (Gulf, 
Continental, Standard Oil, and Texaco), for instance, are 
widely separated on both axes. The sole academic 
respondent (Alfred University, drawn at random) appears 
equi-distant from the two accounting and industrial 
clusters in the lower right quadrant. 
A last-ditch effort to uncover separation on Brown's 
first question at last paid off in Figure 15 (horizontal 
axis). At one end we find the pairwise groupings of four 
private-industry respondents (Inland Steel with 
Continental Oil, and Gillette with Masonite); at the 
other, two Big-8 respondents (Coopers and Lybrand and 
Arthur Young). The four corporate subjects all answered 
"no" to Brown's question (on whether GPL supplementary 
information should be required); the two accounting firms 
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responded in the affirmative. 
Again, however, we are at a loss to uncover the 
subjects' underlying interpretations of this rather 
all-inclusive question. Do they find GPL disclosures 
useful in general? Perhaps more importantly, do the 
benefits of GPL exceed its costs? (It is entirely 
possible for information such as GPL to be desired, yet 
not produced, for it is simply not cost-effective to do 
so.) Should the FASB issue a requirement with respect to 
GPL reporting? And, if so, would supplementary GPL 
disclosures suffice? 
In order to assess the salience of these fundamental 
issues to special-interest constituents, their responses 
to these four sub-component questions were separately 
scaled. The results of this final phase of analysis 
reveal not only improved fit statistics, but a much 
clearer picture of their GPL opinions as well. 
The elbow curve for these refined questions shows 
better (lower) stress values than those of Brown's 
original list, beyond the one-dimensional scaling. In 
fact, we now attain about the same fit in three dimensions 
(0.0702) that Brown's questions took four dimensions to 
reach (0.0683). Therefore, simply in terms of parsimony 
(same fit—smaller space), these amended issues provide 
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the better solution. On the other hand, the 
four-dimensional solution slices the stress value down to 
0.0354— comfortably within Kruskal's "good-to -excellent" 
range. This solution will now be discussed. 
Granted, overall fits are one thing....but is that 
catch-all question of Brown's more specifically 
interpretable now as well? According to Figure 16, the 
answer is yes. A look at the horizontal axis reveals one 
Big-8 subject (Touche Ross) diametrically opposed to a 
right-hand cluster containing Peat Marwick, Inland Steel, 
and Gulf. Closer inspection of subjects' letters of 
comment suggests that this is in fact the "usefulness" 
dimension. 
Touche Ross felt that adjustments for the general 
level of prices provides little information for cash-flow 
prediction—a critical reason why users analyze financial 
statements in the first place. "Force of habit" is a 
powerful deterrent to change as well. Gillette labelled 
GPL as too confusing a departure from conventional 
historical-cost accounting. Arthur Andersen pointed out 
that lack of user enthusiasm in the past might simply 
reflect the scarce availability of these types of special 
disclosures. 
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NAA once again did not express an opinion on this 
issue. Another professional society (FAF) noted with 
alarm the accelerating rate of inflation in the U.S. 
during the early '70's and conceded that some sort of GPL 
adjustment would eventually need to be made. FAF also 
suggested, however, that before a final pronouncement is 
issued, the FASB ought to commission a study of the 
effects of inflation on stock prices and profitability for 
those companies which are either capital-intensive or have 
slow inventory turnover. Eli Lilly urged further studies 
of user needs with" respect to GPL disclosures—more 
specifically, its effects on financial decisions and 
especially the 'costs' of misuse through user confusion 
about what these numbers really mean. (Typically, the 
most frequently cited misinterpretation of GPL adjustments 
is in mistaking them for indicators of value —e.g., 
"current cost" or "replacement cost".) This "undecided" 
cluster appears just to the right of the origin. 
The hard-core advocates of GPL usefulness generally 
stress the way in which inflation distorts conventional 
historical-dollar amounts. The statements, in effect, 
contain a jumble of assets purchased at different times 
and, thus, different 'real' prices. Corporate performance 
over time is obscured by the confounding element of change 
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in the overall price level. As Gulf Oil (a member of this 
affirmative cluster) points out, GPL adjustment better 
standardizes the "true" unit of measure. It also enables 
users of financial statements to make better-informed 
capital budgeting decisions. Lastly, managers can assess 
the impact of price-level movements on divisional product 
performance. 
How can the FASB's position on the "usefulness" issue 
be characterized? In Statement 33, it acknowledged the 
impact of changing prices on such key user concerns as 
cash-flow assessment, enterprise profit performance, and 
capital maintenance. Nonetheless, in the very same 
document it reaffirmed its basic belief that the financial 
statements should continue to be prepared on a 
historical-cost basis. The FASB cited the independent 
verifiability of historical-dollar totals, as well as the 
fact that such amounts usually result from "arms'-length" 
bargaining processes between buyers and sellers. Finally/ 
it acknowledged the argument cited by some respondents, 
concerning user familiarity with historical costs. 
As a result,the FASB's position can best be described 
as "neutral." The Board eventually settled these issues 
through the limited disclosures described earlier. 
Furthermore, in Statement 39, it expressed some misgivings 
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relative to the usefulness of GPL disclosures in the oil 
and gas industry. The exemption awarded to investment 
companies has already been noted. However, disclosures 
remain mandated for companies meeting the "size" tests 
listed in Statement 33. All this is graphically indicated 
by its generally middle position (but in the positive 
half) on the "usefulness" dimension. 
The only other significant dimension to emerge is the 
"should GPL be required" issue. (This was already 
discussed in the analysis of Brown's original questions; 
please refer back to Figure 12 and the accompanying 
narrative.) 
How, then, can these results be summarized? 
Respondents to DM 2 are primarily concerned with the 
underlying usefulness of GPL disclosures. A second, 
related area of interest is whether such disclosures 
should apply across the board to all entities. The form 
of such disclosures (supplemental vs. integrated) is 
apparently not as important, since it did not emerge as a 
significant dimension in any of the three scalings. 
Similarly, the cost-benefit issue did not generate notable 
controversy when separately examined. 
In the original analysis (Brown's questions), an 
issue of GPL implementation emerged: the proper choice of 
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adjusting index. The FASB ended up taking a position 
which was diametrically opposed to that of all the sample 
respondents; its outlier status was uncovered and 
explained. 
Lastly, an attestor-preparer dimension was 
discernible in Brown's initial (and somewhat marginal) 
three-dimensional solution. However, the underlying basis 
for this separation was not readily interpretable. 
Moreover, the attestor-preparer clustering was not as 
evident in both the improved-fit (four-dimensional) 
solution and the disaggregated-issue scaling. 
Discussion Memo 3 
Accounting for foreign currency translation. The foreign 
currency translation issue, which will be analyzed next, 
is a fine example of policymakers' yielding to both users' 
wishes and economic reality. The FASB (in Statement 8) 
initially prescribed a laundry list of detailed (and, 
admittedly, often arbitrary) classifications of exactly 
which financial-statement items should be adjusted for 
changes in the exchange rate. Further, a strictly 
"U.S.-dollar mentality" produced problems for those 
companies whose foreign branches conducted all their 
business in some other currency. Fluctuations in the 
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exchange rate ended up being recognized in their current 
income. Yet these accounting gains and losses had no 
basis in the day-to-day business affairs of these foreign 
extensions, since they would never have occasion to deal 
in dollars to begin with. 
The FASB substantially modified its stance with 
regard to both of these problems in a new pronouncement, 
issued six years later. Statement 52 greatly simplified 
reporting procedures for businesses whose "functional 
currency" is not the dollar. Exchange gains and losses of 
the type just described would not be immediately taken up 
into income. Rather, they would now be accumulated in a 
separate section of stockholders' equity and recognized 
only upon liquidation of the foreign component (at which 
point, presumably, U.S. dollars would finally change 
hands). The treatment of income-statement and 
balance-sheet items was greatly streamlined as well—all 
were simply converted at the current rate. 
If, however, the foreign branch turned out to be 
little more than a 'clearinghouse' for American 
transactions and orders, then the "functional currency 
was still actually the U.S. dollar. Under these 
circumstances, any changes in the exchange rate do 
substantially affect the operations of this branch and 
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must be immediately recognized. For these companies, use 
of the rules in Statement 8 is still required. That is, 
certain accounts are converted at historical rates; and 
the resulting exchange-rate gains and losses are taken up 
into income of the period. 
The Board obviously became more flexible in its 
reconsideration of the topic area through its issuance of 
Statement 52. Multinational companies may now choose the 
rules to follow, depending on their monetary 
circumstances. As a result, the timing of their real 
gains and losses is better synchronized with reality—as 
opposed to being a meaningless bookkeeping convenience as 
before. Finally, their conversion procedures ('use 
current rate for all statement items') are now much easier 
to apply to the accounts. 
Note that Statement 52 was issued two years after 
Brown's study. Therefore, the FASB's extracted position 
on his issues is expected to differ markedly, since he had 
to use the more rigid rules of Statement 
In the first step, his original set of policy issues 
will be scaled for the special-interest respondents. The 
supplementary list contains one additional question. This 
will be added as a second step, to see whether it emerges 
as a significant dimension. 
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For this particular DM, the four-dimensional solution 
will be interpreted. Its corresponding stress value is 
0.0718—"fair to good",according to Kruskal's guidelines. 
(Brown, in contrast, chose to analyze a two-dimensional 
space which yielded a value of 0.2070. Note that this 
exceeds Kruskal's "poor" boundary.) 
The horizontal axis of Figure 17 reveals several 
distinct groupings of respondents with inherent common 
interests. To begin with, the cluster in Quadrant 2 
contains three of the Big-8 firms (Haskins and Sells; Peat 
Marwick; and Ernst and Ernst), as well as one professional 
association, the Financial Executives Institute. None of 
the corporate special-interest subjects cluster with these 
four respondents. Thus, it may be characterized as 
'accounting/financial reporting' in nature. 
A somewhat similar industrial grouping occurs in the 
central cluster (just at the left of the origin and below 
the x-axis). Three of the four oil-company subjects are 
within, or very close to, this cluster: Atlantic 
Richfield, Standard Oil of Indiana, and Texaco. The FASB 
appears within this cluster as well, along with the Big-8 
firm of Coopers and Lybrand. 
The final oil-company subject. Sun Oil, may be found 
in the upper-rightmost cluster. This group is notably 
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more diverse than the other two discussed thus far. It is 
composed of the sole representative of academe (Alfred 
University); the Big-8 firm of Price Waterhouse; and two 
industrial subjects, I.T.and T. and Sun Oil. 
The final identifiable cluster found along Dimension 
1 is almost as assorted in its content. It contains one 
reporting society (NAA), another Big-8 firm (Arthur 
Young), and a corporate subject (Dow Chemical). At its 
polar extreme (right side of Dimension 1), we see the 
AICPA plotting as an outlier and directly on this axis. 
Now that a couple of similar-preference and general 
groupings have been identified, can Dimension 1 be 
interpreted in terms of any of Brown's policy questions? 
As it turns out, this spread is due to a rather minor 
implementation issue: the "proper" treatment of preferred 
stock. Surprisingly,this question generated a great deal 
of controversy in the letters of comment —far exceeding 
that of more basic issues, such as the "correct" choice of 
currency for reporting purposes, and the disposition of 
exchange gains and losses. 
The AICPA, as well as respondents generally on the 
right-hand side of this axis, focused on the rather 
permanent nature of certain types of preferred stock. If 
it is not likely to be liquidated in the foreseeable 
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future, it essentially constitutes a non-monetary item. 
Therefore, they recommended translation at historical 
rates, in the same manner as for, say, fixed plant assets. 
The NAA, Arthur Young, and Dow all advised use of the 
current rate instead. However, none of these respondents 
gave reasons for their rationale in the letters of 
comment. 
Note that the FASB plots very near to the origin, but 
on the 'current rate' side of Dimension 1. This may be 
explained by its reconsideration of the issue, as was 
noted earlier. In Statement 52, the Board opted for the 
greater convenience and simplicity of converting all 
balance-sheet items at current rates, for those companies 
with non-dollar "functional currencies." However, the old 
rules of Statement (which required adjustment for 
non-convertible preferred stock) have been kept in place 
for multinationals whose functional currency turns out to 
be the U.S. dollar. As a result, the FASB became 
markedly more flexible with regard to both camps of 
opinion. This is reflected in its "balancing" position 
near the origin—a radical departure from Brown's results. 
(Recall that Statement 52 was issued several years after 
the completion of his study.) 
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One rather heterogeneous duo shows up with respect to 
the vertical axis: the pairing of the Financial Analysts 
Federation and Ford. Touche Ross and TRW comprise one 
extreme of this axis; General Mills, Chrysler, and Eli 
Lilly, the other. This dimension, however, eludes 
interpretation in terms of Brown's policy questions. 
A glance at Figure 18 (in which the y-axis 
constitutes Dimension 2) reveals many of the same patterns 
noted in Figure 17. Note, again, the pure accounting 
orientation of the right-most cluster on Dimension 1. 
However, an intresting change involves the new proximity 
of "academe" (Alfred University) to this practitioners' 
circle. 
Similarly, the negative end of the horizontal axis 
features the same NAA-Arthur Young-Dow Chemical trio as 
before. FASB also assumes its identical "balancing" 
position. 
On the bottom portion of Dimension 2 (y-axis), we can 
observe in close proximity the three oil subjects which 
clustered together in the first space: Atlantic Richfield, 
Standard Oil, and Texaco. Once again. Sun Oil did not 
cluster with them, but rather with I. T. and T and Price 
Waterhouse. (A newcomer to the latter cluster is the 
American Accounting Association.) 
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Despite the spread of respondents it provides. 
Dimension 2 also is uninterpretable. In other words, 
there was no policy issue for which Coopers and Lybrand 
(top half, y-axis) took a position diametrically opposed 
to that of Atlantic Richfield and Standard Oil (bottom 
half). 
A glance along the y-axis does provide moderate 
evidence of Brown's "attestor-vs.-preparer" dimension. 
The bottom portion of the space (negative y-values) 
contains only two accounting-oriented respondents, both of 
which are clustered in Quadrant 2: Price Waterhouse and 
the AAA. All the rest of the subjects in this portion of 
the axis are industrial special-interest respondents. The 
top half, in contrast, contains only four members of the 
latter category: Dow, Eli Lilly, Pepsi, and Ford. 
Symmetrically, these all appear in the fourth quadrant. 
The balance of subjects whose y-coordinates are positive 
are accounting firms and/or financial societies. As noted 
earlier, the FASB is nearly dead-center, the sole 
respondent plotting so near to the origin. 
All remaining pairwise combinations of axes were 
similarly evaluated. However, the resulting point 
scatters basically replicated the results already 
uncovered in Figures 17 and 18; or else they turned out to 
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capture the same policy question (e.g., treatment of 
preferred stock). 
The additional list of policy issues for DM 3 
contained one question which was not on Brown's original 
list. This question is as follows: "Should the 
translation of accounts be affected by changes in the 
exchange rate subsequent to the end of a period, but prior 
to the issuance of the financial statements?" 
Such fluctuations in the exchange rate could 
conceivably have a pronounced effect on net income, under 
the "old rules" of Statement 8. (Recall that gaiins and 
losses resulting therefrom had to be immediately taken up 
into income, regardless of whether the foreign branch ever 
dealt in U.S. dollars.) The question was thus considered 
relevant and worthy of inclusion in the policy list. The 
same respondents' letters were rescaled with respect to 
this question and the entire analysis was rerun. 
Once again, the four-dimensional solution yielded a 
fit in the "fair-to-good" range. The stress value is 
0.0700—virtually identical to its first-half counterpart 
of 0.0718. 
These results yielded an unexpected twist. An 
additional interpretable dimension emerged which related 
not to this new policy question, but to a more 
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controversial implementation issue which was effectively 
masked in the original scaling. 
Before revealing this "surprise" dimension, though, 
the additional policy question deserves some closer 
scrutiny. If it was indeed relevant, why did it fail to 
produce significant spread among the special-interest 
respondents? 
As it turned out, there was very little substantive 
disagreement with regard to "post-statement-date" 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. The vast majority of 
respondents (in particular, the corporate subjects) felt 
that simple footnote disclosure should suffice. The 
Board, in fact, agreed with this position in Paragraph 34 
of Statement 8? and it was not in any way amended within 
Statement 52. (Note also that this view corresponds to 
Statement of Auditing Standards No. _1, which requires 
disclosure of significant dollar effects, but not 
adjustment of the aaccounts themselves.) 
Several of the accounting subjects cited possible 
extenuating (albeit rare) circumstances which would 
necessitate recalculation of account balances. Touche 
Ross, Arthur Young and the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants all mentioned the case of a foreign 
currency being artificially supported by central banks or 
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other economic agencies. If such support is abruptly- 
discontinued, or the support rate changes sharply, then 
the amounts in the statements should be restated for the 
change. 
Dow Chemical rather creatively linked the possibility 
of currency devaluation to the accounting issue of "future 
losses." In other words, prolonged severe inflation and 
other macroeconomic deterioration usually presages drastic 
remedial measures such as devaluation. That is, although 
the devaluation may officially occur after the closing 
date of the fiscal period, the economic conditions which 
necessitated it are properly matched to the preceding time 
interval—that which is covered by the financial 
statements. Therefore, the accounts whould be restated to 
cover this "economic loss" in the same manner as is done 
for other negative contingencies. This step is in keeping 
with the dual accounting objectives of 'conservatism' and 
'the matching principle.' 
The two respondents who were most 'positive' on the 
issue of post-date restatement admittedly had to fall back 
on a rather vague benchmark concept. Chrysler advocated 
recalculation "if material". The Financial Analysts 
Federation went a step further in operationalizing 
materiality as "a rate change which is greater than, or 
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equal to, 3% Naturally, the arbitrariness of such 
cutoff points is self-evident (though, in the clear 
absence of a theoretical link, nothing beats a convenient 
rule of thumb). 
To summarize, none of the respondents advocated 
unequivocal restatement of the accounts under these 
circumstances. Most opted for simple footnote 
disclosure... a position ultimately adopted by the FASB. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the issue did not 
produce sufficient differences of opinion to emerge as a 
distinct MDS dimension. 
Instead, the vertical axis (Dimension 4) in Figure 19 
appears to capture another implementation issue. In some 
ways, this particular item is substantively more 
interesting and controversial than the treatment of 
preferred stock. It has to do with the "proper" 
conversion of deferred taxes. 
Two Big-8 firms cluster together at the bottom of 
this axis. Both of them felt that deferred taxes should 
be adjusted for changes in the exchange rate. Haskins and 
Sells reminded the FASB that deferred taxes are generally 
expected to reverse. Use of the current rate would instead 
make them look like liabilities. Peat Marwick likewise 
supported use of the historical rate, since deferred taxes 
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are neither receivables nor payables, according to APB 
Opinion No.11. Therefore, they should be classified with 
other 'non-monetary' items, and converted accordingly. 
Texaco, Dow, and Sun Oil are three corporate subjects who 
agreed with the non-monetary nature of this item; note 
their positions in the same half of the space. 
Chrysler, in contrast, strongly urged use of the 
current rate for deferred taxes. It also acknowledged the 
tendency of this item to reverse in future accounting 
periods. However, fluctuations in the exchange rate mean 
that the amount which is amortized to tax expense could 
differ markedly from the current tax expense it is meant 
to offset. The misleading consequence, then, is a 
distortion of the 'effective tax rate.' 
Another corporate respondent, Eli Lilly, gave a more 
practical reason for its position. Since deferred taxes 
would most likely be settled in foreign currency, their 
eventual 'value' would be better approximated by use of 
the current rate. (Note that this rationale is, in 
effect, a precursor of the FASB's ultimate "functional 
currency" orientation.) 
How can the FASB's position on this issue be 
characterized? Note that it appears in the top half of 
the y-axis. In Statement 8, it required a complex 
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four-way, three-tier classification scheme for the 
components of the deferred tax account. That portion 
which is both determined by the "gross change method" and 
does not correspond to balance-sheet items translated at 
current rates, is adjusted for changes in exchange rates. 
On the other hand, corresponding taxes calculated by the 
"net change method," but pertaining to assets and 
liabilities translated at the historical rate, are 
themselves translated at current rates. Likewise for the 
third possibility: deferred taxes pertaining to net assets 
translated at current. 
Needless to say, the above rules are complex and 
unwieldy, requiring extensive disaggregation of the 
deferred-tax account balance. While such literal matching 
by account type may be theoretically sound, one may 
question whether any extra information is actually worth 
all of that trouble. The FASB ultimately opted for 
simplicity in Statement 52. Deferred taxes, along with all 
other accounts, could now simply be translated at current 
rates for non-dollar functional currencies. Therefore, 
its plot in the top half of this axis reflects the 
softening of its position. 
Before leaving the subject of foreign currency 
translation, a couple of key theoretical issues will be 
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given a last look. The "correct'* choice of reporting 
currency, as well as the "best" disposition of translation 
gains and losses, were previously identified as 
significant. Neither of them, however, turned out to be 
significant MDS dimensions. Despite their lack of purely 
mathematical import, these issues deserve brief mention 
because of their influence upon the FASB's turnaround via 
Statement 52. 
The first policy question asked whether the currency 
of the parent company should be used for financial 
reporting purposes. Recall the implicit assumption of a 
"U.S.-dollar mentality" in Statement 8, even for those 
branches which conducted all their business in some other 
currency. Did respondents to the initial DM foresee the 
problems with this approach? 
As it turns out, the comments made to this question 
are a veritable glimpse into the future world of Statement 
52. The FASB's eventual definition of "functional 
currency" in this pronouncement seemed to mirror the 
rationale for their arguments. 
To begin with, nearly all subjects basically answered 
"it depends," rather than taking solid yes-or-no 
positions. (This preponderance of "neutrals" certainly 
explains the lack of dimensional emergence of this issue.) 
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Commonly recurring suggestions for choosing the 
"appropriate" currency include the following: 
1. where the parent company is headquartered 
2. where 
place 
the largest number of transactions take 
3. where most of the shareholders, creditors, and 
other suppliers of capital reside (especially 
since, as Texaco reminded the FASB, financial 
reporting exists for the benefit of such parties 
in the first place) 
4. where the parent company is incorporated 
It is easy to see how the FASB's eventual definition 
of "functional currency" evolved from these practical 
guidelines. 
A second, related issue dealt with the proper 
disposition of translation gains and losses. They usually 
lacked economic relevance for companies whose functional 
currency was not the U.S. dollar. Yet, as was pointed 
out at the beginning of this discussion, Statement 8 
mandated their inclusion in income of the period. Were 
these exchange adjustments misleading when included in 
this manner as components of 'changes in economic wealth'? 
Arthur Young recognized the "bad timing" inherent in 
such immediate inclusion. That is, it argued that these 
exchange-rate adjustments pertain to assets and 
liabilities which are amortized over a period of 
time....in proper compliance with the matching principle. 
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Furthermore, it was concerned that users might 
misinterpret these amounts as changes in market value of 
the corresponding assets and liabilities—an echo of DM 2 
and general price level reporting. Alfred University 
conceded that precise matching is fine in theory but would 
be very difficult to implement practically. Thus, direct 
write-off may be the more expedient solution. 
Some respondents cited rather unique circumstances 
and/or rules of thumb to follow. Texaco would defer 
adjustment gains/losses under either of the following two 
conditions: 
1. if the translation adjustment of long-term debt 
represents a true adjustment of the cost of 
borrowing 
2. if the proceeds of such borrowing are used to 
purchase fixed assets just prior to a change in 
the exchange rate 
Ingersoll-Rand proposed that the gain/loss ratio 
should be deferred only if it exceeds a specified 
percentage. Otherwise, it warned, there is a veritable 
"yo-yo" effect on net income if the exchange rate should 
fluctuate wildly. Income figures are often projected in 
the search for trends, as part of investment and credit 
decisions. This sort of instability obviously impairs the 
predictive validity of such calculations. 
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Interestingly enough, the opinion expressed by 
Atlantic Richfield most closely approximates the FASB's 
final ruling in Statement 52. It labelled these 
translation adjustments, not as gains and losses in the 
usual sense, but rather as "monetary corrections" to 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, they should not be 
part of net income, but instead closed out directly to 
retained earnings (with appropriate disclosure). And this 
is exactly what the FASB decided to allow, when it 
deferred recognition of gains and losses until liquidation 
of the foreign component, if its functional currency was 
something other than the dollar. 
In summary, then, foreign currency translation is a 
classic example of a reversal in accounting policy-making. 
The FASB went from prescribing rigid, piecemeal rules 
(Statement ^ to a more flexible and expedient approach 
(Statement 52) as economic circumstances warranted. Its 
more "middle-of-the-road" policy emerged in the scaling. 
Also evident were two issues of implementation: the 
handling of preferred stock and deferred taxes. 
Respondents hedged their positions on the correct handling 
of translation gains and losses, rather than recommending 
the all-or-nothing type of approach which characterized 
Statement 8. However, this hedging proved to be remarkably 
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prophetic in terms of the Board's reversal of position. 
As was explained in the preceding section, they strongly 
urged consideration of the "true" economic operating 
environment of the foreign branch. Therefore, when the 
FASB ultimately took up this case-by-case position in 
Statement 52, it appeared to be an example of policy 
bending to constituents' preferences. 
Discussion Memo 4 
Accounting for contingencies. The area of accounting for 
future losses (also known as "contingencies") represents 
perhaps the purest embodiment of the principle of 
conservatism. Losses which seem imminent, but which are 
properly linked to transactions and events of the current 
period, ought to be recognized immediately. Not only is 
such treatment in keeping with the matching principle; it 
protects against painting an overly optimistic picture for 
readers, by not overstating net income. 
Yet this issue is plagued with substantial questions 
of implementation. Exactly what constitutes a "reasonably 
probable" loss? In other words, how certain must we be of 
its occurrence before ascribing it to a given financial 
reporting period? What if its probability is high, but 
its expected dollar amount is difficult to pinpoint? How 
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should such an unstable estimate be communicated to 
readers of the financial statements? 
This brings us to a complementary concern: what sorts 
of economic events may be considered "accruable future 
losses"? Procedures of estimation and prediction are 
admittedly better developed for some than for others. 
Actuarial science allows us to place considerable faith in 
the catastrophe reserves calculated by insurance 
companies, for instance. On the other hand, both the 
eventual outcome and the settlement amount of litigation 
may be anyone's guess. Expropriation losses by 
multinationals whose foreign holdings are suddenly seized 
are another example. The infinite number of variables in 
these two settings virtually guarantee highly unstable 
estimates at best. Yet the potentially overwhelming 
financial impact of such events on results of operations 
can hardly be denied. 
The area of accounting for contingencies remains 
timely, even though it was one of the very first issues 
successfully tackled by the FASB. Statement _5, 
"Accounting for Contingencies," was issued in March of 
1975. To this day, it remains the cornerstone ruling on 
accruable losses. Only four very minor modifications have 
been made to date. This is remarkable when compared to 
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the reversal of position which the FASB was forced to make 
for oil and gas reporting, for instance. Brown labelled 
future losses as the first controversial issue taken up by 
the FASB. This may have been so for its time? but its 
aftermath was nothing like the public fallout over 
reporting for changing prices, or the question of 
capitalization of long-term leases. 
As it turned out. Statement _5 was relatively 
straightforward in both form and content. It provided a 
lengthy list of potentially accruable contingent events. 
It also clearly stated two criteria, both of which must be 
present for the loss to be currently accruable. A quick 
glance at the list of possible contingencies is enough to 
convince anyone of the relevance of this ten-year-old 
ruling. The past decade has seen countless instances of 
terrorism, natural disasters, overseas nationalization of 
properties, and staggering lawsuits. The issue is 
therefore worthy of inclusion in the present study. 
Brown chose to analyze a two-dimensional solution 
with the rather poor stress value of 0.1718. The 
two-dimensional space of the present study would have 
generated a slightly better fit (0.1455). Nonetheless, an 
additional dimension will be added in order to reduce the 
stress value to a much more acceptable 0.0564. 
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Before going on to examine the individual pairwise 
spaces, one unique result must be previewed for DM 4. 
This is the only DM for which scaling of Brown's questions 
did not yield "content-identifiable" (in terms of 
individual issues) dimensions. However, the clusters of 
respondents which emerged revealed some notable patterns. 
(Recall, too, that in this particular application of MDS 
our primary objective is generation of the distances among 
subjects. Interpretable axes are of course desirable and 
interesting; but there is no guarantee that they will 
occur.) The pairwise maps will now be examined in greater 
detail. 
The first two axes (Figure 20) produce a plot which 
replicates one of Brown's key findings but in much sharper 
detail—and uncovers an additional result of note. First 
of all, the horizontal axis provides clear evidence of an 
attestor-preparer dimension. The left half of the space 
contains all but one of the Big Eight firms. Both of the 
financial reporting societies (FEI and FAF) are found here 
as well. The only corporate exceptions are Inland Steel 
(which clusters with Coopers and Lybrand) and A.T. and T. 
In contrast, all of the remaining corporate subjects 
appear on the right-hand side. 
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But a closer look at the right side reveals a newer 
and even more interesting finding: a huge special-interest 
cluster. Every single one of the insurance companies 
included in the study is located in this grouping. Also 
plotting with them are three of their own professional 
associations: Insurance and Financial Analysts Society; 
the American Insurance Association? and the American 
Society of Insurance Management. (The American Academy of 
Actuaries, the fourth special interest association, is in 
extremely close proximity, near the origin. Since drawing 
in the iso-contours is a matter of judgment, it could 
easily be identified as part of this rather fluid 
grouping.) It is also interesting to observe that two 
accounting societies, the AICPA and the AAA, group with 
these insurance-oriented respondents. 
The FASB plots in the left half of the map; that is, 
along with the majority of accounting respondents. 
However, note that these subjects are nowhere as cohesive 
as their special-interest counterparts; rather, they are 
relatively scattered in the sub-space. For this reason, 
the FASB cannot exactly be characterized as "clustering" 
with the accounting subjects. 
The same sort of respondent distribution is apparent 
in Figure 21. This should not be too surprising, since 
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Dimension 1 is still the horizontal axis. However, Inland 
Steel has now shifted its alignment partner, from Coopers 
and Lybrand (Figure 20) to the FASB. Also recall that 
Arthur Young, Price Waterhouse, and the National 
Association of Accountants were "outliers" with respect to 
the previous vertical axis. Now, A.T. and T. and Ernst 
and Ernst appear as polar opposites on Dimension 3. The 
FASB has moved a bit closer to the origin; its vertical 
coordinate value is presently 0.295, as opposed to 0.619. 
The remaining pairwise space finds the large, fluid 
cluster in a more central location. But this time its 
membership is noticeably greater—and much more 
heterogeneous as well. All of the insurance-company 
respondents still plot here, along with the associations 
identified earlier. But now they are joined by three of 
the Big Eight accounting firms: Price Waterhouse (formerly 
an outlier), Arthur Andersen, and Haskins and Sells. 
Furthermore, both the FEI and the FAF are now located in 
this cluster, as are the FASB and Inland Steel (but now 
these two are on opposite sides of the cluster, as opposed 
to their pairing in Figure 21). The only professional 
society (of any sort) which fails to appear in this 
portion of the space is NAA. 
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Despite careful scrutiny of the outliers on each 
dimension, an attempt to match their relative positions to 
individual policy issues was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, 
the letters of comment yielded certain conclusions for 
each of Brown's five policy issues. These will be briefly 
summarized. 
The first question was undoubtedly the foundation of 
all the rest in DM 4. It asked simply whether losses 
should be accrued in advance of their occurrence. Most 
accounting respondents proposed specific lists of criteria 
as to when contingencies should be recognized. Not 
surprisingly. the theoretical duo of matching and 
conservatism were frequently cited. The majority of 
special-interest subjects, in contrast, addressed the bulk 
of their comments to the more specific types of losses 
considered in some of Brown's other questions. A couple 
of subjects expressed concern about the temptation to use 
loss accruals as an income-smoothing device. Both FAF and 
Standard Oil of Indiana warned against calculated 
"managing" of reserves; that is, over-deducting and then 
selectively restoring, with an eye on the bottom line. 
In Paragraph 8 of Statement 5_, the FASB set forth two 
general criteria, both of which must be in place before a 
loss may be accrued in advance. These may be condensed as 
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reasonable probability (of either a liability incurrence 
or an asset impairment); and estimability (of dollar 
amount of the loss). This FASB position can be 
characterized as middle-of-the-road. This is because the 
stated criteria are general enough to allow for 
considerable management discretion. (Contrast these two 
rules with the four criteria for lease capitalization. 
The latter, while not quite tamper-proof, are certainly 
more detailed as well as complicated.) 
Three of Brown's questions went on to deal with 
specific types of contingencies. The first of these asked 
whether expropriation losses by foreign governments ought 
to be accrued in advance of their occurrence. The key 
question here seems to be: how much of such a "risk" is 
inherent (i.e., by definition), as opposed to excessive? 
The FAF was one of those who took the former position. It 
felt that "excessive" risk (if any) was already taken into 
consideration by the securities markets. Therefore, any 
haggling as to the form and/or timing of related 
disclosures was redundant at best. Texas Instruments was 
of the opinion that common sense should override purely 
statistical considerations when necessary. Granted, the 
relative rarity of such an event precluded the luxury of a 
large sample,and thus calculation of very precise. 
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low-variance estimators. However, some best-guess attempt 
should be made anyway, in the interests of avoiding 
misleading financial statements. As the FEI reminded the 
FASB, there is simply no way to avoid the use of 
"judgment." 
Most respondents who answered "yes" to this question 
simply said, "It meets our criteria, as outlined in 
response to Question 1." A number of them suggested 
footnote disclosure as a possible alternative to loss 
accrual. One unusual dissenter was Inland Steel. It 
claimed that detailed revelations with respect to 
expropriation losses amounted to giving away too much 
valuable inside information to one's competitors. (This 
"loss of competitive advantage" argument will figure even 
more prominently in the analysis of DM 5, "Segment 
Disclosures.") If some accounting treatment must be used, 
said Inland Steel, "segregation of retained earnings" 
should suffice. Finally, as before, the majority of 
insurance subjects did not respond to this question. 
The FASB included expropriation losses in its list of 
ten potentially accruable contingencies (Paragraph 4, 
Statement _5) . Keep in mind, though, that this particular 
loss, along with all the others, is subject to the two 
criteria discussed in Question 1. 
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The next type of loss studied by Brown at last 
elicits the bulk of the insurance subjects' comments. As 
stated. Brown's question reads, "Should accrual of future 
catastrophe losses of property and casualty insurance 
companies be allowed in advance of their occurrence?" In 
general, insurance subjects felt that the actuarial 
sciences were sufficiently developed to allow for reliable 
projections and timely accruals. 
One unusual theoretical argument deserves to be 
singled out. The American Academy of Actuaries felt that 
periodic accrual was in keeping with the going-concern 
concept. For one thing, there was a "tendency of 
policy-holders to renew." But more importantly, "exposure 
to catastrophic loss is continuous," and therefore this 
should be reflected by spreading recognition across time. 
Accounting respondents were particularly concerned 
about mismatching and income smoothing. With regard to the 
former, Arthur Young cited actual evidence of accruing 
"losses" for policies not yet in existence. In a 
complementary vein. Peat Marwick stressed that losses must 
emanate from current events or operating conditions in 
order to be assigned properly to the given accounting 
period. 
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A number of subjects concluded that the only possible 
reason for such practices was, again, the desire to 
"manage" reported net income. But a partial deterrent to 
such activities was proposed, oddly enough, by the Society 
of Insurance and Financial Analysts. It suggested that 
the Board set up rigorous criteria for adding to, or 
subtracting from, existing reserves. 
As with expropriation losses, the FASB listed 
"catastrophe losses" in Statement _5. In other words, they 
also qualify, provided they meet the two general criteria. 
The final type of loss considered by Brown was 
"pending or threatened litigation." In general, 
accounting respondents stated "reasonable approximation" 
as a necessary precondition for accrual. However, a 
number of them commented on the practical difficulty of 
meeting this criterion in the case of litigation. A 
couple of subjects likened this type of contingency to 
provisions for self-insurance, which would be entirely 
reasonable in their opinion. Litigation losses once more 
appeared as a line item in Statement J5. 
Brown's fifth and final issue is perhaps most 
interesting, because it is in some ways a "mirror image" 
of his first, most basic question. Through its two 
criteria in Statement 5, the FASB in effect agreed that 
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yes, certain losses should be accrued. But, as noted 
earlier, these rules are very general in nature—leaving 
considerable room for management discretion. Furthermore, 
both of them must be met in order to recognize the 
contingency in accounting terms. 
This means, of course, that there will be potential 
losses which fail to meet one, or both, criteria. There 
could be a contingency which is virtually certain to 
occur, but whose expected value is highly variable. Or a 
loss could be pinpointed at a fairly precise (and 
potentially staggering) amount—yet its probability is 
elusive. Now suppose that both of these contingencies are 
firmly rooted in events of the current operating cycle. 
Do they warrant some sort of accounting recognition? 
Would outside parties be misinformed if such events are 
omitted from mention in the statements? In this regard, 
the criteria for loss recognition bring to mind the 
dilemma of the rules for lease capitalization. That is, 
are such rules enough of a "safety net?" ? or can certain 
economic events be slipped through as a result of clever 
circumvention by managers? Perhaps what we have here is a 
case of "letter-vs.-spirit-of-the-law." The relevant 
policy issue asks if accounting standards should also be 
set for the disclosure of non-accruable future losses. 
Quite a few accounting subjects pointed out that, in 
fact, precedent already exists for doing so. They 
frequently referenced both ARB No. 50 ("Contingencies") 
and APB No. 43, Chapter 6. These rulings suggest that 
disclosures should be made as to the underlying economic 
events leading up to such losses, as well as their 
estimated effect upon reported accounting figures. Still 
another guiding principle, mentioned by Peat Marwick, was 
APB No. 22, "Disclosure of Accounting Policies." Among 
other things, it draws a distinction between "losses" vs. 
"risks" and requires "...a brief description of unusual 
risks assumed by the reporting entity." 
However, several accounting subjects also warned of 
the need to distinguish carefully between normal, 
day-to-day operating risks, vs. unusual conditions. One 
must not get carried away and exaggerate the negative 
impact of the former. 
Not surprisingly, corporate subjects were far more 
tolerant with respect to the form of accounting for 
non-accruable losses than were Big-Eight firms. The 
latter categorically tended to oppose appropriations of 
retained earnings? a couple of the former specifically 
mentioned that they could find nothing wrong with this 
treatment. 
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In the FASB' s opinion, disclosure was definitely- 
warranted if the loss was reasonably likely to occur, 
based on present circumstances. More specifically, the 
company needs to disclose its nature, as well as its 
expected value (or the range within which it is likely to 
occur). If a reliable estimate of its expected value 
cannot be made, but the loss is reasonably probable, this 
shall be stated. Disclosure, however, is not required if 
the loss is unlikely to occur. (Again, since no numerical 
or other such guidelines were given as to what constitutes 
a "reasonable probability," the determination is largely 
in the hands of individual managers.) 
In a surprising departure from Big-Eight opinion, the 
FASB decided not to forbid appropriations of retained 
earnings for this purpose. However, such appropriation 
must be clearly labelled as a separate line item of 
stockholders' equity. Such an appropriation, though, is 
really nothing more than a channel of communication. It 
most definitely is not a "reserve," such as is set up for 
accruable losses. This is because the FASB went on to 
prohibit write-offs against this appropriation. Nor may 
any portions of it be transferred to net income, in the 
event that the non-accruable loss fails to occur. 
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At this point, three additional policy issues will be 
considered. These are primarily concerned with the impact 
and placement of accruable future losses within the 
financial statements. 
The solution quickly converged to an outstanding fit. 
Stress of 0.0177 was attained with just three dimensions. 
Once again, the MDS solutions produced a number of 
reasonably homogeneous clusters. Several of these are 
prominent in Figure 23. Quadrant 2, for instance, shows 
that half of the Big Eight accounting firms not only 
plotted together—they actually overlapped. These are 
Ernst and Ernst; Arthur Andersen; Arthur Young; and Touche 
Ross. Reading clockwise, we note the FASB and Peat 
Marwick pairing up as coincident points, and as relative 
outliers with respect to the vertical axis. Near the 
origin we see three insurance firms (Aetna, Traveler's, 
and Fireman's Fund) along with the American Insurance 
Association. Also located in this cluster is Searle. 
Directly above it is a mixed cluster containing two 
accounting societies (the AICPA and the AAA), as well as 
the American Insurance Society and Lincoln National 
Insurance. Finally, the top of the vertical axis reveals 
the accounting-oriented pair of Coopers and Lybrand and 
the NAA. Just to its right we can locate Texas 
128 
Instruments and the American Academy of Actuaries. 
Three observations may be made about this particular 
point scatter. The clusters which have emerged are 
notably smaller than their counterparts for Brown's 
questions. However, they are also tighter and less fluid, 
since they are all composed of perfectly overlapping 
points. Lastly, they are slightly less homogeneous as a 
result. Observe that both the insurance and accounting 
societies are more separated than before. So too are the 
Big-Eight firms? the four which did not appear in the 
southeast cluster are relative outliers in the perceptual 
space. 
We can also observe a weak respondent separation with 
respect to the y-axis. The top portion of the map appears 
to be dominated by professional societies and insurance 
firms? the bottom, by accounting firms and 
non-insurance-oriented corporate subjects. 
Happily, the horizontal dimension turns out to be 
interpretable as well. It is anchored by Chrysler and 
A.T. and T. on the left side? and by Haskins and Sells, 
Standard Oil of Indiana, and the FEI on the right. The 
question which produced this split asks whether standards 
should govern the disclosure of the method of accruing 
future losses. That is, should the individual firm be 
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forced to reveal its computational formula? 
Most of the accounting respondents believed that a 
general description of the method used, plus 
reconciliation of any changes in the balances of reserves, 
should suffice. Furthermore, they believed that adequate 
legislation was already in place, in the form of APB No. 
22, "Disclosure of Accounting Policies." In fact, a 
couple of subjects believed that requiring such disclosure 
of accrual method was a potential deterrent to the 
income-smoothing behavior described earlier—at least 
necessary, if not quite sufficient. (The three outliers 
on the right side are among those who responded "yes" to 
this question.) 
Once again, the insurance subjects were much more 
concerned about issues of measurement than disclosure, and 
opted to skip comment on this question. But an emphatic 
"no" came from Chrysler, A.T. and T., and Inland Steel. 
They cautioned that too much disclosure along these lines 
was again tantamount to giving away valuable inside 
information. Only the beginning and ending balances of 
the reserve account need be provided, so that the reader 
may calculate for himself the net change therein. 
The FASB's resolution of this issue is as 
middle-of-the-road as its graphical position vis-a-vis the 
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horizontal axis. In one decidedly terse sentence in 
Statement _5, it acknowledged that the nature (as well as, 
sometimes, the amount) accrued is necessary so that the 
financial statements will not be misleading. No further 
elaboration is given by the Board. 
Although the vertical axis provided excellent 
respondent spread, it turned out to be uninterpretable. 
Therefore, the next pairwise combination of axes will be 
examined at this point. 
At first glance. Figure 24 looks like a simple 
rotation of its immediate predecessor. In fact, the 
composition of the labelled clusters is identical to those 
in Figure 23. 
However, a subtle shift has actually occurred with 
respect to a few key outliers. Haskins and Sells now 
stands diametrically opposed to the coincident duo of 
Texas Instruments and the American Academy of Actuaries. 
The relevant policy question is an issue of placement 
with respect to contingencies. It asks, "Should accrued 
future losses be classified as liabilities in the balance 
sheet (as opposed to the use of an asset-valuation 
account, or a special category)?" 
Most accounting subjects felt that the "liability" 
category would be most appropriate for bona fide pending 
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legal claims. On the other hand, if the "loss" 
constituted a write-down or other sort of revaluation, 
then the asset category would be preferable. Commonly 
cited precedents for the latter treatment included the 
reserves for bad debts and for depreciation. 
Haskins and Sells, however, rejected both 
alternatives as being too narrow. It advised accumulating 
the contingencies separately as credit balances, and then 
placing them in a unique category on the right-hand side 
of the balance sheet. In this regard, its extreme 
relative position in the space is justified. (Standard 
Oil also opted for a deferred credit.) 
A rather specialized and detailed answer to this 
question was offered by the American Academy of Actuaries. 
It gave several operational definitions of what it termed 
"reserve liabilities." The first of these, "claim 
reserves," was defined as the "estimated value of future 
payments for death and disability." "Policy reserves" 
constituted the "present value of the difference between 
expected future costs and expected future valuation 
premiums." Lastly, there was to be a reserve for 
"deficiencies in gross premiums." Incidentally, the 
Academy felt that no new FASB rulings on this issue should 
be necessary; in its opinion, the "Audit Guide for Stock 
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Life Insurance Companies" already provided adequate 
coverage of the issue. 
The FASB ended up supporting the dual treatment 
advocated in the accountants' positions. Such contingent 
events as probable tax assessments, warranty obligations, 
and guarantees of third-party indebtedness were to be 
classified as liabilities. On the other hand, certain 
other future losses constituted asset impairments and 
should be recorded as such. These include probable 
uncollectible receivables and asset expropriations. In 
both cases, however, the FASB cautioned that the amount 
must be "reasonably estimable" in order to earn placement 
in the balance sheet. This dual position essentially 
matches the FASB's central placement with respect to the 
vertical axis, as can be seen from Figure 24. 
The one remaining pairwise combination of axes 
generated no additional information. Figure 25 reveals 
basically the same sorts of respondent clusters (albeit 
rotated) that have already been identified. 
The last of the supplementary policy issues also 
failed to emerge as a distinct dimension. This may be due 
to a redundancy in content. As originally stated, the 
question reads, "Should accruable future losses be 
measured by the effect on the results of operations (both 
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periodic and irregular charges, as applicable)?" But the 
essence of this question brings to mind the matching 
principle. Most respondents dealt extensively with this 
concept in their answers to Brown's first issue (e.g., 
"should contingencies be accrued in advance?"). 
Therefore, its failure to emerge here is not too 
surprising or disappointing. 
The results of analyzing DM 4 may be summarized in 
the following manner. Brown's original issues were scaled 
as an initial step. These had to do with the overall 
desirability of accruing future losses, as well as several 
specific, common types. An attestor-preparer dimension 
was clearly discernible in the sub-spaces. A cohesive 
cluster of insurance respondents and professional 
societies was also evident in the maps. 
The second scaling (three additional issues) produced 
an excellent overall fit. Respondent clusters were now 
smaller, but even more cohesive, being composed in all 
cases of overlapping points. Many of these clusters are 
now slightly more heterogeneous as well (particularly with 
regard to the professional societies). However, some 
accounting firms still tended to plot together, as did 
insurance companies. 
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Two of these additional policy issues emerged as 
identifiable separators. They dealt with proper 
classification of accruable losses7 and with disclosure 
requirements for non-accruable losses. 
The area of accounting for contingencies certainly 
remains relevant today. Businesses continue to be faced 
with uncertain international political environments 7 
natural disasters; and an exponential growth in volume of 
litigation, among other potentially catastrophic events. 
In this regard, DM 4 was almost ahead of its time. Though 
it was issued ten years ago, the past decade has seen 
numerous memorable examples of all three types of losses 
in the headlines. The real challenge, as pinpointed by 
several subjects, is to give proper recognition to such 
losses—without overstepping the bounds of "reasonable" 
conservatism. Central to their recognition, too, is the 
need to come up with a workable definition of just what 
constitutes an "unusual and catastrophic" future loss in 
/ 
the first place. 
Discussion Memo 5^ 
Financial reporting for segments. Two of the Discussion 
Memos talked about thus far may be labelled as "the 
measuring-unit problem." DM 2, on general price level 
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changes, dealt with the issue of a "standard" dollar 
yardstick whose "true" value fluctuated with inflation. 
And foreign currency translation (DM 3) asked whether the 
U.S. dollar was the appropriate denominating currency for 
operations whose transactions were primarily conducted in 
some other national monetary unit. 
The main issue raised in DM 5 ("Segments") has to do 
not with the measuring unit, but rather with the thing 
being measured. In fact, it can be seen as a "level of 
aggregation problem." Should financial statements be 
prepared only on a companywide basis? Or should reporting 
be broken down into smaller and more homogeneous units, 
such as product lines? In an age of conglomerates and 
diversification, important information may be concealed in 
the summing process of the former approach. Divisional 
return on capital assets and product-line profitability 
are two prime examples which come to mind. Stellar 
performers need to be managed differently than 
long-standing cash drains. Furthermore, different items 
are controlled by different product managers. 
Company-wide results are useless in terms of relevant, 
timely feedback to accountable cost centers. Only a more 
disaggregated reporting system can adequately serve 
internal marketing needs. 
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In selecting this ideal partition of reporting, 
though, there is no escaping the thorny "allocation 
problem" first referred to in the DM 1 discussion. 
Certain figures, such as sales revenue, cost of goods sold 
and administrative outlays such as advertising, may be 
linked fairly reliably to specific product lines. But 
what about more generalized charges, such as plant 
insurance or fixed maintenance fees? They clearly benefit 
all products sold, as operations simply could not proceed 
otherwise. But can they be cleanly split up among these 
many diverse product lines? More to the point— should 
they? Users might mistake them for the direct costs 
mentioned above if the two are commingled in the 
statements. Yet their omission seems to ignore the 
necessary incurrence of these charges.... and, in effect, 
"overstates" product income as a result. How, then, 
should such disaggregated segment statements be prepared? 
Brown's original questions dealt with such basic 
issues; they will be scaled in the first step and the 
results analyzed. As in the case of DM 3, the FASB later 
reversed its position on an issue which was not on Brown's 
list. This issue, along with two others, will be examined 
afterward. 
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The first two axes (Dimensions 1 and 2 in Figure 26) 
feature an assortment of subject groupings. The bottom 
cluster (third quadrant) is composed of four 
accounting-oriented subjects (Ernst and Ernst; Arthur 
Andersen; Touche Ross; and the National Association of 
Accountants), as well as two corporate subjects, Honeywell 
and L.T.V. To its northeast, we see the trio of Price 
Waterhouse, the American Accounting Association, and Dow 
Chemical. 
In the top portion of the space, an equally varied 
group of respondents clusters on the y-axis. Texaco pairs 
up with the Financial Executives Institute. It is 
interesting to note, though, that two other petroleum 
subjects are in close proximity to Texaco: Mobil and 
Standard Oil. Masonite virtually overlaps with the AICPA, 
just to the left. 
Now that respondent clusters have been identified, 
does the perceptual space give any clues as to the 
underlying meaning of these dimensions? As it turns out, 
the horizontal axis (Dimension 1) captures the most basic 
of these policy issues. On the extreme left-hand side, we 
see Procter and Gamble. Several other corporate 
respondents can be found in this cluster.Its counterpart 
in the right half is the Financial Analysts Federation, 
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with Peat Marwick in close proximity on the axis. 
The question which produced this split asks whether 
financial information should be reported per segment—the 
'level-of-aggregation' issue raised at the outset of this 
section. Procter and Gamble strongly opposed this 
divisional partition of the financial statements. 
According to them, previous studies showed that sales and 
profitability disclosures by segments did not result in 
more accurate earnings forecasts. As for external 
parties, P and G also demolished the widely touted belief 
that segment reporting was 'useful' to creditors. After 
all, they said, lenders of small amounts tended to base 
their decisions on the totality of company operations. 
And larger creditors were surely sophisticated enough to 
obtain as much product-line information as they really 
needed, without having to wait for accountants to 
"formally" supply it. (Standard Oil of Indiana concurred 
with this argument of negligible usefulness of 
disclosures.) 
Other respondents who plotted in this half of the 
axis gave more normative reasoning against segment 
disclosures. Texas Instruments felt that managers should 
be maximizing the value of the company as a whole. Haskins 
and Sells also suggested that segment reporting could 
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erroneously lead potential investors to believe that 
segments are interchangeable across companies. Thus, the 
only logical least-common-denominator is the firm. CPC 
cautioned that users in general could develop a sort of 
tunnel vision. In other words, they might exaggerate the 
relative importance of section(s) of the firm, to the 
detriment of others. Another respondent which opposed a 
requirement for segment reporting is Rockwell. Note that 
all of these subjects can be found in the same half of the 
space. 
There were several other notable arguments against 
segment reporting. A recurring theme (to be elaborated 
later) is the arbitrariness of cost allocation 
schemes—inevitable when common expenses are somehow to be 
divided up among distinct divisions. Related to this is 
the sticky problem of pricing inter-segment 
transfers—equally inescapable when products move from one 
division to another in various stages of completion. 
Moreover, wouldn't detailed revelations of activity per 
product line (i.e., revenues, advertising outlays,target 
markets) amount to surrendering valuable 'inside 
information' to potential competitors? 
On the other hand, doesn't there already exist a 
veritable 'information overload' with respect to required 
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financial disclosures? Do readers really need or want yet 
another set of figures? Or—even if they say they 
do—would the purported benefits of segment reporting 
exceed the additional costs of its preparation? (Recall 
the studies cited by P and G and Standard Oil.) More 
importantly, can these additional disclosures be prepared 
and released quickly enough to be useful....or will the 
'timeliness' objective fall short with yet another 
burdensome set of reports to be issued? 
Proponents of segment reporting, in contrast, 
concentrate on the diversity of "pieces" comprising this 
companywide total. According to the Financial Analysts 
Federation (right-hand extreme of Dimension 1), these 
segments often have vastly different target markets, 
product growth rates, profit margins, and returns on 
investment. Summing over them (and thereby ignoring this 
variability) washes out individual effects and thus 
hampers cash-flow forecasts and earnings-trend 
projections. A.T.and T., Peat Marwick and Arthur Young 
agreed with the usefulness of such disaggregated 
disclosures. Price Waterhouse also observed that 
individual product-line results can run contra to overall 
macroeconomic activity (e.g., products at the end of their 
life cycles, despite upswings in consumer spending 
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statistics) and deserve not to be obscured. And the 
American Accounting Association cited a report by the 
Financial Analysts Federation to the Trueblood Committee. 
According to this study, analysts typically request 
segment disclosures in order to better assess relative 
risk patterns across product lines. 
Upon weighing all the evidence, the FASB opted for a 
"middle-of-the-road" position, corresponding to its 
somewhat central location in the space. In Statement 14, 
it set up three distinct criteria. Those divisions which 
met at_ least one of these three tests would qualify as 
"reportable segments." These criteria are as follows: 
1. Segment revenue greater than or equal to 10% of 
total enterprise revenue 
2. Segment operating profit/loss greater than or 
equal to 10% of combined operating profit/loss of 
totality of segments 
3. Identifiable segment assets greater than or equal 
to 10% of total company fixed assets 
Those segments not meeting at least one of the above 
tests were exempted from the disclosures mandated in 
Statement 14. (The exact nature of these disclosures will 
be taken up shortly.) Therefore, the FASB's position on 
the issue of reporting requirements may be summed up as 
"It depends." Hence, the middle position. 
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As it turns out, the vertical axis of Figure 26 is 
equally interpretable. Note that Monsanto plots 
diametrically opposed to a cluster containing (among 
others) Ernst and Ernst, Touche Ross, Arthur Andersen and 
Honeywell. This dimension appears to be the equally broad 
secondary issue of whether the FASB should specify the 
"proper" guidelines for segmentation. 
In a rather prophetic recommendation, Monsanto urged 
the FASB to prescribe what it called a "10% rule" for 
segment reporting—remarkably similar to the 
aforementioned tests in Statement 14. Another subject 
which plotted in this half, Texas Instruments, urged the 
Board to set rules of thumb which were both "broad" and 
"flexible" (it did not elaborate further). 
In marked contrast, Honeywell felt that such 
percentage-based segmentation was entirely too arbitrary. 
It felt that management was in the best position to 
determine, in each case, just what constitutes a 
"reportable segment." Similarly, Price Waterhouse and 
Arthur Andersen stated that popular classification schemes 
such as Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
were too cut and dried and did not always reflect actual 
corporate subdivisions. Haskins and Sells conceded that 
SIC codes (but not beyond three digits) can be a helpful 
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first pass? but other company-specific information (e.g. 
ROI, rates of growth,relative risk measures) should also 
be used to define segments. Ernst and Ernst suggested a 
multiple-criterion approach, based on such "size" measures 
as revenue, net assets, and gross margin. All these 
subjects may be located in the bottom half of the y-axis. 
Once again, the FASB's central location matches up 
with its ruling on the 'guidelines' question. In 
Paragraph 2 of Statement 14, it carefully weighed the pros 
and cons of classification schemes such as the SIC. It 
conceded the impossibility of prescribing one all-purpose 
definition of a "reportable segment," thereby recognizing 
the need for multiple measures as well as a healthy dose 
of managerial judgment. The result was the set of three 
criteria listed earlier. 
The two policy issues discussed thus far have been 
rather broad-based in nature. That is, they deal with the 
overall desirability of segment disclosures and the FASB's 
duty to prescribe them. Inevitably, though, these 
questions give rise to more "implementational" concerns: 
exactly what financial information needs to be reported 
per segment? Should complete statements (income 
statement? balance sheet? statement of changes in 
financial position) be prepared for each individual 
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product line? Or will select components of these 
statements (e.g., net assets; sales revenue; capital-asset 
acquisitions) suffice? Would simple footnote disclosures 
of key segment events be enough? 
One such implementational issue surfaces in Figure 
27. A glance along the y-axis (Dimension 3) reveals 
several distinct clusters—and a prominent extremist too. 
The topmost cluster contains CPC International, Texaco, 
and the FEI. Just to their southeast, we see A.T.and T., 
Price Waterhouse, and Dow Chemical. A strictly accounting 
cluster lies just below, and on the x-axis: the trio of 
Arthur Young, Peat Marwick, and the AICPA. Near the 
origin we find the NAA, LTV, Ernst and Ernst, and Arthur 
Andersen. And in the extreme opposite (bottom half of 
space), we find the FASB itself. 
Which question caused the Board to deviate from much 
of its constituency? It turns out to be the issue of 
requiring balance-sheet disclosures for each reportable 
segment. CPC, Texaco and the FEI (topmost cluster) were 
all strongly opposed, due to the allocation problem cited 
earlier. Certain fixed assets benefit more than one 
product or division simultaneously. Yet there may simply 
be no single defensible way to apportion such assets among 
discrete divisional balance sheets. The FASB, in 
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recognition of this problem, required disclosures related 
to "identifiable net assets" (including aggregate 
depreciation). 
The horizontal dimension turned out to be 
uninterpretable in terms of any of the remaining policy 
issues. It should also be noted that the scatter of 
respondents is not clearly divisible into the 
"accountants-vs.-industry" sub-spaces which were evident 
in both Brown's work and prior DMs. Both types of 
subjects are pretty widely dispersed among all four 
quadrants. 
As a final step, the perceptual spaces containing 
Dimension 4 were examined. However, this axis was also 
not readily interpretable. Furthermore, it did not yield 
any additional insight in terms of notable subject 
groupings. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the additional 
policy questions, some comments will be made with respect 
to the remaining implementational issues referred to 
above. A distinct continuum of opinion emerged regarding 
the desirability of segment information for the three 
different financial statements listed. Respondents mainly 
favored income-statement information (albeit in somewhat 
limited form—more elaborate discussion will follow); they 
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were rather mixed as to the balance sheet; and most of 
them opposed requirements relating to the statement of 
changes in financial position. Once again, the 
traceability of costs and revenues to segments underlined 
specific recommendations. 
With regard to the income statement, this philosophy 
can be summed up in the familiar accounting label 
"contribution margin." That is, disclosures as to net 
billable sales revenues, cost of goods sold and 
segment-specific marketing and administrative outlays are 
highly desirable. Nearly all the subjects opposed any 
sort of attempts at cost allocation, however. As both 
Standard Oil and Mobil put it, the critical question to be 
asked is, "Would these expenses still exist, even if the 
division did not?" If so, it would simply be best to 
disclose them as a lump sum within the aggregated 
statements. 
Perhaps the strongest 'contrary' argument came from 
Monsanto. It supported the SEC's recommendation of 
reporting "income before extraordinary items and taxes." 
(Note that this would require allocation of costs.) 
Monsanto also thought that companies which could not—or 
would not—report per-segment operating income should be 
forced to justify their non-compliance. 
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Cost allocation was not the only potential roadblock 
to a pristine derivation of "segment income." 
Inter-segment transfers also posed a problem, according to 
the two accounting professional societies. The AAA and 
the AICPA both noted the rather nebulous nature of this 
item: neither 'sales' nor 'expense' in the true sense, but 
necessary nonetheless. Should it be included in the 
computation of segment income? If so, in which category? 
At a minimum, though, all subjects agreed on the 
desirability of disclosing sales revenue per product line. 
This figure is perhaps most determinable, and immune from 
the allocation problem as well, since pricing and sales 
records are readily kept for each product. 
With regard to the balance sheet, the more extreme 
opinions have already been noted. LTV perhaps typefies 
the greater concern over tenuous net-asset allocations. 
Certain fixed assets can undoubtedly be linked directly 
with identifiable divisions. Yet according to LTV, such 
"partial asset allocations" are misleading and 
unrealistic. Few companies would divide up all their 
plant assets for self-appraisal purposes in this manner, 
anyway. And the resultant figures do not lead to useful 
indicators of overall corporate performance. 
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Several respondents, however, identified key 
balance-sheet items which (if directly traceable) could be 
useful to financial analysts. These include product 
inventories; divisional equipment (with accumulated 
depreciation); net current assets; and segment debt and 
equity. As FAF stated, these items could help explain why 
ROI, cash flow and earnings growth often differ markedly 
across product lines—even within the same conglomerate. 
Thus far, we can characterize the "vote" on 
income-related disclosures as a "yes" (due to the 
overwhelming desire for revenue data in particular). And 
balance-sheet information, as explained above, warrants at 
least a "maybe." What, then, is the verdict on the last 
major statement: changes in financial position? 
Here, the tentative nature of the responses comes 
disturbingly close to a "no." The most succinct reasons 
come from Caterpillar Tractor. It reminded the FASB that 
the components of the funds-flow statement, after all, 
emanate from activities relating to both the balance sheet 
(financial position) and the income statement (results of 
operations). Therefore, if these "parent" statements 
cannot themselves be entirely segmented, then neither can 
the statement of changes in financial position. Standard 
Oil also felt that the statement of changes was most 
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pertinent to the company as a whole. Chopping it up into 
segments would be a useless mathematical exercise at best. 
Not surprisingly, a few respondents acknowledged the 
desirability of per-segment funds-flow information if 
"reliable," "practicable," "traceable," etc. But only two 
such specific items were consistently mentioned:"capital 
expenditures by line of business" and "working capital 
provided per segment." 
The FASB ended up mandating disclosures from all 
three of these statements, however. In paragraphs 23-27 
of Statement 14, it required the following information 
from "reportable segments": 
1. aggregate revenues (with inter-segment pricing 
policies consistently applied and departures 
disclosed) 
2. divisional operating profit/loss (with cost 
allocation schemes consistently applied and 
departures disclosed) 
3. the aggregate amount of "identifiable divisional 
net assets," with disclosure of accumulated 
depreciation, depletion and amortization 
4. acquisitions of fixed plant assets per segment 
during the period 
5. information pertinent to investments in 
vertically integrated equity-method investees 
6. per APB Opinion 20, the effects of a change in 
accounting principle upon the operating 
profit/loss of individual segment(s) 
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Other disclosures relate to the types of 
products/services sold. They are given in Paragraph 2 of 
the statement. 
The Board was flexible concerning the form that these 
disclosures should take. They may be presented in any of 
the following ways (Paragraph 28): 
1. as part of the financial statements themselves 
2. as footnotes to these statements 
3. - as supplementary schedules 
Now that the major issues of implementation have been 
examined, a trio of supplementary questions remains. The 
first of these concerns the desirability of additional 
disclosures, other than those already discussed. The 
second is a re-emergence of a sticky problem encountered 
in foreign currency translation changes which, occur after 
the fiscal-period closing date but before the public 
release of the financial statements. Should segment 
disclosures be retroactively restated in such cases? The 
last issue is perhaps the most interesting, since it 
constitutes a complete change of heart by the FASB. A 
year after Statement 14 went into effect, the Board issued 
another pronouncement which effectively suspended its 
stand on this very question. The topic: interim reporting 
by segments. 
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The same subjects' letters were read for these three 
issues and their responses scaled. Compared to the 
preceding solution. Figure 28 reveals two markedly 
homogeneous clusters. The third quadrant contains the 
industrial foursome of Mobil Oil, Dow Chemical, Procter 
and Gamble, and Texas Instruments. Directly to the left, 
we can see four of the Big-8 firms (Ernst and Ernst, Peat 
Marwick, Touche Ross and Haskins and Sells), as well as 
the AICPA. Only two corporate respondents, A.T.and T. 
and Monsanto, plot with this group. Three other 
professional reporting societies (AAA, FEI and FAF) are 
also located in this quadrant. In fact, as we scan the 
perceptual space from northeast to southwest, we can 
observe a moderate split between accounting-oriented and 
industrial subjects. 
But it is the vertical axis (Dimension 2) which 
captures the controversial policy issue of interim segment 
reporting. According to Caterpillar Tractor, the 
imposition of yet another such reporting requirement could 
unnecessarily delay its issuance. Since timeliness is 
especially crucial for the shorter fiscal periods covered 
by interim reports, such delays could ironically make the 
released figures "old news" to readers. Honeywell went a 
step further, in declaring that this sort of 
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over-disaggregated information could easily be 
misinterpreted. For example, excessively short reporting 
periods may not be representative, particularly in the 
case of seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in product 
demand. 
Some accounting-oriented respondents also opposed 
interim segment reporting requirements. Arthur Andersen, 
for example, pointed to the lack of workable existing 
guidelines for interim reporting iri general. If usable 
rules haven't yet been worked out for companies in the 
aggregate, isn't it a bit premature to impose a divisional 
requirement at this time? The NAA also felt that such 
disclosures should be left up to management's discretion. 
At the opposite end of this axis, we can find three 
ardent supporters of interim requirements. LTV 
acknowledged the existence of seasonal fluctuations, but 
it felt that adequate disclosure could help prevent the 
sort of confusion alluded to by Honeywell. Standard Oil 
agreed that, although consolidated amounts may remain 
unaffected, changes in bases of segmentation or material 
swings in revenue/cost totals, deserve revelation 
immediately upon their occurrence. Masonite also 
supported interim segment reporting. 
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There was a noticeable "split" within the Big 8, 
pertaining to the required amount of interim segment 
disclosure deemed necessary. This is perhaps reflected by 
their dual locations (top half vs. middle) on the y-axis. 
For instance, both Ernst and Ernst and Peat Marwick, 
possibly mindful of the "timeliness" problem, thought that 
interim reporting was a good idea—but it should be done 
in a greatly condensed form. Haskins and Sells also urged 
summary data in the manner presented within APB 28 
("Interim Financial Reporting"). Note their position in 
the "mostly-accounting," right-hand-side cluster. 
Incidentally, the other members of this group agreed with 
this position. A.T.and T., Monsanto, and the AICPA all 
opted for limited disclosures at best. 
How can the FASB1s extreme position on this axis be 
explained? At first glance, it seems a bit surprising to 
find it plotting with the "no" subjects. After all, 
didn't it require a veritable laundry list of segment 
disclosures in Statement 14? 
Actually, the FASB initially took a highly similar 
position with regard to this issue. According to 
Statement 14, issued in 1976, companies which prepare 
complete aggregate statements on an interim basis were 
required to include segment disclosures as well. However, 
154 
just one year later, the Board drastically altered its 
stand. The FASB admitted receiving numerous letters 
complaining that Statement 14 was much too vague. As a 
result, in Statement 18 the Board announced that it was 
suspending the interim requirement, pending completion of 
its own technical study of the situation. (No additional 
pronouncements have been issued to date.) 
In like manner, the horizontal axis of Figure 29 
(Dimension 1) proves to be interpretable. But first, note 
that the respondent split pointed out in Figure 28 is even 
more clearly evident here. At one extreme we find the 
four corporate subjects Texas Instruments, Mobil Oil, 
Procter and Gamble, and Dow Chemical. Located at the 
other end is the same predominantly accounting cluster 
found in Figure 28. Though there is some mixing of 
respondents in the middle, a distinct 
corporate-to-accounting trend can be seen as we move from 
left to right. 
Which question triggered such an attestor-preparer 
split? It had to do with the usefulness of additional 
segment disclosures, other than those within the 
statements themselves. Accounting subjects tended to 
subscribe to the maxim, "more is better." On the other 
hand, corporate subjects saw little value beyond the 
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revenue and income disclosures already proposed. 
Dow and P and G both believed that net sales and 
operating income figures should suffice. According to 
their letters, any additional disclosures ought to be left 
up to individual managers—a position also supported by 
Mobil. Texas simply stated that additional disclosures 
were unnecessary. 
The accounting respondents, however, drew up 
veritable "wish lists" of items they would like to see 
reported per segment. The following is a compilation of 
recommendations made by the subjects on the right-hand 
side of this axis: 
1. segmentation bases (including changes) 
2. major products/services offered for sale 
3. pricing policies relating to inter-segment 
transfer of goods 
4. cost-allocation procedures 
5. accounting methods used 
6. unusual and infrequently occurring items 
7. explanation of inventories accounted for by the 
equity method 
8. treatment of corporate minority interests 
9. material changes in the net amount of income/loss 
reported (especially if the bottom-line amount is 
the "contribution margin per segment") 
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In fact, the Financial Analysts Federation urged that 
individual segments which differ markedly from the rest 
should be.forced to present a complete set of statements 
in their own right. 
Throughout Statement 14/ the FASB managed to mention 
all/ or most, of the above disclosures. Recall/ however, 
that this statement applies only to those segments meeting 
one or more of the three "tests" discussed at the outset. 
Hence, its somewhat "midpoint" plot- relative to the x-axis 
can be explained. Furthermore, the FASB wavered on the 
question of whether these disclosures should be made 
within the statements, or outside them, as was also noted. 
Therefore, with regard to their form, the FASB may once 
again be viewed as "neutral." 
The vertical axis reveals a mixed cluster in the 
bottom portion of the space. Price Waterhouse, Rockwell, 
Honeywell, and the NAA all plot here, along with the FASB. 
However, Dimension 3 was not directly interpretable. 
How can the analysis of DM 5 be summarized? In the 
scaling of Brown's questions, two basic issues and one 
implementational issue emerged as clear separators. These 
had to do with the overall desirability of segment 
requirements; the appropriateness of FASB guidelines with 
regard to bases of segmentation; and the usefulness of 
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balance-sheet disclosures. 
Three additional questions were scaled as a follow-up 
step. One of these, concerning interim reporting for 
segments, constituted a FASB turnaround. The Board did, 
in fact, plot with those subjects whose opinion it 
eventually adopted in Statement 18. With regard to the 
desirability of additional disclosures, however, the FASB 
opted for a more neutral position. 
The perceptual spaces for these three issues also 
revealed the "preparer-attestor" split so often mentioned 
in Brown's work. Generally speaking, accounting-oriented 
subjects argued the theoretical merits of greater 
divisional disclosures. Corporate respondents, on the 
other hand, were much more likely to focus on the 
mechanical and interpretational problems of such 
additional reporting requirements. 
The FASB's strategy with regard to segment 
disclosures is a recurrent phenomenon. That is, the Board 
tends to resolve such policy questions by carefully 
circumscribing their content and form. It set up size 
tests for reportable segments in Statement 14. Any 
division not meeting at least one of these tests was 
automatically exempted from the requirements. 
Furthermore, it permitted such information to be placed in 
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supplementary notes. This "compromise" approach is also 
evident in the areas of leasing, GPL reporting, foreign 
currency translation, and pension disclosures. 
These findings are therefore in line with Wolk, et. 
al.'s observation that the FASB copes with controversial 
issues by allowing for some individual discretion. Not 
only is it expedient; it may be the only way to resolve 
accounting issues for such imprecise concepts as 
"reportable market segments." Supplying information whose 
limitations are made known may be preferable to not 
reporting it at all. 
However, the possibility of information overload must 
always be kept in mind. Given the capabilities of data 
processing technology, it is admittedly tempting to crank 
out a veritable blizzard of figures. An infinite number 
of items could conceivably be reported relative to 
manufacturing, distribution and marketing strategies. But 
is all of this additional information really useful? Does 
most decision making boil down to just one or two key 
figures —which are already being supplied? Users would 
be paralyzed with indecision if they were forced to treat 
each item of disclosure as being of equal importance. 
More work needs to be done about such inherent 
"multicollinearity" in accounting information. 
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Discussion Memo _7 
Accounting for leases. The issue of accounting for leases 
neatly illustrates the dilemma in following the letter vs. 
the spirit of the law. Lessors typically prefer to omit 
leases from their balance sheets. After all, they claim, 
they do not hold title to the leased property; therefore, 
it is not one of "their" assets. By this omission, of 
course, they deftly improve their debt ratios and rates of 
return on assets. By not reporting the corresponding debt 
obligation, they may also manage to avoid violating credit 
restrictions in existing debt covenants. 
Opponents of this "off-balance-sheet financing" take 
a more liberal approach to the ownership issue. What 
matters most in their view is not a legalistic threshold 
such as passage of title. Rather, anyone who enjoys a 
definable stream of economic benefits from the leased 
property, in effect, has an "asset" which should be 
acknowledged (along with its corresponding debt 
obligation) in the financial statements. 
Furthermore, proponents of the efficient markets 
hypothesis argue that the capital market is not fooled in 
the least by this sort of lease concealment. Lending 
institutions such as banks are well aware of the 
popularity of leasing, and they routinely factor its 
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effects into evaluation of credit applications as well as 
setting of borrowing restrictions. Why, then, try to hide 
something whose effects are known anyway? 
In the first scaling. Brown's original eight 
questions will be examined. These have to do with 
treatment of various types of leases by both lessors and 
lessees. Several of these questions are somewhat 
overlapping in their content. This "multicollinearity" 
resulted in the emergence of fewer distinct interpretable 
dimensions than with other DMs. Furthermore, a large 
number of respondents (most notably the corporate 
special-interest subjects) took a very narrow, legalistic 
interpretation of some questions—especially the 
"asset-recognition issue"—thereby causing them to omit 
many of the secondary questions. All these factors 
impaired the fit and interpretability somewhat. 
The supplementary policy list contained four 
additional questions which dealt with various types of 
disclosure. These are scaled separately. As will be 
seen, this set produced a dramatic improvement in fit; and 
thus more clear-cut groupings of subjects. 
The most striking feature of the first map (Figure 
30) is not its clusters, but rather the overall picture. 
The left-hand side is dominated by accounting subjects; 
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only two industrial respondents (3M and Sunoco) plot here. 
In contrast, the right half almost entirely belongs to 
these special-interest groups(with the exception of NAA, 
Price Waterhouse and Touche Ross). 
Which policy issue engendered this sharp split 
between accounting and non-accounting subjects? It 
actually turns out to be two questions which seem to tap 
the same underlying asset-recognition issue. 
Question 1 asked whether leases which are, in 
substance, "installment purchases" ought to be 
capitalized. This seems to be a question of substance vs. 
form. Most of the accounting respondents felt that the 
right to enjoy use of the leased property was certainly 
enough to warrant calling it an asset. Not surprisingly, 
though, the majority of corporate respondents opted for 
the narrower "who-holds-title" interpretation— believing 
their financial performance was enhanced by omitting such 
property from their statements. 
Most accounting subjects offered specific tips as to 
judging when a lease becomes a bona fide asset. Coopers 
and Lybrand felt that a "noncancellable lease term of over 
three years' duration" was sufficient evidence. The 
Financial Analysts Federation specified two different 
criteria. The lease term ought to extend over at least 
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75% of the remaining useful life of the property. Also, 
the terms of the lease contract should permit the lessor a 
complete recovery of his original investment in the 
property, plus a "reasonable" return on such funds. Many 
others cited this sort of "material equity" argument, 
among them the AAA and the AICPA. Peat Marwick reached 
back to the underlying definitions of financial statements 
in its opinion. It stated that, by not recording such 
leased property as assets, the balance sheet would fail to 
reflect all of the economic resources and obligations of 
the entity (and thereby also all significant sources of 
its financing). 
The crux of the split between both groups is perhaps 
even more glaringly evident in the second policy issue. 
This question asks whether leases whose terms give rise to 
debt in the strict legal sense should be recorded as 
liabilities. In effect, this constitutes the mirror image 
of the asset-recognition question, for a corresponding 
equity would need to be shown. 
Most accounting respondents felt this was a moot 
issue at best. The key question, according to them, is 
not the legal creation of a debt obligation, but rather 
the acquisition of an economic resource (e.g., use of the 
leased property). All such leases should be capitalized 
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as assets; therefore, the criterion implied by the second 
policy question is "necessary but not sufficient." 
In contrast, the special-interest subjects hedged 
their responses in the direction of a legalistic 
interpretation. Hoover and Marriott, for instance, felt 
that there had to be concrete evidence of a purchase 
(e.g., a bill of sale) prior to equity recognition. 
Frontier Airlines specified yet another pre-condition: a 
firm option to buy, rather than lease, which had to be in 
effect from the start of the lease term. 
International Multi foods offered perhaps the most 
forceful argument against balance-sheet recognition of 
leased properties. It pointed out the inevitable rise in 
debt ratios, but with the following insidious 
"postscript." The company might be forced to scuttle 
those products or divisions which derive mainly from such 
leased property. It might also be pushed back into the 
equity markets, to raise alternate financing to counteract 
the "pseudo-debt" of the lease. This would have an 
inflationary effect upon the macro-economy through 
pressure on interest rates. Furthermore, the company's 
tax burden would increase, as "corporate franchise taxes" 
are linked directly to total net assets held. 
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One accounting respondent which sided with these 
corporate subjects is the NAA, as depicted by its position 
in the right half of the space. Regarding liability 
recognition, NAA admitted that the readers of financial 
statements do bear a "social loss" if potentially 
predictive information is not disclosed. Yet....in an age 
of intricate legal liabilities, can managers be blamed for 
hesitating to commit to paper a figure which is not 
precisely determinable? After all, the "liability" would 
involve discounting minimum lease payments to present 
value. Who can say with certainty what the "appropriate" 
interest rate should be, given the ups and downs of the 
lending markets? 
The remaining residual value of the property upon 
expiration of the lease is yet another unknown which 
enters into the calculations. Would it not be safer, 
according to the NAA, to disclose such an amount as 
"contingent"? Also, it felt that more work is needed on 
the basic conceptual framework of accounting (e.g., 
exactly what constitutes an "identifiable asset"), before 
delving into specifics such as capitalizing or not 
capitalizing individual items. 
In Statement 13 ("Accounting for Leases"), the FASB 
clearly opted for the more liberal view of asset 
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ownership. Paragraph 7 set up four distinct tests to be 
applied to the acquisition of leased property. If the 
lessee meets even one of these tests, he is to recognize 
the lease as an asset (with its corresponding liability) 
in his financial statements. The tests are as follows: 
1. The lease transfers ownership of the property to 
the lessee by the end of the lease term (e.g. # 
basically the straightforward "passage-of-title" 
condition) 
2. The lease contract awards the lessee a "bargain 
purchase option" on the leased property (e.g.# 
significantly less than its fair value on the 
open market at the time) 
3. The term of the lease extends through at least 
75% of the expected economic use life of the 
asset (this test does not apply if the lease 
contract is initially entered into during the 
last 25% of the asset's life) 
4. The present value of the total minimum lease 
payments, less such transitory costs as 
insurance, taxes, and maintenance expenses, is at 
least equal to 90% of the "fair value" of the 
property to the lessor, less any investment tax 
credit accruing to him (again, an exception is 
made for lease contracts which begin during the 
last quarter of the property's economic use life) 
Why is this interpretation considered broader in 
scope? The FASB is clearly considering alternative 
evidence of "ownership" than the mere passage of title 
(Test 1). If the lessee has use of the property for a 
substantial portion of its expected life, then it is 
realizing tangible economic benefits which deserve to be 
acknowledged as assets (Test 3). 
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Similarly/ the lessee might get an opportunity to buy 
the property at a price far below what an outsider would 
be expected to pay for its current value (Test 2). Why 
would such a price break be awarded? One possible reason 
is that the periodic leasing "expense/" or payments, would 
in total substantially equal the value of the asset (Test 
4). 
In other words, the lessee is building up a "material 
equity" in the property through these large periodic 
payments. Wolk, Francis and Tierney (1984) pointed out 
that this material equity is a gradual buildup of 
"ownership" by the lessee, and thus as much evidence of 
possession as the one-shot event "passage of title." 
How exactly is the leased property to be recorded? A 
"Leased Asset" account is debited for the aforementioned 
present value of minimum payments—but not exceeding the 
fair market value of the asset at the outset of the lease, 
in keeping with the principle of conservatism. However, 
several deductions are to be made from the present-value 
summation. These include the executory costs (Test 4); 
residual value of the property; bargain-purchase options; 
and any non-renewal payment penalties. 
With regard to the second policy issue, the 
conservatism principle again shows up in the guise of the 
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"proper" interest rate to be used by the lessee in the 
discounting procedure. The FASB allowed use of the 
lessee's "incremental borrowing rate" in general. (Note 
that this is somewhat readily obtainable and verifiable, 
assuming that the lessee borrows for other purposes, and 
in other forms, in the capital markets, according to Wolk, 
et. al. This somewhat mitigates the argument made by 
International Multifoods in response to this question.) 
However, if the lessor's implicit interest rate is 
obtainable and smaller than the incremental rate, it must 
be used instead. 
How is this "conservative"? Wolk, et. al., point 
out that this lower rate, when applied in the discounting 
process, results in a higher present value. This makes 
Test 4 easier to meet (or, perhaps more to the point, 
harder to beat!) for the lessee. 
In terms of the second policy issue, one important 
point should be noted regarding the discharge of the 
liability through periodic lease payments. The FASB 
prescribed the use of the "effective interest method." In 
other words, the payment is to be split into two distinct 
parts: reduction of the loan itself, and recognition of 
interest expense thereon. 
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Looking now at the vertical axis (Dimension 3), we 
note the Financial Analysts Federation and Price 
Waterhouse (among others) in the bottom portion. Arthur 
Young, Hoover and Eastern Airlines, in contrast, have 
relatively large positive y-values. By far, though, the 
bulk of respondents (along with the FASB) are centrally 
located on this axis. 
The question which produced this split asks whether 
accounting by lessees and lessors should be symmetrical. 
Those subjects who said "no" pointed out the limitations 
of such rigid absolutes in the face of extenuating 
circumstances. Eastern Air reminded the FASB that 
establishment of "ownership" is not always clear-cut. 
Arthur Andersen cited the case of a lease transaction 
which is treated as a "purchase" by the lessee. Yet, the 
lessor collects only a very minimal down payment, and 
retains what Arthur Andersen calls "significant 
unperformed activities" relative to this leased property. 
In such a case, the transaction cannot simply be handled 
as a clear-cut "sale/purchase." Arthur Young refers 
generally to "varying economic interests and risks by the 
various parties to a transaction." These frequently 
necessitate special—if sometimes asymmetrical—accounting 
treatment in order to reflect their nature as accurately 
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as possible.As Hoover neatly sums it up, symmetry is 
nice— i_f it arises naturally. But it shouldn't be the 
most important consideration. 
On the other hand, some subjects feel that symmetry 
shouldn't be too difficult to attain in its own right. 
The credibility of the reporting profession will suffer 
otherwise, according to Hoover, if marked inconsistencies 
are tolerated. The Financial Analysts Federation went a 
step further, urging that auditors insure symmetry by 
specifically communicating with all parties to the leasing 
agreement. 
Not surprisingly, however, the bulk of respondents 
linked their answer to the more basic issue of asset 
recognition. In other words, they claimed that symmetry 
is a function of the clarity of accounting standards and 
definitions. If the policy-making agency can reach 
specific agreement on exactly when a "purchase" or "sale" 
occurs in the first place, then "proper" reporting will be 
much easier to attain. 
There is one economic conflict of interests which 
tends to discourage symmetry in reporting between lessees 
and lessors, according to Wolk, et. al. The latter would 
enjoy better operating performance by treating the lease 
as a "sale", and thus reporting related revenues. 
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However, the lessee would much prefer not to consider the 
leased property as a "purchase"—and thus a capitalizable 
asset—for the reasons cited earlier. 
Nevertheless, the FASB attempted to make the 
reporting of both parties as parallel as possible. The 
four capitalization tests of Statement 13 apply to the 
lessor as well. He would correspondingly recognize a 
receivable for the present value of total installment 
payments plus total residual value of the property, less 
the same sort of periodic maintenance fees. The lessor 
also is to use the effective interest method to subdivide 
these installment payments into reduction of the 
receivable and earned interest revenue. 
If none of the four tests are met, the property is 
simply treated as an "operating lease" by both parties. 
This means that the transaction is nothing more than a 
rental. The installment payments are not capitalized as 
assets by the lessee in this case. Rather, they are 
expensed as incurred. Similarly, the lessor treats them 
as periodic rental income. 
The FASB did not manage to close all possible avenues 
of deviation in recording lease agreements, though. Wolk 
identifies two components of the calculations which could 
theoretically result in different net amounts for lessees 
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and lessors—despite the presence of the same economic 
transaction. One of these, the interest rate used in the 
discounting of payments , was referred to earlier. While 
the lessor can only use his own implicit rate, the lessee 
must select the lower of his incremental borrowing rate 
and the lessor's implicit rate. 
A second area of difference is in treatment of the 
residual value of leased property. According to the 
fourth capitalization test, the lessor uses the entire 
residual value when computing his receivable. But the 
lessee only adds in that portion which has been 
guaranteed. 
Despite these departures from perfect symmetry. 
Statement 13 greatly standardized the conditions under 
which a lease is to be capitalized. Because the four 
tests apply to both lessee and lessor, reporting by both 
parties to the transaction became notably more consistent. 
The next perceptual map (Figure 31) depicts an even 
clearer spread of accounting-vs.-non-accounting subjects 
(left to right, respectively). The vertical axis in this 
case failed to reveal either definitive clusters or 
conceptual interpretability. 
With eight distinct policy questions scaled, why did 
only three emerge in the analysis? As mentioned earlier, 
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there is marked collinearity among these questions. A 
glance at Brown's list reveals that most of them deal with 
some aspect of capitalized leases, from both the lessee's 
and the lessor's viewpoints. (The complementary nature of 
the first and second questions—capitalization and 
liability recognition—was just discussed with respect to 
the first horizontal dimension.) 
A related problem deals with the narrowness of 
special-interest subjects' responses to the Discussion 
Memo, and the resultant "missing values" for most of the 
remaining questions. Corporate lessees have a natural 
incentive to keep leased property off the balance sheet. 
Therefore, their overriding objective in their letters was 
to talk the FASB out of any notions of capitalization. 
In other words, they either addressed only Brown's first 
policy issue, or else they re-interpreted the remaining 
issues in this light. 
Take, for example, policy issue 4. This question 
asks whether footnote disclosure represents a satisfactory 
ternative with respect to capitalization for users' 
information needs. Since many corporate subjects were so 
vehemently opposed to asset recognition, they in fact 
viewed footnoting as the only acceptable alternative 
anyway. 
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The accounting subjects, however, took a more literal 
interpretation of the question. Some of them were 
concerned that too-heavy reliance on footnoting once again 
undermined the credibility of the standard-setting agency. 
That is, footnote disclosure should not be used as a 
dumping ground for potentially useful information which 
accounting policy-makers otherwise don't know how to 
classify correctly. (This goes back to the AAA's initial 
recommendation to establish a solid conceptual framework 
as a top priority.) 
Others felt that footnoting should not be viewed as 
the sole alternative to capitalization. Ernst and Ernst 
suggested that such leases could be segregated and shown 
below other net assets on the face of the balance sheet, 
in much the same manner as earnings-per-share data is 
separately provided on the income statement. Still, many 
of these respondents kept getting drawn back to the issue 
of asset recognition. If the balance sheet is to reflect 
fairly all of the company's resources and obligations, the 
lessee must somehow decide whether the lease fits this 
definition—that is, whether it constitutes an "asset." 
For if the answer is "yes," footnote disclosure is clearly 
insufficient. 
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Two other questions looked at leasing from the 
lessor *s viewpoint. Question 8 asked if leases which are 
the equivalent of sales should be accounted for as such. 
In a complementary vein. Question 9 asked whether 
financing-type (non-sales) leases should result in profit 
recognition by the lessor. 
Both questions resulted in numerous "skips" when 
coded for the corporate subjects. Again, their personal 
overriding concern was lease capitalization and thus they 
had little interest in stepping into the lessor's shoes. 
The accounting subjects basically answered both 
questions by pointing to the same simple concept. They 
overwhelmingly said "yes" to the first, and "no" to the 
second, because in their opinion the earnings process is 
"reasonably complete" only for sales-type leases. 
"Substance over form" was once again the catch-phrase 
for Question 11. It asks if leases which are "financing 
arrangements for the purchase of property" should be 
identified by the same criteria as those which constitute 
"sales of property." Several of the Big 8 pointed out 
that, in this case, the lessor effectively wears two hats: 
financing agent and seller. If the bulk of the risks and 
rewards of ownership have passed to the lessee, then in 
essence the transaction is a sale. 
175 
Finally, the question of accounting for leveraged 
leases primarily interested only the accounting subjects. 
This question asked whether leveraged leases warranted 
special accounting consideration. In retrospect, Arthur 
Andersen's response came closest to the ruling of the 
FASB. It advised disaggregating the various interests of 
a leveraged lease transaction, and applying existing 
standards to these pieces—rather than piling on yet 
another set of copious rulings for this situation. 
Both Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse referred 
specifically to the tax effects as the most distinctive 
aspect of leveraged leasing. The latter firm reminded the 
FASB that the investment tax credit is often the subject 
of considerable haggling among the parties. If the lessor 
should win its acquisition, Price Waterhouse believed that 
it should be deducted from total net investment in the 
lease. Furthermore, any cash savings from tax deferrals 
must be regularly accrued, rather than recognized in a 
lump sum as they materialize. Price Waterhouse was 
especially concerned with separate disclosure of tax 
effects, particularly cash savings, in terms of users' 
analysis of financial position. Above all, several 
subjects felt that tax effects alone should never drive 
optimum reporting considerations. 
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The independently generated list of policy issues 
contained four additional questions. These were 
separately analyzed? a detailed explanation of the results 
follows. 
At first glance, the unannotated graph of the first 
two axes (Figure 32) looks downright sparse. That is, 
fewer than usual distinct points (letters and numbers) 
were initially printed out. Recall, however, that all 
points can be located in the space through their 
respective coordinate values. 
This identification process revealed perhaps the 
highest degree of overlap—and therefore the tightest 
clusters—of any discussion memos thus far. Take a look 
at the northeast grouping in Quadrant 1 of Figure 32. For 
one thing, it is exclusively accounting in nature, 
containing half of the Big 8 as well as the AICPA. But an 
even more startling fact emerges from scrutiny of these 
respondents' coordinate values —they virtually overlap* 
In many cases, their x- and/or y-values are either 
identical or differ by thousandths of a unit of measure. 
This degree of homogeneity (particularly among 
common-interest respondents) is quite a find. 
The same phenomenon is evident in the rightmost 
cluster on Dimension 1. Three other Big-8 subjects, as 
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well as the Financial Executives Institute and Hoover 
Corporation, once again occupy the exact same spot on the 
map. 
An industrial grouping can be seen just to the left 
of the origin. International Multifoods, Howard 
Johnson's, A and P, Ashland Oil and Storage Technology are 
tightly concentrated in this group. NAA, Gulf Oil, and 
Touche Ross are in close proximity. 
In sum, the horizontal axis separates accounting and 
non-accounting subjects to some degree (positive vs. 
near-zero values, respectively). But is this separation 
identifiable in terms of any additional policy issues? 
Two distinct questions appear to characterize this 
split. Both happen to deal with lease disclosures, but 
under distinctly different circumstances. The first 
question represents the scenario which most corporate 
subjects would prefer—namely, keeping installment leases 
off the balance sheet entirely. If this were to be 
permitted, the question states, should disclosure of the 
effects on net income, had these leases been capitalized, 
be made anyway? 
The vast majority of accounting respondents believed 
such dual hypothetical accounting treatment would do more 
harm than good. It somehow implies that the original. 
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within-statement treatment of leases (e.g., 
non-capitalization) was in essence incorrect; otherwise# 
why hedge one's reporting via the completely different 
disclosure? Not only would users of the statements be 
misled; the credibility of the derived net income figure 
(and thus of the standard-setting agency) is once more 
called into question. The existence of a sound conceptual 
framework (and particularly of "generally accepted 
accounting principles") should always inspire public 
confidence that the best and most acceptable method was 
used in the statements themselves. In short# you can't 
have it both ways; as Arthur Young so aptly put it# "As-if 
accounting impugns as-is accounting." 
If one believes that the substance of disclosures 
takes precedence over their form# it should come as no 
surprise that several industrial respondents also opposed 
this sort of back-door asset recognition. Union Oil# 
Hoover and Marriott all referred to the aforementioned 
credibility problem which taints these multiway 
presentations. Furthermore# Sunoco felt that users would 
be confused# instead of enlightened# upon being swampe<^ 
with such a mass of calculations. 
Perhaps the most unique negative opinion came from 
3m. It claimed that the sum of "depreciation plus rental 
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expense" (the capitalization alternative) is not readily 
comparable to "rental charges" (the non-capitalization 
alternative). For one thing, how does one offset 
"periodic maintenance charges" vs. the "pride of property 
ownership"?i 
But there are also several items of difference which 
are all too easily overlooked at first glance. These 
include income-tax provisions, profit-sharing payments, 
and dividends declared. As a result, users could easily 
miscalculate the actual cash-flow implications of one 
method vis-a-vis the other. Note that all of these 
special-interest subjects plotted in the same (right) half 
of the space. 
Despite such general opposition, there were a few 
respondents who thought that these alternate disclosures 
were a pretty good idea. Eastern Airlines, the subject 
with the most extreme left-side coordinate value, answered 
"yes" to this question. According to its interpretation 
of Accounting Series Release No. 147, the hypothetical 
effects on net income should be stated regardless of 
whether or not the lease is actually capitalized. 
Frontier Airlines also supported such disclosures. 
It believed, however, that firms should have the option of 
smoothing reported net income by allowing the hypothetical 
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interest plus depreciation to equal the lease payments. 
(Recall that the effective interest method would 
accelerate expense recognition in the earlier years of the 
lease contract, thereby unfavorably reducing the 
hypothetical reported net income.) The AAA stated that 
this requirement would greatly enhance comparability 
between lessees and those firms which happen to acquire 
similar property by other means (e.g., installment 
purchases). 
The FASB, through the four test criteria in Statement 
13, effectively rendered this issue superfluous. That is, 
by applying these rather all-encompassing tests to their 
particular lease contracts, both parties can readily tell 
whether their lease constitutes a purchase or a rental. 
Therefore, the single most appropriate accounting 
treatment (capitalize vs. expense) flows naturally from 
the classification procedure—no dual reporting is 
necessary. In other words, the FASB's "answer" in this 
regard (hypothetical disclosures) is "no"; hence, its 
position in the right half of the space. 
This was not the only issue underlying the horizontal 
separation of subjects, however. A somewhat more 
realistic aspect of disclosure also characterized this 
separation. According to this second question, is 
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balance-sheet capitalization of "purchase" leases enough? 
Would any additional disclosures about such leases be 
superfluous? 
This question brought a resounding—and, in fact, 
unanimous "no"—from the accounting respondents. The 
following list is a compilation of disclosures which they 
believed would definitely be useful: 
1. periodic payment schedules and terms 
2. interest rate applied 
3. contractual restrictions on additional borrowing, 
leasing, dividend payments, etc. 
4. renewal and/or purchase options and guarantees 
5. type of property leased 
6. sub-lease income (if any) 
7. basis for computing depreciation schedules (e.g., 
accelerated vs. straight-line) 
8. other future lease commitments (at both gross 
amounts and discounted to net present value), 
segregated by type of leased asset 
Once again, Eastern Airlines took a diametrically 
opposed position. However, it gave no reason as to why 
additional footnote disclosures were unnecessary for 
already-capitalized leases in its opinion. 
Several respondents pointed out that capitalization 
and footnoting are not all-or-nothing propositions. For 
instance. Hoover suggested parenthetical balance-sheet 
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disclosure as another choice. Perhaps FAF put it best 
when it stated that the two forms of reporting are 
complementary in nature. Inclusion in the balance sheet 
fulfills the statement's avowed purpose of listing all 
economic resources and obligations. Footnotes, on the 
other hand, should provide any additional information 
which would be useful for analyzing the company's 
financial condition and results of operations for the 
period. (The items in the aforementioned list serve as 
fine examples.) 
Evidently the FASB agreed with this viewpoint. In 
addition to the four capitalization tests. Statement 13 
required the lessee to disclose the following additional 
information relative to capitalized leased property: 
1. Total gross dollar amount of leased assets 
2. A five-year schedule of future minimum lease 
obligations 
3. Non-cancellable sub-lease rentals receivable (if 
any) 
4. Total contingent rentals accrued 
Basically, then, the FASB agrees with the (mainly 
accounting) subjects that some additional information 
relative to capitalized leases should be required. This 
explains its position in the right portion of the map. 
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The map in Figure 33 is of interest primarily because 
it illustrates the same tight clusters as its predecessor. 
(Remember: the three clusters sketched in on the 
right-hand side are actually farther apart than they look. 
The x-coordinates of these points are virtually identical, 
as noted earlier; thus, they literally overlap.) 
Also note the failure of a couple of same-industry 
respondents to cluster together. The four oil-company 
representatives (Gulf; Sunoco; Union Oil; and Ashland Oil) 
are scattered throughout three quadrants. And though 
Frontier Air and Eastern Air both appear in the third 
quadrant, they too are widely separated. 
Before leaving the topic of leases, a few comments 
are in order regarding the two questions which failed to 
emerge. Question 3 asked whether the income effects of 
capitalized leases should differ from those of operating 
leases. Perhaps the most notable aspect of the responses 
is the corporate subjects' paranoia about the effect of 
accelerated expense recognition (via interest and 
depreciation charges) in the early years of leasing. This 
is nothing more than the "income-smoothing" argument 
encountered earlier. 
The remaining question, however, has much more 
substantive financial-analysis implications. Its failure 
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to emerge as a dimension was a distinct disappointment. 
This question reads as follows: assuming no change in 
present requirements for capitalization of leases, should 
disclosure of the present values be required for certain 
non-capitalized lease commitments as well? 
This issue virtually split apart the accounting 
subjects—in stark contrast to the other leasing issues 
discussed. Some of them felt such disclosures would be 
useful in cash-flow prediction. Others, however, labelled 
them as just another example of "as-if" accounting. 
Most of the corporate subjects omitted this question, 
concentrating all of their efforts on talking the FASB out 
of tougher capitalization requirements in the first place. 
One of them, though, came amazingly close to the FASB's 
ultimate decision in its letter. Union Oil of California 
suggested that the reporting requirement should apply only 
to non-cancellable lease arrangements of at least three 
years' duration. Union Oil also advised that present 
values should be disclosed alongside the total gross 
amounts. 
The FASB studied the situation and eventually 
mandated (in Statement 13) the following disclosures for 
non-cancellable operating leases in excess of one year: 
1. Total rental obligations for the next five 
reporting periods 
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2. Total rental payments receivable under 
non-cancellable sub-leases (if any) 
3. Certain pertinent features of the lease contract 
However, the FASB's policy ruling on disclosures 
constitutes a curious reversal, according to Wolk, et. 
al. Recall that Statement 13 considerably toughened up 
the requirements for lease capitalization. However, its 
supplementary disclosures are markedly less stringent than 
those of Statement 131s predecessor ruling. APB No. 31, 
which preceded it by just three years, specifically 
required that all future rentals must be disclosed at both 
gross and discounted totals. This dual requirement 
applied regardless of the duration of the operating lease 
contract. Statement 13 eliminated the reporting of 
present value and restricted its supplementary disclosures 
to so-called "long-term" arrangements only. 
Wolk, et. al., were convinced that lessees would 
attempt to "beat" this requirement through manipulation of 
the terms of the leasing agreement. Even if they were 
unable to do so, however, the authors believed that they 
ended up shortchanging readers, as they no longer had to 
report present values. In any event, this question failed 
to emerge as a distinct dimension, in spite of its avowed 
(by Wolk) controversial economic-consequences nature. 
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The results of the analysis of accounting for leases 
may be summarized as follows. By far, the most 
significant aspect of this topic is the issue of asset 
recognition of leased property by the lessee. The 
questions dealing with capitalization and recording of 
related liabilities sharply divided the accounting and 
corporate subjects. Also especially salient was the 
question of symmetry in accounting by lessees and lessors. 
Several complementary disclosure issues were examined as a 
follow-up step. These related to the desirability of 
additional disclosures for leased property which has 
already been capitalized, as well as hypothetical income 
effects of non-capitalized leases. 
All of these issues pointed up the industrial 
subjects' preoccupation with "form over substance" of such 
requirements. That is, they worried excessively about the 
effects of lease capitalization on their debt ratios and 
borrowing covenants. They also noted with alarm the 
effects of corresponding depreciation and interest expense 
upon their reported net income figures. 
Not surprisingly, the accounting respondents had more 
theoretical concerns in mind. They defended 
capitalization of installment-purchase leases in keeping 
with the "economic resources" definition of the balance 
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sheet. 
This issue perhaps again illustrates the necessity of 
reaching clear agreement on a solid conceptual framework 
of accounting. Questions such as those pertaining to 
leases critically depend upon establishing exactly when a 
bona fide " asset" comes into existence , as well as how it 
ought to be measured. As noted repeatedly in the 
subjects' comments, the perceived credibility of any 
standard-setting organization such as the FASB depends 
vitally upon its ability to derive unambiguous—and 
unbreakable —guidelines which would resolve such concrete 
applications as the "correct" recording of leased 
property. 
Discussion Memo 9^ 
Accounting for pensions. The area of accounting for 
pension plans is perhaps more "legalistic" in nature than 
the other Discussion Memos presented thus far. It also 
brings the "separate-entity assumption" into sharp focus. 
Exactly what constitutes the employers' obligation to 
provide retirement benefits? Is it limited to those 
assets and other investments set aside to be used for 
future benefits as they fall due? What happens if they 
are insufficient to cover such benefits, even if through 
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no fault of the depositor (e.g., lower rate of return on 
these investments than originally anticipated)? Or 
suppose the final amount is directly keyed to salary 
levels, which vary with changes in the rate of inflation. 
Should these future obligations be reflected as 
liabilities now? If their future amounts are somewhat 
uncertain, how should they be calculated? And exactly 
whose liabilities are they: the employer's? or the entire 
pension plan's? or maybe the fund's? Many practical 
questions remain unresolved to this date, despite issuance 
of several DMs and Statements. 
Brown did not include pensions among his original set 
of projects. As a result, the five policy issues which 
will be analyzed are all from the "supplementary" list. 
In the first perceptual space to be examined (Figure 
34), the accounting and professional societies seem to be 
especially tightly concentrated. Note, for example, the 
cluster which is positioned directly on the left-hand side 
of the x-axis. It contains half of the Big 8 (Ernst and 
Ernst; Haskins and Sells; Touche Ross; and Arthur 
Andersen), along with one prominent accounting society, 
the AICPA. In close proximity, we also find the American 
Accounting Association. Two corporations also plot with 
these accounting subjects: Atlantic Richfield and 
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Honeywell. 
Just to the northeast, we see an even more 
homogeneous grouping. Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse 
cluster with the Financial Executives Institute. Also 
located in this cluster, interestingly enough, is the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC was 
set up in 1974 according to the Employees Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA). The primary purpose of the 
PBGC was to insure a percentage of benefits for vested 
employees of terminated plans; it does this by collecting 
periodic premiums from qualifying sponsors. 
Two similar special-interest respondents pair up in 
the bottom portion of Quadrant 2: the American Academy of 
Actuaries and the American Life Insurance Company. Note, 
however, that neither Prudential nor Liberty National 
Insurance plot within this cluster. 
Continuing to read clockwise, we find a familiar 
governmental respondent contained within a rather diverse 
trio. The Internal Revenue Service plots with Rockwell 
and the National Association of Accountants. 
Dimension 1 (x-axis) did not provide much spread 
within this particular perceptual space. As shown in 
Figure 1, all of the respondents appear to have 
small-to-moderate coordinate values on this dimension. 
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However, a glance along the vertical axis (Dimension 
2) reveals a couple of extreme values: U.S. Steel and 
Prudential, respectively. Note that most of the Big-8 
firms plot in the upper half of the space as well. The 
insurance companies and professional societies are in the 
bottom portion. 
The question providing this separation asks whether 
the assets and liabilities of the pension plan should be 
measured at historical cost. U.S. Steel reminded the FASB 
that a "plan" is simply a reporting entity, like any 
other; and it should therefore be accounted for in 
compliance with "generally accepted accounting principles" 
(GAAP) as well. Therefore, according to the cost 
principle, the only acceptable measurement base is 
historical cost. The use of current value, according to 
U.S. Steel, is somewhat pessimistic, as one must assume 
liquidation to arrive at the amounts which would be 
obtained for net assets of the pension fund. 
Finally, keep in mind that fund assets often consist 
of a mixed set of investments, both short- and long-term. 
Market prices for these securities often are subject to 
reversible fluctuations. U.S. Steel believed that taking 
such temporary gains/losses into either income or equity 
(as would be necessary to keep restating the fund at 
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"current value") is misleading to users. 
Prudential,however, took the opposite position, 
reminding the FASB that ERISA had- mandated the use of 
"fair market value" for assets of the pension plan. Two 
other respondents gave identical reasoning in their 
letters of comment: the American Academy of Actuaries and 
American Life Insurance. The latter subject, in fact, 
defined fair-market value as "surrender value" of 
contracts held by insurance companies. 
A sizable number of subjects (especially Big 8) 
advocated a piecemeal approach to the valuation of net 
assets of the pension plan. The recommendations given by 
Arthur Young are representative of these itemized 
suggestions. It advised segregating debt investments into 
those which are expected to be held until maturity, and 
those which are likely to be sold off sooner. Since the 
former are in the nature of "long-term assets," they 
should be kept at cost (net of any amortized 
premium/discount)—regardless of their current liquidity. 
The latter, however, should be recorded at the lower of 
cost" or "net realizable value." Declines in liquidity 
are therefore recognized, in keeping with the principle of 
conservatism. Equity securities should be shown at 
current values (using market quotations); and leases 
192 
should be recorded as the present value of expected cash 
flows. Finally, there are probably some plant assets 
(e.g., office equipment) which are used in the general 
administration of the company's pension plan. Since these 
are simply fixed, long-lived assets, they should be shown 
at cost less accumulated depreciation. Other respondents 
in this category proposed similar multiple-valuation asset 
plans. 
This mixed approach also appealed to the FASB. In 
Statement 35 ("Accounting and Reporting for Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans"), it grouped net assets into three 
categories. Investments such as real estate, debt and 
equity instruments were to be shown at fair market value. 
Contracts with insurance companies should be valued 
according to the ERISA reports already being filed. (In 
effect, this expedient ruling eliminated the need to "keep 
two sets of books.") Finally, fixed plant assets which 
are allocable to pension-fund activities would remain on 
the books at cost less accumulated depreciation. 
An even more basic reporting issue emerges in the 
next set of pairwise axes (Figure 35). First of all, it 
may be noted that these two dimensions provide far greater 
separation within the space; both axes now show distinct 
extreme values. 
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The northwest corner of the space is predominantly 
accounting-oriented in nature. The topmost cluster of 
Quadrant 4 is composed of Touche Ross, Haskins and Sells, 
and Arthur Andersen. Right below, we see the pairing of 
Ernst and Ernst, along with Honeywell and Atlantic 
Richfield. Even the FASB is located in this portion of 
the map, although it is paired with Union Carbide. 
Quadrant 3 features three professional societies and 
a government agency. The IRS is paired with the Financial 
Analysts Federation. In addition, both the NAA and the 
AAA plot in this quadrant. 
In fact, we can note a weak accounting/non-accounting 
separation as we scan the space from top to bottom. This 
is because all of the Big-8 firms, as well as the FASB and 
one professional association (FEI) appear in the top half 
of the graph. 
Turning first to the vertical axis (Dimension 3), we 
can find U.S.Steel and TRW at the bottom extreme. Quite a 
few subjects form the opposite pole, including five of the 
Big-8 firms, plus Marcor and Commonwealth Edison. 
Likewise, the trio of Touche Ross, Haskins and Sells 
and Arthur Andersen anchors the left-hand side of the 
Horizontal axis (Dimension 1). Other extreme values on 
this side of the axis include Atlantic Richfield, Ernst 
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and Ernst, Honeywell and the AICPA. The right-hand side 
of the horizontal axis is anchored by Coopers and Lybrand, 
Marcor, Commonwealth Edison, the American Academy of 
Actuaries, and American Life Insurance. 
Dimension 1 in fact turns out to capture two distinct 
policy issues. The first (and perhaps most basic) of 
these concerns the proper choice of reporting entity for 
pension assets. Should financial statements be prepared 
for the plan, or the fund? 
Those subjects who opted for the plan cited both the 
"stewardship function" and the "accrual basis of 
accounting" in support of their choice. As Touche Ross 
saw it, a "fund" is nothing more than an existing 
collection of assets. However, it does not reflect such 
contingent obligations as accumulated, but unfunded, 
vested benefits. Therefore, according to Ernst and Ernst, 
the fund is too limited with respect to users' needs to 
know the amounts of such imminent claims. Atlantic 
Richfield, in particular, referred to risk assessment as a 
salient interest in its similar position. Furthermore, 
both Arthur Andersen and Honeywell felt that disclosures 
per "fund" could mislead users. This is because the fund 
frequently contained a mix of assets pertaining to 
separate, distinct pension plans. 
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Supporters of the fund, in contrast, offered more 
down-to-earth reasons for their choice. Contingent 
liabilities notwithstanding, the assets actually available 
to provide these benefits are limited to those in the 
fund—this from Marcor. American Life Insurance reminded 
the FASB that obligations to contribute pension assets are 
often transferred to outside parties, such as Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or insurance companies. 
This corresponding obligation would be listed in the 
third-party accounting reports. But there was no place in 
the framework of the "plan" to show such transferred 
duties. 
Coopers and Lybrand was the only one of the Big 8 to 
avoid staunch advocacy of the plan. In fact, its response 
basically asked what all the fuss was about. Generally 
speaking, the fund is a vehicle for aggregating assets 
earmarked for pension fulfillment, and the plan is a 
collection of rules and regulations which governed this 
accumulation process. Other respondents who favored the 
fund were Prudential, Commonwealth Edison, and the 
American Academy of Actuaries. 
In Statement 35, the FASB opted for the plan as the 
proper reporting entity. Taking a somewhat legalistic 
interpretation of the issue, the Board stated that the 
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plan best reflected both the obligation to fund benefits, 
and the investments made in fulfillment thereof. This is 
graphically depicted by its position in the left-hand side 
of the space along with other advocates of the plan. 
What sorts of disclosures were required for each 
plan? The "net assets available for benefits," as well as 
any material changes therein during the reporting period, 
must be accounted for using the accrual basis. In 
addition, the obligation for pension claims (as well as 
any any changes) must be disclosed. This amount is 
calculated as the "actuarial present value of accumulated 
plan benefits"? it may appear in notes to the statements, 
if desired. 
There was a second issue for which the horizontal 
axis provided good separation. This had to do with the 
classification of unfunded vested benefits. Should they 
be reported as a bona fide liability? 
Both the American Academy of Actuaries and American 
Life Insurance preferred to classify this item as an 
equity interest, or balancing account. The former 
respondent pointed out the rather nebulous, futuristic 
nature of such claims—as opposed to such fixed 
contractual claims as current or long-term notes payable. 
Marcor also referred to the probabilistic nature of the 
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total amount "due," depending as it does on such unknowns 
as future salary levels and total number of vested 
employees to date. 
Once again, Coopers and Lybrand invoked the 
separate-entity assumption in its recommendation. 
Regardless of mandated contributions of the sponsoring 
organization, the amounts available for actual 
distribution are practically limited to concrete assets of 
the plan. 
The AICPA effectively refuted the "uncertainty" 
argument cited above, by noting the widespread use of 
actuarial calculations in the estimation process. 
Honeywell similarly circumvented another aspect of the 
uncertainty issue, by suggesting that the liability be 
limited to current retirees and vested employee benefits. 
Atlantic Richfield concurred that such benefits are bona 
fide future claims against pension-plan assets; thus, any 
category less than a liability would effectively 
understate the total economic obligation to transfer 
resources. All these subjects may be found on the 
left-hand side of the axis. 
As was just noted, the FASB supported disclosure of 
accumulated pension benefits. In fact, it issued a 
special pronouncement (Statement 36) which served as an 
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update of APB 8. Appendix A of this statement illustrates 
the manner in which total benefits must be segregated into 
"vested" and "unvested" portions. Directly below this 
amount, "net assets available for benefits" must be shown. 
Recall that these amounts may appear in notes rather than 
in the body of the statements. However, in the prescribed 
format, any net excess of unfunded benefits over available 
assets subtly conveys the essence of a liability. 
Therefore, the ruling amounts to effective disclosure in 
substance rather than form; e.g., the Board's "balancing" 
position in the space. One footnote: those sponsors with 
plans for which accumulated benefit information is not 
available may continue to comply with APB No. 8. However, 
they must explicitly state the reason for exemption from 
the rules of Statement 36. 
One final perceptual map yielded insight into policy 
differences. Figure 36 shows the rather heterogeneous 
clusters found in this space. 
Several noteworthy points can be made about this map. 
The FASB, despite its somewhat central position, clusters 
with two Big-8 firms: Touche Ross and Haskins and Sells. 
Secondly, three of the four insurance-oriented subjects 
may be found in the third quadrant: Prudential, American 
Life Insurance, and Liberty National. In addition, two 
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financial societies plot in this quadrant: FAF and AAA. 
However, the PBGC clustered not with these insurance 
companies, but rather with a mix of accounting and 
corporate subjects in Quadrant 2. Finally, the American 
Academy of Actuaries did not cluster with either of these 
groups. Instead , it may be found in Quadrant 4. 
Of these two axes. Dimension 4 proves to be 
interpretable. We can find U.S. Steel at one end, and 
the trio of TRW, Arthur Young, and Peat Marwick at the 
other. 
This axis captures the question of whether the FASB 
should specify the way in which assets and liabilities of 
the pension plan are to be measured. Those respondents 
who favored guidelines thought that they should be general 
in nature; in other words, a broad classification scheme 
for reporting should suffice. According to Peat Marwick, 
uniformity and comparability between alternative plans 
would be enhanced by a FASB-suggested format. Arthur 
Young agreed with the need for a directive, but it 
cautioned the Board not to get too carried away with 
creativity. More specifically, the FASB ought to keep in 
mind the long-lived nature of fund assets, as they are 
earmarked for satisfaction for future claims. Therefore, 
any experimentation with current valuation schemes would 
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be inappropriate. 
U.S. Steel, in contrast, answered "no" to this 
question without stating a reason in its letter. Note its 
corresponding outlier position on the y-axis. 
The FASB eventually prescribed the multiple valuation 
scheme (corresponding to type of asset) discussed in the 
analysis of Figure 33. The prescribed format was 
illustrated (and slightly elaborated) in Statements 35 and 
36. However, in the latter pronouncement the Board 
acknowledged that some plans exist which do not have 
complete information on accumulated benefits to date. 
These plans are exempted from the reporting requirements 
illustrated in Statement 36 and are to continue their 
compliance with APB No. 8. This explains the FASB's 
position in the space: located in the top half of the 
y-axis, but near the origin. 
The results of analysis of the pensions DM may be 
summarized in several ways. This topic produced great 
homogeneity among accounting respondents. Several 
clusters which contained at least three of the Big 8 
firms, and/or financial societies, emerged in the scaling. 
The insurance subjects tended to plot apart from both the 
accounting and other corporate subjects, though not 
necessarily together. But the PBGC plotted closer to the 
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accounting/corporate groups than to these insurance 
subjects. Given the "insurer" function legislated to the 
PBGC by ERISA, this was surprising. We also observed the 
FASB taking a "balancing" role in two of the three spaces 
generated. 
Several basic pension issues emerged as salient 
dimensions. They concerned FASB prescriptions as to the 
reporting entity; the classification scheme of pension 
assets and liabilities; and the cost valuation base to be 
used in reporting them. We noted that, except for the 
first of these issues, the Board demonstrated considerable 
flexibility in its pronouncements. Multiple valuation 
bases were permitted, depending on the nature of the net 
assets. Some choice was allowed as to placement of 
reported amounts (notes vs. statements). Lastly, 
qualifying exemptions for some pension plans were 
specifically legislated within Statement 36. The question 
of pension accounting, in fact, is far from settled. The 
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FASB is still fine-tuning APB No. £3; Discussion Memos 21 
and 22 were issued during 1984. 
Discussion Memo 10 
Accounting for debt restructuring. The issue of debt 
restructuring (Discussion Memo 10) is actually a hybrid of 
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three accounting topics already discussed. Accounting for 
the terms of renegotiated loans involved elements of the 
cost principle ("should new debt be recorded at historical 
entry value, or some form of current value?"); accounting 
for contingencies ("when should probable losses be 
recognized?"); and the conservatism principle ("recording 
the lower of cost or market value, as well as recognizing 
probable losses but not gains in advance"). 
There is a variety of ways in which troubled debt can 
be restructured. The creditor may decide to forgive a 
portion of the original debt, thereby reducing the amount 
of total principal due. He may lower the interest rate, 
and/or extend the due date(s) of payment(s). 
Alternatively, he might agree to accept some consideration 
other than cash (e.g., property or fixed assets). 
Brown's original four questions deal with revaluation 
of the loan under such alternative scenarios. 
Specifically, he asks whether historical entry value is 
the proper costing approach in all cases. 
In the second phase of the analysis, four additional 
guestions will be scaled. These have to do with the scope 
of the ruling on debt restructuring, as well as the 
inclusion of contingent interest payments in debt 
revaluations. The latter issue effectively combines the 
203 
revenue realization principle with the principle of 
conservatism. Theoretically/ interest revenues and costs 
should be recognized as soon as they fall due. But what 
should be done if it is unlikely that they will be 
remitted? The first scope question asks which types of 
debt restructurings should be affected by this DM. 
Likewise, the second question zeroes in on a special type 
of borrowing relationship. In memory of New York City's 
"Big Mac" fiscal debacle of the mid-70's, it asks if state 
and local government debt instruments should comply with 
this ruling. 
The rather tight clusters shown in Figure 37 reveal 
several distinct common-interest groupings. Note, for 
instance, the triple contour on the left-hand side of the 
horizontal axis. Three of the five banking societies may 
be found here: Mutual Financial Officers Association, 
Mutual Banks Association, and the Bank Administration 
Institute. A fourth society, American Bankers 
Association, lies just to the southwest of this cluster. 
Within this grouping we also find the FASB and Irving 
Trust. Two of the Big 8 accounting firms, Ernst and Ernst 
and Haskins and Sells, are in very close proximity. 
In like manner, the cluster on the right-hand side is 
composed mainly of banks. Here we see Chase Manhattan, 
204 
First National Bank of Chicago, Banker's Trust of New 
York, and Manufacturers Hanover. New Jersey Banker's 
Association, the fifth professional society, can be found 
here. Finally, the Big-8 duo of Touche Ross and Peat 
Marwick virtually overlap in the sub-space. 
The vertical axis (Dimension 3) also reveals a couple 
of same-interest clusters—much smaller in size but more 
widely separated. In the top left half we find a pair of 
banks: Security Pacific Corporation and J.P. Morgan. Its 
mirror image in the bottom portion of the space is an 
accounting duo: Arthur Andersen and the National 
Association of Accountants. One interesting but more 
heterogeneous pair turns up in the top right-hand side. 
We see the Financial Analysts Federation, which is a 
reporting society, teaming up with Security Pacific Bank. 
The question which caused this vertical split deals 
with the creditor's forgiveness of part of the original 
debt. It asks whether the remaining amount due should be 
kept on the books at its historical entry value. 
This issue divided the accounting subjects, while at 
the same time virtually unifying the special-interest 
respondents. Both the NAA and Arthur Andersen (bottom 
portion) advocated revaluing the remaining debt at current 
market value. Arthur Andersen claimed this approach 
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maintained consistency in the books. This is because the 
original debt was recorded at an amount which reflected 
market conditions for borrowing at the time. In 
particular, interest rates for similar loans are likely to 
have changed. NAA, too, felt that market value would best 
reflect current economic conditions of the debt markets. 
The opposite position was taken by J.P. Morgan and 
Security Pacific. They favored historical entry value 
since it reflects the (remaining) amount which the debtor 
is legally obligated to pay. In fact, virtually all the 
banks advocated some form of historical costing. 
Some respondents hedged their opinions with the more 
conservative "LCM" (lower of cost or market) position. 
That is, if the creditor realistically expects to receive 
less than the remaining face value of the debt (due 
perhaps to the creditor's still-precarious financial 
position), he should write it down to its net realizable 
amount. 
The FASB, as was noted earlier, ended up plotting 
with several professional banking societies. This 
position is best explained by referring to a narrow 
"slant" in some of their letters. The Bank Administration 
Institute, National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 
and the American Bankers Association argued against the 
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idea of "current costing" in general, rather than 
addressing themselves to the particular questions posed 
within the DM. They cited some unpleasant macroeconomic 
side effects from the use of current-valuation methods. 
Short-term fluctuations in interest rates would of course 
introduce instability into the income statement via gains 
and losses. As a result, lending institutions might be 
hesitant to restructure debt in the borrower's favor in 
the first place. Total lending might even be drastically 
reduced, as debtors cut down on their holdings of 
marketable securities. Debt rollovers might only be 
agreed to on a short-run, variable-percentage basis. And, 
as we saw in the discussion of DM 3, an increase in 
foreign-currency exposure hedgings could also result. 
The FASB opted for retention of the 
historical-valuation method in Statement 15 ("Accounting 
by Debtors and Creditors for Troubled Debt 
Restructurings"). How does this constitute "agreement" 
with these banking societies? Recall that in its study of 
general price level accounting (DM 2), the FASB reiterated 
its support of historical cost as the appropriate unit of 
measure for the body of the financial statements. 
(Current costs and inflation adjustments were relegated to 
footnotes.) Therefore, the FASB in fact ended up agreeing 
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with opponents of alternative valuation schemes. 
Respondents basically agreed on how to record the 
amount of debt forgiven. They advised the creditor to 
write it off against a valuation reserve, in exactly the 
same manner as the allowance for doubtful accounts 
receivable. If no such reserve has been set up in 
advance, the forgiven amount is to be directly charged off 
to income. 
Debtors likewise have two options. One is to 
increase the contributed-capital account in stockholders' 
equity by the amount of the forgiveness. Similarly, a 
second (less preferable) method is to include it in 
income. But proper placement in the income statement is 
vital. As the debtor does not normally obtain earnings 
from having his loans forgiven (hopefully!!), this amount 
should not be placed with operating income. Instead, the 
amount forgiven must be disclosed as an extraordinary 
item. 
The horizontal axis of Figure 38 (Dimension 2) 
exhibits the same sort of homogeneous groupings. Irving 
Trust and the Mutual Bankers Association team up with the 
FASB. Directly to its right we find Bankers Trust, 
Manufacturers Hanover, the New Jersey Bankers Association, 
First National Bank of Chicago, and Chase Manhattan. 
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Arthur Young and Touche Ross are located near the origin. 
These mini-clusters may be fused into one larger contour 
as indicated. This contour also includes both reporting 
associations (FEI and FAF), as well as Peat Marwick. 
The right-hand side of the x-axis is anchored by the 
two Big-8 firms of Ernst and Ernst and Haskins and Sells. 
Arthur Andersen is located directly on this axis as well. 
The AICPA and NAA appear directly below. This 
non-accounting(banking)-vs.-accounting separation is not 
as clear-cut as for some other DMs. Nevertheless, the 
extremes of the axis are characterized by common-interest 
groupings. 
This dimension captures two very closely related 
scenarios of debt restructuring. Question 7 deals with an 
exchange of debt which has a different maturity amount. 
Question 8, in contrast, alters only the amount and/or 
timing of cash payments, without a change in overall 
stated maturity. In each of these cases, should the new 
debt instrument be recorded at historical value? 
Responses to both questions revolve critically around 
the existence of a bona fide transaction. Basically, 
subjects agreed that an "accounting event" occurs in the 
first case but not the second. 
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Regarding a change in maturity, Haskins and Sells 
advised recording the new debt instrument at its fair 
market value, in keeping with reflection of the economic 
exchange which has occurred. Both Arthur Andersen and the 
NAA concurred with this viewpoint. They reminded the FASB 
that such unknowns as the ultimate date of full payment 
may be reasonably estimated. The majority • of the AICPA 
task force also advocated use of market value. 
One other respondent found in this portion of the 
space hedged his answer just a bit. Ernst and Ernst 
warned that two separate aspects of debt restructuring can 
sometimes become confounded. A reduction in principal is 
sometimes offset by higher interest charges. According to 
Ernst and Ernst, these two effects must be separately 
identified in order to see if a net gain or loss actually 
exists. 
Most other banking and accounting subjects 
acknowledged the existence of a transaction; yet stuck by 
their support of historical-entry value. As several of 
them put it, the reduction in principal effectively 
amounts to a partial forgiveness, and it should be treated 
as such. In other words, they suggested the same 
write-off against an allowance for the creditor, with an 
increase in paid-in capital (or extraordinary income) for 
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the debtor. The FASB reiterated its approval of 
historical-entry value. Note its appearance, with these 
subjects, in the left-hand side of the.space. 
By the same token, most of these subjects believed 
that a mere change in due date did not constitute an 
"accounting event." In other words, an exchange of this 
sort is nothing more than a normal debt rollover. 
Again, some exceptions to this position characterize 
the right half of the x-axis. Haskins and Sells in this 
case advised of a possible parallel change in interest 
rates. The combined effect might alter net realizable 
value to such an extent that fair value should be used for 
the new debt obligation. Ernst and Ernst conceded that 
perhaps a pushback in due date was a symptom of a 
deteriorating economic situation for the creditor. If so, 
he should recognize the probable loss in keeping with 
accounting for contingencies. The NAA advocated adequate 
supplementary disclosure of such circumstances, in place 
of within-statement recognition. Finally, the AICPA's 
task force was deadlocked—not all members could agree to 
historical entry value, though no reason was stated in its 
letter. 
The vertical axis is somewhat ambiguous in terms of 
its separation. The bottom portion contains two 
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professional societies: one from banking (ABA); the other 
from accounting (AAA). Two banks appear in the extreme 
top half: Security Pacific and Continental Bank. 
Brown's remaining policy issue did not generate 
enough disagreement among subjects to emerge as a 
dimension. Recall that this scenario involved the 
surrender of non-cash assets for all or part of the debt. 
The majority of accounting subjects felt there was 
sufficient evidence of an exchange transaction to warrant 
use of market values. Likewise, the banking respondents 
advocated the lower of market or net realizable value. 
How does this scaling compare with Brown's original 
analysis? He also identified distinct "historical-value" 
vs. "current-cost" proponents. In addition, he correctly 
linked these opposing viewpoints to the 
"existence-of-transaction" concept. However, Brown did 
not go on to discuss specific types of debt restructurings 
in the manner described above. In other words, his one 
interpretable dimension did not appear to be linked to any 
of the four scenarios which he himself set up in his 
questions. 
There are two possible reasons for this confounding: 
one of them is conceptual and the other mathematical. 
Note that each of Brown's policy questions asks about the 
212 
proper choice of accounting for both the debtor and the 
creditor. This tacitly assumes symmetry in reporting; 
that is, that the "best" choice (historical vs. current) 
was appropriate for both parties. 
Coding of responses, however, revealed that this was 
not necessarily the case. (Recall Ernst and Ernst's 
support of fair value for creditors and historical value 
for debtors in Question 8, for instance.) In fact, 
asymmetry was tolerated to an even greater extent than for 
lease accounting. This created a disproportionate number 
of "neutrals" in the coding process, thereby washing out 
extremes. 
All of this suggests that perhaps Brown's questions 
were over-aggregated. That is, accounting for debtors and 
creditors should have been treated as separate issues. 
This flaw may, in fact, underlie the purely mathematical 
problem of poor fit. Brown settled for a two-dimensional 
solution with a stress value of 0.1617. 
Because of its simplicity and adequate fit (0.0583), 
the two-dimensional solution will be examined for the 
additional issues. Figure 39 shows the clusters formed by 
this perceptual space. 
Two relatively large, centralized contours are 
readily identifiable. The group in Quadrant 4 consists 
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primarily of professional banking associations. Here we 
can find the American Bankers Association# Mutual Banks 
Association# the Municipal Officers Association and Bank 
Administration Institute. Two accounting firms# Arthur 
Young and Touche Ross# plot together with the banking 
societies. A financial association (FEI) is located just 
to the south of this cluster. 
A much larger assortment of accounting and banking 
respondents can be found to the southeast of the origin. 
It contains four of the Big-8 firms# two accounting 
organizations# one regional banking society, and five 
banks. The FASB plots with these subjects as well. 
Note that the vertical axis provides the greater 
spread of the two. It captures the essence of the first 
"scope" question. It asks whether certain types of debt 
should be excluded from the FASB ruling on restructuring. 
A handful of subjects answered "no" to this question. 
AAA# NAA# Security Pacific# and J.P. Morgan felt that the 
DM on debt restructuring should apply across the board. 
Note that these subjects appear in the top half of the 
space. 
In contrast# Arthur Andersen and Coopers and Lybrand 
specifically mentioned several items which should be 
exempt. The former subject referred to debt 
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restructurings having "minimal economic consequences/" 
such as the simple extensions of due date and/or small 
revisions in interest charges discussed earlier. Also, 
both Arthur Andersen and Coopers advised excluding 
conversions of debt into stock. Coopers mentioned normal 
rollovers (simple trade of one debt instrument for 
another). 
Most other respondents, in fact, were able to 
pinpoint specific exemptions in addition to those just 
discussed. They include the following items: 
1. optional pre-payments or other acceleration of 
debt repayment 
2. short-term commercial loans 
3. consumer installment loans (e.g., credit cards) 
4. government-insured mortgage agreements 
5. mortgages secured by real estate owned by the 
borrower 
6. home-improvement loans 
7. loans which are renegotiated at a percentage rate 
below prime 
Why should such a large number of borrowings be 
excluded from the ruling? The New Jersey Bankers 
Association claimed it would simply not be cost-effective 
for small lenders to do so. 
The FASB's position on this issue is somewhat 
ambiguous and may be termed a qualified "yes." In 
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Statement 15, it provided a lengthy abstract definition of 
so-called "troubled loan situations" (Paragraph 2) with 
equally broad examples (Paragraph 5). Paragraph 8 cited 
some specific exclusions, such as lease and pension-plan 
contracts. Yet, the FASB did not explicitly discuss the 
commonly cited exclusions which respondents preferred 
(above). Therefore, it is unclear whether or not the 
Board's broad definition was well understood and easily 
applied by preparers of financial statements. Thus, the 
FASB plots along with some of the respondents who favored 
exclusions—although the Board's exclusions were not 
identical to theirs. 
In a sense, the most basic of the four additional 
questions was the only significant MDS dimension to 
emerge. As it turns out, one of the remaining issues 
generated near-perfect agreement. The remaining two 
issues deal with a valuation scheme with which the Board 
ultimately disagreed. Therefore, their lack of emergence 
is not too disappointing in a practical sense. 
Question 2 asked if different restructuring rules 
should be set up for debt of state and local government. 
All the respondents who addressed this question said that 
this would be unnecessary. Several of them acknowledged 
one advantage which government debtors have over their 
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business counterparts: the ability to raise revenues by 
taxation. Perhaps this explains Chase Manhattan's and 
Security Pacific's warm praise of government debtors as 
'reliable.' However, Haskins and Sells balanced out the 
picture by reminding the FASB that government and 
corporate borrowers are alike in some key respects. Both 
face the same sort of budgetary constraints and 
uncertainties in their periodic capital planning 
activities. Therefore, there is really no reason why a 
broad-based ruling such as Statement 15 shouldn't apply to 
government debt instruments also. This position was 
adopted by the FASB too. With such unanimity of opinion, 
it is no wonder that Question 2 did not emerge as a 
separating dimension. 
Questions 3 and 4 presumed that some sort of present 
value attribute would be used to measure the restructured 
debt. In such a case, the two questions asked whether 
contingent interest payments should be included in the 
calculation for the debtor and the creditor, respectively. 
In this pair of issues, we can observe the combined 
forces of two distinct accounting principles, from the 
creditor's point of view. Theoretically, he will be 
entitled to collect both principal and interest at some 
future point(s) in time. But if contingent interest is 
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included in the discounted total# doesn't this amount to 
recognizing revenue before it is realized? Quite a few 
subjects thought so. 
The story from the debtor's viewpoint# however# has 
quite a different ending. Most subjects pointed out 
that—if and when such a contingent amount becomes 
reasonably probable and estimable— it qualifies as a 
"loss contingency" per Statement _5. Thus# in keeping with 
conservatism# the amount must be immediately recognized as 
a loss. 
As it turned out# the FASB excluded contingent 
interest for both parties. This is certainly justifiable 
theoretically from the creditor's viewpoint but not the 
debtor's. This across-the-board ruling might well have 
been made for purposes of simple expediency....or perhaps 
to encourage symmetry. 
Yet the FASB has tolerated moderate departures from 
perfectly parallel accounting# as we noted in the leases 
DM. Furthermore# respondents have consistently viewed 
symmetry as a desirable side effect rather than an end in 
itself. That is# it ought to flow naturally from accurate 
economic representation of a transaction. 
Evidently# this ruling is yet another example of what 
Wolk# et. al.# refer to as "rigid uniformity. 
M But such 
218 
speculation is beyond the purpose of this particular 
analysis. Suffice it to say that the two questions did 
not generate enough disagreement among the subjects to 
emerge as dimensions. 
In summary, the analysis of DM 10 produced several 
noteworthy results. For one thing, professional banking 
associations tended to cluster together in both scalings. 
Banks themselves constituted the majority of a few large 
contours. With regard to Brown's questions, 
special-interest respondents were more unified in their 
opinions than their accounting counterparts. The former 
generally opposed use of any current costing techniques to 
revalue restructured debt. This was a position which the 
FASB also adopted, perhaps in keeping with its 
corresponding stand in Statement 33. 
Specific types of restructuring which emerged in the 
analysis were forgiveness as well as modifications of 
terms of the debt. All subjects generally agreed that the 
alteration of due date alone did not constitute a 
reportable accounting transaction. However, material 
changes in terms, such as principal and/or interest rate, 
warranted recognition. Here, too, the FASB mandated the 
use of historical entry value. 
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The second phase of the scaling revealed similar 
homogeneous subject clusterings. The most salient issue 
was the proper scope of the debt- restructuring DM. Most 
subjects felt that certain types of loans should be 
exempted from these rulings. The FASB attempted to 
develop a broad-based definition of so-called 
"troubled-loan" situations. The clarity and applicability 
of such a definition, though, is an empirical question. 
Perhaps it represents the FASB's attempt to put into 
practice a call for a "sound conceptual framework"—an 
issue encountered in the asset-recognition tests for 
leases. The similarity of the problem in the case of 
troubled debt did not escape the attention of several 
subjects; they argued against a "piecemeal" approach in 
their letters. At any rate, the ultimate success of the 
FASB's response remains to be tested. 
Discussion Memo 13 
Accounting for the extractive industries. The area of 
accounting for the extractive industries brings to mind an 
issue already posed in research and development: exactly 
what counts as a "success"? Searching for oil fields is 
by definition a chancy venture. Invariably a large amount 
of money will be spent on false leads prior to discovery 
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of a producing well. Can these seemingly unproductive 
initial outlays be deferred and assigned to the well, on 
the assumption that they are necessary for the ultimate 
find? Or should they be written off immediately, with 
only those charges directly attributable to the producing 
well classified as a bona fide "asset"? 
These opposing viewpoints represent the "full cost" 
and "successful efforts" methods of accounting, 
respectively. They are also the focal point of the most 
controversial issue ever tackled by the policy setting 
agencies of accounting. Over the past 21 years, standard 
setters have in fact come full circle on this issue. Two 
agencies, the APB and the FASB, were forced to retreat 
from advocacy of the successful-efforts approach. In each 
case, the policy setter initially made its pronouncement 
with the full blessing of its primary "overseer" 
organization, the SEC. However, massive lobbying efforts 
ultimately forced the SEC to capitulate and allow 
alternative methods of reporting. 
As a result of this desertion, accounting standard 
setters had no choice but to follow suit. The APB's 
response was to sidestep the topic altogether—it simply 
dropped oil and gas reporting from its agenda of issues. 
In the case of the FASB, however, the surrender was even 
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more dramatic. The FASB initially mandated 
successful-efforts accounting in Statement No. 19. This 
pronouncement was issued in 1977, only after exhaustive 
research studies and lengthy consultation with the SEC. 
However, just two years later the FASB suspended the 
effective date of this requirement via a new ruling. 
Statement No. 25. Public pressures to do so had simply 
been too intense, and particularly well organized. Once 
the SEC decided to permit either accounting method, the 
FASB reversal was inevitable. 
Why should the choice between full cost and 
successful efforts stir up such controversy? Not 
surprisingly, the "effect on the bottom line" was the 
primary catalyst. Successful efforts, with its mandatory 
charge-off of all expenses not directly linkable to 
"hits," naturally produced a lower net income. Full cost, 
on the other hand, effectively "smoothed" net income 
according to Wolk, et. al. This is because it deferred 
all preliminary expenditures as being assignable to the 
eventual "hit." 
The negative income effect of successful efforts on 
small ("wildcatter") and/or relatively new companies could 
be especially severe. If a certain amount of unproductive 
groundwork is par for the course, were such companies not 
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in effect being unfairly penalized for their patient 
efforts by successful efforts? More specifically,were 
they handicapped in the capital markets by their lower 
reported net income? 
Supporters of successful efforts (yes, there have 
actually been some!) reply that, on the contrary, full 
costing in effect feeds misleading information to 
investors and creditors. This is because deferral of 
costs not directly associated with future benefits (e.g., 
exploratory costs tied to a dry hole) is for all practical 
purposes a camouflage of failure and risk. Optimal 
resource allocation in the capital markets cannot occur 
unless risk is clearly highlighted. 
What all of this boils down to is the question of 
proper asset recognition and the matching principle. At 
what point does an expenditure become linked to a future 
economic benefit (e.g., a net revenue stream)? We 
encountered a somewhat similar issue in leasing, where the 
primary controversy was "form over substance" relative to 
an economic resource. 
But in this case, as with R and D, there is an 
additional twist to the issue of cost deferral. Just how 
certain do we have to be of future economic benefits at 
the time a cost is incurred in order to capitalize it? If 
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success comes at the price of some "false starts," perhaps 
the sum total of all outlays should be deferred. But what 
if the industry is invariably subject to luck? What if a 
specific expenditure is chancy? Would it not be prudent 
to defer such charges with middling probabilities, until 
such time as their realizability can be more reliably 
assessed? Or would it be misleading to report such "iffy" 
outlays alongside other, more tangible "assets"? 
Analysis of this issue is especially noteworthy, 
because there have been some major policy changes since 
Brown's original study. He worked only from Statement 19, 
which made the successful-efforts method mandatory, as was 
noted earlier. Now, however, either accounting method is 
permitted. Also, in November of 1982 the FASB issued 
Statement 69, which required certain present-value 
disclosures relating to proven oil and gas reserves. 
These rulings naturally alter the FASB's position with 
respect to several of Brown's original issues; therefore, 
they warrant re-examination in this light. 
The first pairwise combination of axes (Figure 40) 
reveals four very tight clusters—and one of them sizable. 
From left to right, we can locate the oil-industry trio of 
Texas Gas Transmission, Southern Natural Resources, and 
Shell. All these subjects occupy an identical position 
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(-1.022, 0.207) in the space. Next we find a cluster in 
which three of the Big 8 (Price Waterhouse? Haskins and 
Sells? and Coopers and Lybrand) coincide with the two oil 
firms of Getty and Standard Oil of California. To its 
southeast and near the origin lies the heterogeneous trio 
of Ernst and Ernst, NAA, and Exxon. The final pairwise 
grouping of note consists of a Big-8 firm and an 
extractive-industries trade association: Peat Marwick and 
INGAA. 
Several overall patterns are discernible—but just 
barely. Oil-company respondents are scattered throughout 
the space. A surprisingly large number of these, however, 
plot singly—note especially Quadrant 1. All but two of 
the Big-8 firms plot in the left half of the space. 
However, this cannot be said to constitute an 
accounting-vs.-industry separation as reported by Brown. 
For one thing, the professional reporting societies 
dominate the right half. Also, at least one oil firm 
plots in each quadrant. The FASB appears in the right 
half, but directly on the x-axis and near the origin. 
Several other differences from Brown's results are 
apparent. Here the FASB plots alone, rather than with 
so-called "attestor affiliates." It also occupies a 
closer-to-center position. While Arthur Andersen is an 
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outlier in both sets of results, Exxon and Shell now 
appear in the same half of the space. A greater number of 
clusters has been identified in the present study, all of 
which represent overlapping points (thus, a zero 
intragroup variance). Recall that Brown settled for a 
two-dimensional fit of 0.1908, which provides very poor 
separation according to Kruskal's guidelines. The 
two-dimensional solution of this study yielded a fit of 
0.1565—better, but not yet satisfactory.) 
Turning next to interpretation of these dimensions, 
we unfortunately run into a slight indeterminancy. First, 
though, note that Dimension 2 (y-axis) provides especially 
good spread. It is anchored by Standard Oil of Indiana 
and the Financial Analysts Federation at the top; and by 
Arthur Andersen, Touche Ross and Atlantic Richfield at the 
bottom. The FASB's position with respect to this axis is 
dead-center (zero y-coordinate value). 
As it happens, the policy issue which best matches 
this separation is the central one of this DM. It asks 
whether the FASB ought to adopt the successful-efforts 
method for the extractive industries. 
Analysis of the letters of comment revealed marked 
disagreement among the Big-8 subjects, which corresponds 
to their relative separation in the space. Arthur 
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Andersen, for instance, answered "no". In its opinion, 
full cost would be preferable due to the difficulty in 
establishing a stable quantifiable relationship between 
initial expenditures and eventual oil discoveries. (A 
potential problem with using this particular response as a 
discriminator in labelling the axes will be taken up 
shortly.) 
Touche Ross went even further in its negative 
response to this issue. It maintained that, since such 
exploratory outlays were necessary to the ultimate "hit," 
full costing represented a better application of the 
matching principle. In its view, asset understatement was 
every bit as serious a reporting error as overstatement. 
Peat Marwick (also appearing in this half of the space) 
backed up this opinion by stating that all oil investment 
is made with some prior probability of initial failure. 
As such, all preliminary expenditures become legitimately 
attachable to the "success"—without which the investments 
would certainly not have been made in the first place. 
Atlantic Richfield's response was more mixed. While 
theoretically favoring successful efforts, it supported a 
rather liberal amortization policy for non-attachable 
costs—more specifically on a "countrywide" (vs. "field") 
cost-center basis. Thus, for all practical purposes, it 
227 
is not surprising to find this subject appearing in the 
full-cost half of the perceptual map. 
Both outliers in the top half, however, were staunch 
supporters of the successful efforts approach. Standard 
Oil of Indiana reminded the FASB that oil and gas reserves 
were becoming steadily scarcer natural resources. As 
such, financial statements ought to highlight clearly 
those dollars expended which did not yield a measurable 
return on investment. Otherwise, comparabi1ity between 
different oil and gas enterprises would be severely 
compromised. 
The other outlier respondent in this half is the 
Financial Analysts Federation. It too voted for 
successful efforts. In doing so, FAF specifically 
rejected the argument that successful efforts harmed small 
companies in the capital markets. After all, said FAF, 
the choice of accounting method should not drive the 
process of raising investment capital. Rather, the 
purpose of financial disclosure is to allow for the 
assessment of relative risk across enterprises. In this 
regard, successful efforts provides a better picture of 
corporate effectiveness by revealing as period costs 
unproductive expenditures. FAF especially rejected the 
often-cited analogy between "dry holes" and "normal 
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spoilage rates" in manufacturing. In their view, the 
former was more in the nature of a bona fide "failure" or 
loss. 
In keeping with its eventual reluctant tolerance of 
either method, the FASB appears directly in the middle of 
axis 2. This corresponds exactly to the ruling of 
Statement 25, which suspended the successful-efforts 
requirement of Statement 19. As expected, then, the 
graphical plot of the FASB differs from that of Brown's 
map. Since his study was completed prior to the issuance 
of Statement 25, his results showed the FASB clustering 
with supporters of the successful-efforts approach. The 
present scaling of positions has therefore faithfully 
reproduced the FASB's newest stand vis-a-vis the extreme 
advocates of both sides. 
Where, then, does the aforementioned "indeterminancy" 
come into play? The problem arises in connection with the 
position of Pennzoil (Quadrant 1). It answered "no" to 
this issue for essentially the same reasons as Touche 
Ross. Pennzoil stated that, strictly speaking, the 
matching principle did not require a precise correlation 
between expenditures and revenue-generating reserves 
within any given year. As such, the entirety of 
preliminary expenditures could be "matched" to the 
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producing well, regardless of how much later it was 
discovered. In other words, Pennzoil was voting for full 
costing; thus, it should have graphed along with the 
subjects in the bottom half of the space. 
How can this discrepancy be accounted for? The fit 
statistic of 0.0674 implies that the correspondence 
between subjects' proximities and fitted distances is 
about as good as it can get. In other words, the problem 
is not purely mathematical in nature. 
As it happens, the underlying meaning of the 
horizontal dimension yields a powerful clue. It captures 
a question which appears to ask nearly the same thing as 
the preceding issue. Such "multicollinear" (content-wise) 
questions could well be responsible for this sort of 
confounding. 
To be specific, this second question asks whether the 
degree of association between a cost incurred and minerals 
discovered ought to affect the capitalization/expense 
decision. Why the overlap in content? Proponents of the 
successful-efforts method are especially likely to argue 
for the cause-effect link, therby only capitalizing those 
costs directly associated with producing wells. On the 
other hand, full-cost advocates either claim that such a 
precise relationship cannot possibly be reliably 
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estimated, or else that "cause/effect" should be 
interpreted in the broadest possible sense of the term. 
To be sure, there were several cases of inconsistency 
across responses to the two questions— which could very 
well distort the overall fit. But, by and large, these 
questions are basically tapping two closely associated 
aspects of the same underlying issue. 
Please re-read Arthur Andersen's response to the 
first policy question at this point. Doesn't it sound as 
though the subject is addressing the second issue instead? 
Yet in their letters, subjects' individual responses are 
clearly preceded by a repeat of the question to which they 
intend to reply. As regards the answer to whether a 
cause-effect relationship should exist, Arthur Andersen 
responded "yes"—a formula, in fact, if it can be 
mathematically derived. This is but one example of the 
aforementioned response inconsistencies. 
As a matter of fact, the vast majority of CPA firms 
answered "yes" to this question (despite the fact that 
they were split on the successful-efforts issue). Most 
referred to the need to establish "future economic 
benefits," per the matching principle, as a precondition 
for capitalizing cost outlays. 
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Notice that, although the horizontal axis separates 
less well, its left-hand extreme is characterized by a 
trio of coincident respondents. Texas Gas Transmission, 
Shell, and Southern Natural Resources are among those who 
supported a causal relationship. 
The other end of this axis contains Pennzoil, Peat 
Marwick and INGAA, among others. Pennzoil (in a curious 
twist to its other answer) said "no": that, in effect, all 
costs incurred are for the ultimate purpose of reserve 
discovery. Peat Marwick said that, in practice, the 
relationship of acquisition, drilling and exploration 
costs to proven wells is too indirect to pin down via 
formula. INGAA, too, felt that only such complete 
deferral would result in "proper" matching. 
To summarize, the MDS technique has provided 
satisfactory separation, in light of the fact that some 
subjects' responses to essentially identical questions 
were inconsistent. This can be explained in two ways. 
Either the subjects failed to perceive the connection 
intended by the FASB; or else they made a deliberate 
distinction between the two criteria. 
The Oil and Gas DM listed several distinct facets of 
the capitalization-expense decision. Brown only included 
the first: the aforementioned cause-effect association 
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between costs and mineral discoveries. In order to 
explore this central issue more fully—as well as possibly 
get around the preceding collinearity— five of these 
additional questions will be separately scaled as a 
follow-up step. 
The next perceptual space (Figure 41) looks like a 
rotated repeat of Figure 40 at first glance. Since 
Dimension 1 is still the x-axis, this is not too 
surprising. The three clusters on the left-hand side of 
the space are identical to their Figure-40 counterparts. 
The only "new" grouping to emerge is the overlapping pair 
of Inexco Oil and the Financial Analysts Federation on the 
right side. 
However, Dimension 3 (the new y-axis) generates the 
greater spread and reveals some new outliers. In the top 
half we find Arthur Young, Texaco and Mobil. Directly 
opposite are Standard Oil, Touche Ross and the FASB (the 
last, no longer occupying its frequently observed 
"balancing" position). 
Unfortunately, this new dimension proves to be 
uninterpretable in terms of either of Brown's remaining 
two questions. These will be briefly reviewed. 
Brown claimed to find discrimination for the question 
of whether Statement 9, "Accounting for Income Taxes: Oil 
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and Gas Producing Companies/" ought to be re-addressed in 
connection with the current project. Recall/ though, that 
the effect of this question was combined with that of the 
full-cost vs. successful-efforts issue on Brown's map. 
In other words, it did not emerge as a distinct separator. 
There are two possible reasons for this result: one 
conceptual and one statistical. Certainly the tax issue 
can be considered peripheral to the key question of 
whether full cost or successful efforts is the "most 
proper" accounting method. Indeed, the coding of the 
present study revealed quite a few "skips" for the tax 
question. Most respondents instead devoted the bulk of 
their letters to a lengthy theoretical argument for either 
successful efforts or full cost; or, in the case of the 
latter, elaborate cost classification schemes to decide 
which are sufficiently "associated" with producing wells 
to qualify for deferral. 
The final point of difference is, again, the fit. 
Brown settled for a two-dimensional solution with a rather 
poor stress value of 0.19. Thus, it is no wonder that the 
discriminatory effects of his issues could not be 
disentangled. 
Just as a review. Statement 9 deals with the 
recognition of an unusual "interaction effect." This 
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involves the excess of statutory depletion over cost 
depletion, interacting with the book/tax timing 
differences of interperiod tax allocation. 
Three special-interest subjects (Standard Oil of 
Indiana; Shell; and Atlantic Richfield) gave the same 
reason for their response of "no" to this question. They 
argued that this so-called "interaction" is both rare and 
immaterial in actual practice. This is because the Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975 restricted its recognition only to 
certain small, independent, low-volume producers. As a 
result, the provisions of Statement 9 are, in their 
opinion, "reasonable" enough. In other words, why spend 
time and resources on fine-tuning a ruling with limited 
applicability?I 
The FASB ended up simply repealing the recognition of 
this interactive effect, as part of Statement 19. Two 
years later it reaffirmed this stance in Statement 25, by 
explicitly refusing to reconsider the issue. 
Finally, the last of Brown's issues failed to emerge 
as a separator in both his, and the present, study. This 
may have to do with an ambiguity in the original wording 
of the question. It asks,"Should the traditional 
historical-cost financial statements be supplemented by 
financial statements (emphasis mine) in which reserves are 
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valued by some basis other than historical cost?" 
This question appears to have two distinct 
components—form and content—a guess reaffirmed by 
reading the letters of comment. That is: 
1. Are alternative valuation schemes (other than 
historical cost) advisable for the oil and gas 
industry? 
2. If so, should they be in supplemental-statement 
form (as opposed to, say, footnote disclosures)? 
Actual responses varied as to whether they addressed 
one, or both, of these secondary questions. By and large, 
a majority of accounting and special-interest subjects 
opposed non-historical-cost units of measure on 
theoretical grounds. They correctly identified this 
question as simply an offshoot of DM 2, "General Price 
Level Reporting." In their opinion, why single out one 
industry (oil and gas) for such a major reporting change 
which had not yet been made mandatory across the board? 
A few subjects (both accounting and special-interest) 
felt current value information would perhaps be all right 
in supplementary disclosure form. (This does not 
necessarily imply entire statements. ) But even they 
preferred to wait until more preliminary work was done on 
the entire issue: e.g., upon completion of the FASB's 
Conceptual Framework project, and/or the SEC's experiment 
with Regulation S-X. 
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The FASB tried to opt for the path of least 
resistance in two separate rulings. Statement 39, 
"Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Specialized 
Assets—Mining and Oil and Gas," extended the 
supplementary requirements of Statement 33 to the 
extractive industries. But in Statement 69 ("Disclosures 
about Oil and Gas Producing Activities"), the FASB 
essentially salvaged the SEC's somewhat failed experiment 
in reserve recognition accounting. This involved 
discounted present-value estimates relative to the net 
cash flows from proven reserves, as well as ongoing 
revisions of the development of past ore discoveries. 
Based on its feedback, the SEC decided these estimates 
were too unreliable to be required in its filings. The 
FASB, however, felt that such disclosures could .still be 
useful to readers, provided they were made in 
supplementary form rather than in the body of the 
statements. Statement 69 also restricted this requirement 
to "publicly traded companies with significant oil and gas 
producing activities." 
As noted earlier, five additional considerations 
relative to the capitalization-expense decision were 
scaled separately. Despite the very good separation 
attained by this solution, only one pairwise combination 
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of axes turned out to be substantively interpretable. 
This map is shown in Figure 42. 
Several observations may be made from this space. 
For one thing, the Big-8 firms are more scattered than for 
the previous set of questions— they appear in all four 
quadrants, in fact. 
Note also the distinct "professional-association" 
cluster on the extreme right-hand side of the horizontal 
axis. The American Accounting Association, Financial 
Analysts Federation, and Interstate Natural Gas 
Association of America plot together. They are joined by 
the Big-8 firm of Haskins and Sells, as well as two oil 
companies (Conoco and Pennzoil). Yet another professional 
society, the NAA, is in close proximity (Quadrant 1). As 
a matter of fact, with the exception of the Financial 
Analysts Federation, all the professional societies appear 
in the right half of the map. 
The remaining two clusters have one thing in common: 
a CPA firm plotting with oil subjects. Near the center, 
we find Price Waterhouse teamed with Atlantic Richfield 
and Texas Gas. (The Big-8 firm of Arthur Andersen plots 
just to its northwest.) Directly below, we can observe 
Coopers and Lybrand, along with Texaco and both of the 
Standard Oil respondents. 
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Recall that for the first set of policy questions, we 
noted a central cluster containing three of the Big 8 
(Figures 40 and 41). In neither of these scalings, 
however, is there support for Brown's 
accountants-vs.-industry separation. (The only somewhat 
"homogeneous" division is that of the professional 
associations referred to above. But even this label is 
misleading, as these groups come from three distinct 
categories: accounting (NAA, AAA, AICPA); finance (FEI); 
and the extractive industries (INGAA).) 
One final comment is in order about the identifiable 
clusters. The pairing of Shell and FAF (bottom portion) 
proved remarkably stable. It turned up in all of the 
remaining pairwise spaces. 
Once again, it is the vertical axis (Dimension 2) 
which provides the better spread in this perceptual map. 
We can observe the Big-8 duo of Touche Ross and Ernst and 
Ernst at the top. Directly opposite we find Getty Oil 
(which in fact lies right on the y-axis), as well as the 
Shell-FAF pairup just discussed. 
This separation seems most characteristic of the 
following policy issue. "Should the degree of risk 
(uncertainty), the stage of operations during which a cost 
is incurred, and the concept of conservatism affect the 
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capitalization/expense decision?" 
Ernst and Ernst felt that, at best, these three 
variables are conditioning factors, rather than basic 
criteria. In its view, they were too subjective and 
arbitrary to serve as operational guides to accounting 
policy. Touche Ross concurred with several other subjects 
that a cause-effect association between costs and minerals 
should be the sole criterion. 
The Financial Analysts Federation, however, believed 
that both the level of risk and the stage of operations 
were critical variables in cost disposition. In fact, 
these two factors were inversely proportional. This is 
because the farther along a company is in the 
exploratory/development process, the less "risky" (in 
terms of low probability of future benefits) the dollars 
expended at that point (and thus, more properly 
capitalized as "assets"). 
FAF also made an analogy which turned up in guite a 
few other letters of comment as well. It likened the cost 
problem in the extractive industries to the issue of 
accounting for research and development expenditures. 
Both of these industries, according to FAF, are 
characterized by inherently high risk, relatively low 
prior probability of success for any given outlay, and 
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highly variable returns on investment. Since the FASB had 
already decided on an expense-as-incurred policy in the 
case of R and D, precedent was in place. 
Getty Oil went even further in its "yes" reply, by 
including an operational definition of "risk." For the 
oil and gas industry, it meant the "success rate of the 
number of producing wells." In Getty's experience, this 
should be a significant factor in cost treatment, as it 
has a strong positive relationship with "future economic 
benefits." 
Shell Oil agreed that risk was simply a proxy for 
"prior probability of success/failure." Thus, it 
warranted careful estimation at the capital-budgeting 
stage, when the company evaluates alternative investment 
prospects. 
The FASB appears in the top portion of the space, but 
with a relatively small y-coordinate value. It made no 
mention of either "conservatism" or "stage of operations" 
in Statement 19. Its position on risk was basically that 
it is inherent to all companies operating in the 
extractive industry, simply by definition. Only the 
"magnitude and number of projects" undertaken by each 
individual firm vary. The Board went on to advocate 
successful efforts, because of its more accurate depiction 
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of failed ventures as period costs. However, recall that 
this requirement was later suspended in Statement 25. 
Therefore, the FASB properly does not plot at either 
extreme? but rather, closer to the center. 
The remaining pairwise combinations of axes failed to 
yield any other interpretable dimensions. This means that 
none of the remaining capitalization-expense criteria 
emerged as significant separators. 
The second of these questions asked whether the type 
(e.g., IDC, geological, geophysical) or the nature of the 
cost incurred (e.g., tangible vs. intangible) should 
affect this decision. Again, the overriding criterion to 
many respondents was the notion of "future economic 
benefit," regardless of type of cost. One interpretation 
(reminiscent of the leasing DM) was that all outlays 
incurred prior to the acquisition of actual property 
rights must be expensed. As noted earlier, some subjects 
devised detailed schematics of how to handle a variety of 
possible charges at each stage of drilling and 
development. 
The next question asked if the medium or method of 
expenditure (e.g., using the company's own personnel as 
opposed to outside contractors) should affect the 
capitalization-expense decision. Most of those who 
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addressed this issue correctly realized that it was a 
question of form over substance. Why should the same 
transaction be handled differently, depending on who 
carries it out? It hardly bodes well for the important 
accounting criterion of comparability among companies. 
One policy criterion was simply too vague to be 
meaningfully operationalized. It asked if "management's 
mode of operations," or the way in which it plans the 
acquisition and development of reserves, should be a 
deciding factor. A number of respondents (including 
virtually all the accounting subjects) recognized that 
this was a nebulous term at best. Once again, 
comparability would suffer if different oil companies 
defined it in different ways. 
The last of these criteria, though, was a 
disappointment in its failure to surface. Wolk, et. al., 
classified it as equivalent to the cause-effect 
association, in deciding whether full cost or successful 
efforts should prevail. The question reads, "Should the 
size or nature of the cost center affect the 
capitalization/expense decision?" As explained in Wolk, 
suporters of full costing in effect consider the entire 
company as the cost center. On the other hand, successful 
efforts assumes only the individual well as the 
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appropriate cost center. 
Quite a few oil-company respondents, as well as the 
Financial Analysts Federation, felt that the concept of 
"cost center" was nothing more than an accounting tool for 
the accumulation of expense records. As such, according 
to Arthur Young and Shell, the size of the cost center 
should be the effect, not the cause, of the 
capitalization/expense decision. In fact, Arthur Young 
suggested that the decision process should proceed in the 
following order: 
1. detailed analysis of overall company operations 
2. step-by-step analysis of the circumstances under 
which each type of cost outlay is made 
3. decision as to how costs should be linked to 
mineral deposits discovered (extent of cost 
linkage essentially represents full cost vs. 
successful efforts) 
4. choice of corresponding "appropriate" cost center 
Evidently, though, the choice of cost center was not 
sufficiently controversial to emerge as a distinct MDS 
separator of subjects. 
Both sets of tests will now be summarized. The 
scaling of the first subset of questions (Brown's 
originals) produced markedly greater subject scatter than 
has been evident for other DMs. The oil subjects, in 
particular, were especially spread out. The tight 
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clusters which did emerge were heterogeneous (Big-8 firms 
clustering with select oil companies, as shown in the 
maps). Although a better fit was attained in the present 
study than in Brown's, there is no evidence here of the 
accounting-industry separation which he claimed to find. 
Despite the improved stress, only three policy issues 
were evident as dimensions. Two of these 
("successful-efforts-vs.-full-cost" and "the degree of 
association between costs and minerals") were collapsed 
into one axis. Several possible reasons for this finding 
were discussed. The third issue, reconsideration of tax 
effects, was also discovered by Brown. However, unlike in 
his study, it emerges here as a separate axis—probably as 
a result of the better stress value. 
Two comments are in order regarding the relative 
position of the FASB. First of all, it appeared in a 
central "balancing" position in those spaces which were 
interpretable. Recall that the FASB was pressured into 
/ 
allowing either full cost or successful efforts— a 
development which occurred after Brown's original work. 
Thus, MDS has correctly reproduced the Board's new 
"compromise" position (rather than having it cluster with 
the proponents of successful efforts). 
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Five additional facets of the capitalization/expense 
decision were then scaled separately. There was even more 
scatter among the Big-8 firms in this subset of results. 
Several small but stable groupings of accounting firms 
with special-interest oil subjects were evident. Again, 
there was no evidence of a preparer-attestor separation. 
Professional societies tended to cluster in the same half 
of the space, however. 
Only one of these additional issues provided 
discernible subject separation. This had to do with the 
degree of risk and the stage of mining operations in the 
capitalization/expense decision. 
Concluding Comments 
The nine DMs just analyzed contain an assortment of 
answers to the research questions posed at the outset of 
this section. Clusters of like-minded respondents have 
been identified in the perceptual spaces. The 
corresponding position of the FASB has been located in 
each map. In quite a few instances, these patterns of 
separation have provided clues as to the meaning of their 
underlying dimensions? these have been discussed in great 
detail. For the reader's convenience. Appendix 3 contains 
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a summary of the DMs analyzed and corresponding stress 
values for one through four dimensions. 
But keep in mind the specific limitations which are 
in a sense the price paid for the versatility of MDS. In 
particular, no hypothesis testing can be done. This is 
because Kruskal's stress is not a bona fide tabulated test 
statistic. This means we must be content with rules of 
thumb, rather than relying on tabled p-values. As a 
consequence, the preceding mix of results cannot be 
re-aggregated via MDS to aid our more basic search for 
undue constituent influence. 
Nevertheless, these scalings have produced as 
optional output a measure which may itself be input into a 
second round of overall tests. We may use the 
Euclidean-distance measures (a continuous variable) to 
test for differences between sub-groups in average FASB 
alignment. The resulting conclusions will therefore be 
more global than the issue-by-issue approach of the 
preceding scalings. Moreover, the tests to be employed 
permit a variety of hypothesis testing. These will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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Follow-Up Aggregate Tests 
The preceding series of multidimensional scalings was 
performed with two goals in mind. The first objective was 
to uncover clusters of respondents who held similar 
positions on accounting policy issues. Secondly/ analysis 
of these subjects' relative positions was aimed at 
identifying those individual issues which generated the 
most controversy. In this manner, both the point scatter 
(subjects) and the dimensions (accounting issues) were 
substantively interpretable. 
At this point, some additional questions come to mind 
concerning subjects' positions vis-a-vis those of the 
FASB. Recall that the primary graphical measure of 
agreement is the simple Euclidean distance. Since it is 
readily obtainable as MDS output, it provides an 
especially convenient vehicle for additional testing. The 
closer two sample points are in the derived spatial 
configuration, the smaller the Euclidean distance between 
them. 
In the preceding scalings we observed several 
examples of the "ultimate" agreement: namely, coincident 
subjects or points. The Euclidean distance between any 
two overlapping points is zero. Conversely, the more 
widely separated two subjects are on the map (that is, the 
more they disagree), the greater the Euclidean distance 
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between them. Therefore, this measure can be used as a 
surrogate for alignment (e.g., respondent vis-a-vis FASB). 
Because it is a continuous variable, it is also amenable 
to a wide variety of statistical tests. 
More specifically, the following questions will be 
examined. Do accounting subjects differ from 
special-interest subjects in terms of average alignment 
with the FASB? What about within each individual 
discussion memo—is there a difference in average 
alignment for a given subset of accounting issues? 
Recall, too, that Brown's questions were supplemented 
by an additional set of policy issues for most DMs. A 
separate scaling was performed whenever there was more 
than one additional question for a given DM. The 
preceding sections highlighted some notable shifts in 
respondent groupings for the extra questions. But is 
there an overall difference in average respondent-FASB 
alignment for these additional questions, as compared with 
Brown's original set? These supplementary research 
questions will be examined in this chapter. 
The underlying shape of the distribution of the 
Euclidean-distance variable must first be examined. This 
initial step is a prerequisite to selection of the 
appropriate statistical tests. For instance, if marked 
departures from normality exist, then nonparametric 
methods should be applied. 
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Figure 43 lists several summary measures applied to 
test for normality. These tests were applied to three 
samples (left column). The first contains all 459 
pairwise-Euclidean distances, comparing the FASB to each 
respondent, for all the DMs that have been included in the 
analysis. Next, an attempt to avoid "double counting" was 
made by including only the complete set of questions for 
DMs 1 and 3 (recall that each of these contained only one 
additional policy issue). Finally, Brown's questions were 
directly compared to the additional set? there were 378 
such responses. 
A quick "eyeball" measure of distribution is the 
coefficient of skewness, listed in the right-most column. 
The amount in parentheses is the value divided by its 
standard error. Looking down this list, we note a 
negative skew in all cases. That is, there are more 
"close-alignment" values (small Euclidean distances) to 
FASB than expected for the usual bell-shaped curve. This 
skew is most pronounced for the 
Brown-vs.-additional-questions subsample; in fact, its 
standardized coefficient exceeds the 2.00 absolute-value 
benchmark. And it is least for the comparison of the 
accounting-vs.-special-interest subgroup. 
This negative skew is pictorially evident in the 
normal probability plots for the subsamples shown in 
Figure 44. A bell-shaped plot would appear as a straight 
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line of points through the origin. By contrast, observe 
the lower values, in the southwest corner of each plot. 
If a straight line were sketched in as a rough guide, 
these points would fall above it. Again, these represent 
the greater-than-average number of small values which 
reflect the slight negative skew. 
However, a more powerful statistical measure is also 
available to us: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Its 
calculated Z-values are shown in the first column of 
Figure 43. In each case, the subsample was tested against 
a hypothesized normal distribution function? viz.: 
Ho: F(x) = F0(x) for all xi 
where F0 = N(0, 1) 
hA: F(x) t F0 (x) for > 1 xi 
As can be seen from the robust Z-values and 
associated p-values of zero, there are significant 
departures from normality in all three cases. This means 
that nonparametric tests should be chosen for the defined 
research questions. 
One such nonparametric measure appears in the middle 
column of Figure 43. As described in Daniel (1978), the 
Wald-Wolfowitz runs test is a quick and general way to 
determine the similarity in shape of two subsamples. That 
is, we can use it to tell whether or not they come from 
the same population (however distributed). It also 
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enables us to determine if they differ with respect to 
each other. However, the Wald-Wolfowitz test cannot tell 
us if a difference is due to means, standard deviations, 
or both. Nonetheless, it is a useful first pass at 
comparing subgroups such as those of the present study. 
As Figure 43 shows, the Wald-Wolfowitz test statistic 
was calculated for both the 
accounting-vs.-special-interest and the 
Brown-vs.-additional-questions subsamples. Since there 
were ties, both the minimum and maximum possible number of 
runs in the data sets were evaluated. The associated 
p-values are generally averaged in such cases. 
The hypotheses may be stated as follows: 
Hq: n]_ and ri2 come from the same population 
hA: population {n^} x population {n2} 
The test results are somewhat marginal in the case of 
the accounting and special-interest subjects. The 
averaged p is 0.06015. There is much more convincing 
evidence of a difference between Brown's questions and the 
additional issues (averaged p = 0.00055). Again, however, 
we have no way of knowing whether the Euclidean distances 
of both groups differ with respect to mean, standard 
deviation—or perhaps both—at this point. 
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Additional investigation of differences in FASB 
alignment between accounting and special-interest subjects 
seems warranted. Based on the above results, this will be 
done separately for Brown's questions and the additional 
issues. 
Because of the non-normal distributions (as evidenced 
in Figure 43 tests), the Mann-Whitney U test statistic is 
the proper one to use. However, one of its underlying 
assumptions is that the variances of the subsamples being 
compared must be equal. But recall that the 
Wald-Wolfowitz test, run as a preliminary step, could not 
provide any conclusive evidence as to whether this holds 
true. 
Fortunately, there is a way out of the dilemma. Two 
measures of equality of the dispersion parameters were run 
for the two subsamples. 
The first of these is called Levene's test and is 
shown in Figure 45. Its related hypotheses are as 
follows: 
2 2 
a 1 = a2 
2 u 
Now strictly speaking, Levene's test theoretically 
requires a normally distributed population. But one of 
its properties allows us to sidestep this catch-22; it 
happens to be much less sensitive to departures from 
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normality than some of its counterparts—most notably, 
Bartlett's test. So it is not unreasonable to look at its 
value, again as an initial pass. 
In practice, it is common to use a = 0.01 as a cutoff. 
In other words, if p-calc exceeds 0.01, it is safe to 
assume that the two subgroups have the same variance. 
(Otherwise, in the case of a normally distributed 
population, we must compare groups using the "t-separate," 
rather than the "t-pooled," calculated statistic. Both of 
these are automatically provided in BMDP3D.) Figure 45 
shows us that this is indeed the case for both subsamples 
(p-calc = 0.2118 and 0.1809, respectively). 
There is a second alternative to testing for equality 
of variances. This nonparametric statistic has far less 
restrictive assumptions in place; namely, it does not 
require equal subgroup means. This is known as the Moses 
test. Note from Figure 45 that the Moses test also would 
have led us not to reject the null (p-calc > 0.01 in both 
cases). In other words, the groups being compared are 
assumed to have equal within-group variances. Based on 
the results of both the Levene and Moses tests, we may now 
proceed with the Mann-Whitney U test for sub-group 
comparisons. 
Since the equality of subgroup variances cannot be 
rejected, we may now examine the research questions posed 
at the outset. The first of these research questions asks 
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if accounting subjects and special-interest subjects 
differ in their average alignment with the FASB. A 
Mann-Whitney U test was performed using mean Euclidean 
distances; e.g., 
H0• VACCTG = ysiG 
hA• PACCTG 1* ysiG 
According to the results shown in Figure 46, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. The calculated value 
of the test statistic is 18,816.50, with a two-tailed 
p-value of 0.1588. 
(Just as a point of interest. Figure 46 also shows 
corresponding results for the "t-trim, pooled" statistic. 
This robust measure is based on eliminating the largest 
and smallest 15% of observations in BMDP3D. This is done 
in order to minimize the influence of extreme values on 
the calculated t (and perhaps gain a more nearly normal 
subsample as well). The tradeoff, of course, lies in a 
reduced overall sample—really less of a problem here than 
with initially small sample sizes. While the associated 
p-value is different in absolute amount, it too would have 
led us not to reject the null.) 
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Next we can examine whether there is a difference in 
average Euclidean distance between Brown's questions and 
the additional set. That is: 
H0: yBROWN = yMARYD 
hA: yBROWN ^ yMARYD 
Note that the Mann-Whitney U test provides marginal 
evidence for assuming that a difference exists. Figure 46 
shows a 2-tailed p of 0.0553 for the calculated t of 
19,511. (Note that the trimmed t is in close agreement: 
its p equals 0.0444.) 
Now there is no a priori theoretical reason to assume 
that the alignment for Brown's questions should be closer 
than for the additional set; or vice versa. (That is why 
one-tailed hypotheses were considered appropriate.) All 
we can tell at this point is that a difference exists. 
It would certainly be desirable to know if accounting 
subjects and special-interest subjects differ in their 
respective alignment for Brown's questions, as opposed to 
the additional issues. However, due to sample-selection 
restrictions, this cannot be tested in the context of the 
present study. The question would call for a 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Yet only the accounting subjects 
remain fixed throughout all of the included DMs. The 
special-interest subsample was unique to each DM because 
there was no corresponding pool of non-accounting subjects 
who responded to all of the DMs. 
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But it is definitely possible to probe further than 
Brown did in his original work. He, too, concluded there 
was no overall difference in accounting and non-accounting 
subjects. He reached this conclusion by preparing an 
aggregate MDS map, as well as performing a discriminant 
analysis on preparer vs. attestor subjects. 
However, keeping in mind the nature of the averaging 
process, one wonders if some significant individual 
differences ended up getting obscured thereby. Curiously 
enough. Brown bypassed working with Euclidean distance 
measures, even though they are readily obtainable as 
output in ALSCAL. He thereby overlooked a natural means 
of testing for differences in alignment (accounting vs. 
corporate) within each of his specific topic areas. 
This, then, is the natural follow-up step of the 
present study. The average alignment for accounting vs. 
special-interest subjects will be tested within each of 
the included DMs. Since prior overall test results 
revealed a difference for Brown's questions and the 
additional issues, these will be treated separately within 
each DM. The only exceptions, as before, are DMs 1 and 3, 
for which there was just one extra question. To keep 
consistent with the unit of analysis of MDS, only the 
complete set of questions will be examined for these two 
DMs. Likewise with DM 9, which was not included in the 
Brown study—since all the questions here are 
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"additional," by definition. 
The results of applying the Mann-Whitney U test to 
accounting vs. special-interest respondents appear in 
Figure 47. The question we are asking is if accounting 
and special-interest subjects differ with respect to FASB 
alignment for a given DM and within a given subset of 
questions (Brown vs. additional). 
Significant differences between both groups are 
evident for several cases. The complete set of questions 
for research and development produced a p of 0.0715. 
These issues dealt with the desirability of guidelines, as 
well as disclosure requirements and the proper costs to be 
included. 
For the contingencies DM, only the additional issues 
produced statistically significant differences (p=0.0479). 
These had to do with disclosure and classification 
requirements for accrued future losses. 
On the other hand. Brown's issues produced the 
greater differences for the topic of leases (p=0.0108). 
These questions included capitalization of 
installment-purchase leases; liability recognition of 
corresponding debt; the desirability of footnoting as an 
alternative to statement inclusion; and symmetry in 
accounting by lessee and lessor. 
Interestingly enough, the additional DM (not in 
Brown's original set) turned out to be significant too. 
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The topic of pensions generated a p-value of 0.0345. The 
reporting entity, unit of measurement, and the proper 
treatment of unfunded accumulated vested benefits 
comprised this issue. 
The final sample which produced a difference between 
accounting and special-interest subjects was Brown's set 
of issues for DM 10 (Debt Restructuring). The p-value for 
this set was 0.0026. These issues were basically a list 
of alternative forms of satisfaction of debt. In each 
case, the primary focus of interest was the choice of 
measuring unit of the new debt: historical vs. current 
value. 
Keep in mind that each of the above results is based 
on a two-tailed test. That is, accounting and 
special-interest subjects were hypothesized simply to 
differ somehow. But what if we wish to make inferences 
with respect to the direction of these differenes? In 
other words, are there any subsets of issues for which 
average distance to the FASB is expected to be smaller 
than for special-interest groups? And vice versa? These 
sorts of questions require one-tailed tests instead. 
Figure 48 presents a summary of issues for which 
accounting subjects align more closely with the FASB. The 
table shows the DM, question source, and level of 
significance (based upon comparing the calculated t 
statistic given in Figure 47 to the tabled values in 
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Daniel). 
The first of these is the complete set for research 
and development, as discussed earlier. The pension subset 
and Brown's leasing questions also turn out to be 
significant at the a levels shown. 
However, now Brown's issues for future losses show up 
in the list as well. These comprised a list of possible 
items which theoretically might qualify as accruable in 
advance (e.g., pending litigation; foreign expropriations; 
catastrophe losses). 
In addition, the extra questions for leases produced 
smaller average distances to the FASB for the accounting 
respondents. These had to do with hypothetical 
disclosures for both capitalized and non-capitalized lease 
commitments— in particular, the effects on reported net 
income of various alternatives. 
In contrast, the two subsets of issues for which the 
special-interest subjects aligned closer to the FASB 
appear in Figure 49. These are the additional questions 
for contingencies and Brown's questions for debt 
restructuring. 
To summarize, the topics which produced the most 
difference in average alignment are research and 
development; leases; pensions; future • losses; and debt 
restructuring. Additional conclusions and suggestions are 
given in the following section. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
Introduction 
Now that the statistical results have been set forth, 
it is appropriate to re-examine them in the context of the 
broader research questions of this study. There were 
actually five basic objectives. The first of these was to 
identify clusters of respondents holding similar positions 
on accounting policy issues. Both accounting and 
special-interest subjects comprised the two primary 
sub-samples. A second goal was to identify the FASB's 
corresponding position with respect to these respondents. 
In other words, did it side with a sub-group of 
respondents? Or did it instead take an outlier or neutral 
stand? Related to these two questions is the objective of 
discovering, if possible, those specific accounting policy 
issues (dimensions) on which these subjects took diverse 
positions. 
The series of multidimensional scalings discussed in 
the data-analysis chapter provided graphical answers to 
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these three types of questions. Recall, however, that 
these were performed for nine essentially different 
accounting topic areas. Therefore, relative positions and 
conclusions were somewhat piecemeal in nature. 
The final two research objectives attempted to be a 
bit more global as a result. Did accounting and 
special-interest subjects show differential average 
alignment with the FASB? And did average FASB-subject 
distance depend upon the particular subset of issues 
(Brown's vs. additional) being analyzed? The 
Euclidean-distance measures from the preceding scalings 
were used in a series of follow-up tests to answer these 
questions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to reframe the 
statistical results obtained in terms of these basic 
objectives. First, these findings will be reviewed and 
their implications discussed. Next, some limitations of 
the study design and methodology used will be presented. 
As a final step, a few proposed extensions of this work 
will be briefly outlined. These are definitely worth 
pursuing, given renewed public interest in the possibility 
of undue influence in accounting standard-setting. 
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Implications of Research Findings 
A number of results found in this study correspond to 
conclusions of prior work which was outlined in the 
literature-review chapter. For instance, several distinct 
accounting/non-accounting dimensions emerged in the 
preceding scalings. More specifically, they occurred 
within the areas of general price level reporting; future 
losses; segments; and leases. Brown also reported 
attestor-preparer dimensions in overall and individual 
form. Yet a couple of key differences stand out. This 
study did not find such a split on the oil-and-gas issue, 
unlike Brown's results. And in a number of cases, the 
separation of attestor and preparer subjects along a given 
axis was not as clear-cut as claimed by Brown. 
Furthermore, a number of individual issues resulted 
in heterogeneous clusterings (research and development, 
for instance). Most notably, the oil-and-gas DM was 
characterized by Big-8 oil-industry groupings. This 
brings to mind the auditor-client similarities of opinion 
over time, as described by Rhode, Whitsell and Kelsey and 
illustrated statistically by Rockness and Nikolai. 
However, a large number of homogeneous groupings were 
uncovered in specific settings. Recall the cohesiveness 
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of insurance-oriented respondents for DM 4; the stable 
grouping of banks and banking associations for DM 10; and 
the unity of accounting subjects for DM 9. Meyer's claim 
of lack of alignment along employment categories is not 
supported in these instances. 
Especially noteworthy is the number of times in which 
the FASB emerged as a "balancer." In two cases (foreign 
currency and oil and gas) the FASB ended up reversing 
and/or suspending its initial rulings following 
substantial public protest. The middle-of-the-road 
position of the FASB was also evident in such central 
issues as segment disclosures and reporting requirements 
for pension-fund assets. In contrast, the FASB appeared 
to be an outlier for very specific and almost peripheral 
supplementary questions, such as the particular deflator 
(GNP vs. CPI) to be used in general price level 
adjustments. 
The foregoing clusters, as well as the dimensions 
that were identified, pertain to specific DMs. However, 
an attempt was made to aggregate these piecemeal results 
and return to questions such as those posed by Newman and 
Hussein and Ketz. Overall, does the FASB show a 
propensity to align more closely with accounting, as 
opposed to non—accounting (here, "special-interest ) 
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subjects? Both of these studies found no disproportionate 
influence on the part of Big-8 accounting firms. In 
keeping with Brown's sub-sample, the present study 
broadened this base a bit, by including professional 
reporting societies as accounting subjects too. 
There was also no evidence of a difference in overall 
FASB alignment (here, operationalized as mean Euclidean 
distances) between accounting and corporate subjects. 
However, a follow-up question revealed an important 
moderating variable in this comparison. There was 
borderline statistical evidence of a difference in overall 
mean distances for Brown's original issues, as compared to 
the additional set. 
This suggests that the FASB's ultimate position 
vis-a-vis clusters of like-minded lobbyists is very much 
dependent upon the subset of particular accounting 
questions being analyzed within any broad topic area. As 
a result, the average FASB distance for the accounting vs. 
the non-accounting subjects was re-examined within each 
DM, with the subset of issues (Brown's vs. additional) 
serving as a "blocking factor." The question asked was 
this: for which subsets of issues was average distance to 
the FASB significantly closer for the accounting subjects 
than for the special-interest subjects? And vice versa? 
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One subset for which accounting subjects aligned more 
closely with the FASB was the complete set of questions 
for research and development. These included the 
desirability of general guidelines; the costs to be 
included (direct vs. indirect); and the proper accounting 
treatment of such outlays (capitalize vs. expense). But 
the one additional issue, the question of separate 
disclosure, was also significant. 
Brown's set of issues for contingencies also resulted 
in a closer FASB alignment for the accounting subjects. 
These dealt with the overall desirability of accruing 
losses in advance, as well as more specific types (e.g./ 
expropriations, pending litigation, catastrophe losses) 
and the desirability of disclosure requirements for 
non-accruable contingencies. 
In the area of leases, alignment was closer for the 
accounting sample for questions of capitalization of 
installment purchases; symmetry in accounting treatment by 
lessees and lessors; and the suitability of specific 
criteria for individual types of leases (e.g., leveraged 
leases and sales equivalents); among others. These 
questions appeared in Brown's original set. 
But the additional questions also revealed a closer 
distance for the accounting subjects on average. These 
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had to do with hypothetical disclosures for leases which 
escaped one or more of the FASB's strict capitalization 
criteria. 
The final topic for which accounting alignment turned 
out to be closer for the accounting sample was the 
pensions DM. (Recall that Brown did not include the topic 
of pensions in his set of projects. Thus, all of the 
questions are "additional" by definition.) 
In contrast, two topics produced closer distances 
between the Board and the corporate (special-interest) 
subjects. One of these was the additional set of 
questions for future losses. These dealt with the 
desirability of standards for disclosure for non-accruable 
contingencies, as well as the proper placement within the 
statement of accrued future losses. 
The second of these was Brown's set of questions for 
debt restructuring (DM 10). All of Brown's questions here 
were hypothetical scenarios of various forms of debt 
restructuring (e.g., forgiveness; transfer of alternative 
assets in settlement; revisions in payment schedules). In 
all of these cases, the basic question was whether to 
record the debt at current value or historical cost. 
However, in all of the remaining sets of issues there 
was no basic difference in alignment as between accounting 
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and non-accounting subjects. This includes all the issues 
for general price level changes; foreign currency 
translation; segment reporting; and accounting for the 
extractive industries. 
What are the implications of these results for the 
FASB? As noted in the literature-review chapter, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board is the third 
structural attempt to keep standard-setting in the private 
sector. Its two predecessors collapsed in large measure 
as a result of their strictly ivory-tower approach to 
accounting standard-setting. That is, they pictured 
accounting as a pristine science, with very precise, 
derivable rules. In doing so, they failed to take into 
account the conflicting objectives of various factions of 
their constituency—as well as the ferocity with which 
lobbyists could publicly promote their own goals. 
As a result of recommendations made by the Moss and 
Metcalf committees, the FASB consciously incorporated 
procedures for public input into its method of operation. 
But how successful has it really been in striking a 
balance among opposing interests? Is there evidence of 
consistent alignment with accounting subjects? This has 
always been suspected, despite the lack of direct evidence 
from the various studies cited earlier. In fact, the 
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Dingell congressional committee hearings which began in 
February of 1985 are once more focused on this very 
question. 
From the aforementioned results, it appears as though 
the accusations of preferential alignment are unjustified 
as a whole. Note the profusion of general issues for which 
no statistically significant difference emerged. One of 
these, GPL changes, was highly touted as controversial in 
its time. Yet the FASB has evidently balanced out 
constituents' preferences rather nicely. Not 
surprisingly, attestors can afford to subscribe to the 
assumption "more information is better"; they typically 
clamor for all sorts of additional disclosures. For 
corporate respondents, though, this represents yet another 
reporting burden. By limiting the nature of such GPL 
adjustments to certain selected supplementary disclosures, 
the FASB appears to have struck a workable compromise 
between both opposing groups. It also subsequently issued 
a series of statements illustrating how to present GPL 
disclosures for specific industries. This "willingness to 
educate" may have helped win the (albeit grudging) 
cooperation of corporate constituents. 
In fact, a similar balancing was evident in the 
FASB's treatment of segment reporting—another DM which 
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showed no differences in alignment for any of the issues 
contained therein. Again, the accounting subjects tended 
to advocate as much additional information as possible, 
without regard to the feasibility or consequences to 
corporate filers. However, multiple-product-line firms 
were quite naturally concerned about loss of competitive 
advantage if they were forced to reveal too much inside 
information relative to marketing strategies. 
Furthermore, there was some concern about an accounting 
agency prescribing definitions as to what constitutes a 
"reportable" market segment. Once again, the Board 
attempted to compromise by providing broad-based (yet 
easily computable) "size" tests? and by limiting required 
supplementary disclosures to only such relatively 
available amounts as gross-margin line-type items (e.g./ 
total sales revenues and cost of goods sold). 
What do these conclusions imply for the FASB and its 
critics? The Board is evidently successful at remaining 
"neutral" in those instances where it relegates proposed 
new disclosures to supplementary notes; and it also 
carefully limits the number of such disclosures which must 
be made in this form. In other words, one of Wolk, et. 
al.'s frequent comments seems to be a prudent legislative 
strategy. The authors noted that accounting policy-makers 
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typically deal with "controversial" disclosures by 
allowing them to appear as notes, rather than requiring 
them to be placed in the body of the .main financial 
statements. Given the ever-present danger of "democratic 
paralysis," in trying to be all things to all people, this 
may ultimately be the most expedient course of action. No 
doubt the FASB could point out the above instances to the 
Dingell investigators, as illustrations of its compromise 
solutions in the past. 
Suggestions are somewhat less clear-cut from the 
results of two other issues, though. One which did not 
reveal significant differences in alignment seems to imply 
an alternative policy-making strategy. This topic was 
studied in DM 13, accounting for the extractive 
industries. Recall the rather stormy history of this 
topic, and the way in which the FASB was forced to alter 
its rulings in response to the outside pressures of the 
SEC as well as industrial lobbyists. In this instance, 
the Board's "neutral" position actually meant that it 
simply had to back off and allow individual companies to 
choose for themselves between full cost and successful 
efforts. Basically, this eventual flexibility is behind 
the lack of differential sub-sample alignment. 
271 
The lesson here for the FASB is that there is a world 
of difference between "theoretically preferable" 
alternatives (successful efforts) in principle vs. in 
practice. For while its overseer organization agreed that 
this approach was conceptually sound, even the SEC (as 
well as other governmental agencies, such as the Federal 
Power Commission) grudgingly came to tolerate flexibility 
in their own respective required filings. The FASB could 
clearly have saved itself considerable effort by adopting 
this flexible approach at the outset of its acceptance by 
the SEC, rather than having to face the embarrassment of a 
complete reversal due to outside pressures. 
The remaining "no-difference" issue suggests that a 
somewhat different approach may sometimes be necessary for 
the policy-making body, depending on the issue. The 
question of foreign currency translation represents 
another radical turnaround in FASB position. Its original 
solution was to develop a lengthy schematic of which items 
should be translated at current rates and which at 
historic rates. Protests from essentially self-contained 
multinationals compelled the FASB to adopt an admittedly 
arbitrary, but much more expedient, rule: simply translate 
all accounts at the current rate. This neatly sidestepped 
the problem of what to do with exchange gains and losses 
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which arose for ongoing operations. 
But here too the FASB softened its stance a bit by 
proposing the "functional currency" rule. This 
broad-based definition allows individual companies to make 
their own determination of the "correct" currency for 
their respective economic operating environments. Thus/ 
when examined as a whole, the Board's ultimate solution in 
the case of foreign currency also parallels its 
"balancing" positions as described for the preceding 
issues. 
To sum up, the FASB can point to quite a few 
instances of its "neutrality" in answering its critics who 
charge it with undue alignment of any sort (accounting or 
other special interests). In such cases, its 
"middle-of-the-road" stance may be explained by its 
tolerance of both broad guidelines (thereby allowing for 
some individual discretion, albeit circumscribed) as well 
as reporting of additional proposed financial information 
in limited footnote form in many cases. 
However, the evidence here is a bit muddled as to 
which basic, underlying issues (as opposed to accounting 
questions quoted verbatim from particular DMs) are more 
salient to accounting vs. special-interest subjects. We 
noted earlier that the particular subset of issues within 
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each DM is a significant moderating factor in the search 
for differences in subject alignment with the FASB. 
One suggestion to the Board is apparent from these 
results. Perhaps a two-pronged approach to the issuance 
of DMs for public reaction is advisable. As explained 
earlier, each DM simply lists a long and varied assortment 
of accounting questions for constituent response. But 
shouldn't certain more basic questions be submitted to the 
public first? Why not decide if GPL disclosures are 
useful and feasible, before going on to consider 
alternative deflators and modes of classification, for 
instance? (We saw how the poor wording of the 
"usefulness" question by the FASB when it issued DM 2 
produced a confounding of the letter writers' responses 
and also a graphically uninterpretable axis as a result.) 
Isn't it more efficient to decide if losses ought to be 
accrued in advance at: all, before weighing the merits of 
specific types of such contingencies? 
Such a dual approach to DM composition could also 
help lobbyists focus their letter-writing activities more 
sharply. Recall the number of "skips" we encountered for 
implementation-type questions in a number of scalings> 
such as non-catastrophe losses in the case of insurance 
respondents to DM 4. Rather than being inundated with 
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30-plus-item letters, and being compelled to place all of 
these individual items on its agenda simultaneously, the 
FASB could more readily determine areas of subgroup 
agreement by considering more basic questions as a first 
pass. This would help it discern the commonalities in 
respondent preference functions (e.g., criteria that 
accounting reports should possess, which are preferred by 
all constituents) that Bromwich proposed. 
At this point, it is worthwhile to contrast some of 
Brown's findings with the follow-up results of the present 
study. In his constructed classification function for 
preparers vs. attestors. Brown found the FASB grouping 
with the accounting subjects for R and D, contingencies, 
foreign currency, segments, and oil and gas. On the other 
hand, the Board aligned more closely with preparers for 
marketable securities, GPL changes, leases, and debt 
restructuring. 
There are a number of reasons for the differences in 
results. The FASB changed its positions on foreign 
currency and oil and gas subsequent to Brown's work, as 
explained earlier. Its neutral position marks a movement 
toward special-interest subjects and away from strictly 
conceptual accounting considerations. Thus, the 
application of MDS in the present study resulted in a 
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"correctly" centralized FASB plot in both of these cases. 
The topic of marketable securities was not included 
here because it was not preceded by a DM. Brown admitted 
that it emanated directly from an exposure draft. 
However, the latter is not a neutral document, quite 
unlike the construction of DMs. Thus, it would have 
introduced an undesirable source of noise into the balance 
of the (all-DM-based) sample. 
Some similarities in both studies are evident; the 
attestor alignment for Brown's questions on contingencies 
and leases, to be specific. In like manner, the alignment 
for attestors matches Brown's results in the case of debt 
restructuring. However, the choice of particular issues 
is crucial in making these sorts of comparisons, as was 
statistically discovered and pointed out earlier. The 
additional questions for leases also show up for the 
attestor group. But the extra contingencies issues reveal 
closer special-interest alignment. Thus, Brown's results 
match up across the board for the topic of leases; but the 
area of future losses turns out to be a split issue 
(closer attestor alignment for one subset and closer 
preparer alignment for the balance of questions). This 
only underscores the need to disaggregate broad accounting 
topics very carefully into basic vs. supplementary 
276 
questions before making any claims as to FASB-subject 
alignment patterns. 
The present study design contains one structural 
improvement over Brown's work. The coding scheme has been 
expanded so as to disaggregate neutral respondents and 
missing values. (Recall that they had been combined in 
Brown's work.) 
This distinction made a difference in a number of 
cases. A notable example is the research and development 
DM. Recall that the capitalize-vs.-expense question did 
not emerge as a significant dimension here. Respondents 
were not as polarized because the majority of answers were 
actually neutral ("capitalize these accounts but expense 
those"). The improved coding scheme may also explain the 
fact that many of the two-dimensional solutions had better 
stress values than Brown's. 
The second difference is in the composition of the 
second (non-accounting) sub-samples. Here they have been 
separately drawn from each DM index. This is in keeping 
with the initial research objective; that is, to examine 
the clustering and placement of "special-interest 
respondents" on policy issues. 
At this point it is worthwhile to mention a few 
limitations of the present study design. These will be 
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briefly discussed next. 
Limitations of the Study 
One of the most basic limitations of this study lies 
in the sample-selection procedure for special-interest 
subjects. An initial attempt to use frequency of DM 
response proved unsuccessful. The "size" surrogate seemed 
to be a reasonable method, given Watts and Zimmerman's 
work and the availability of the Fortune 500 lists as 
sampling frames. More specialized sampling frames were 
utilized for debt restructuring, leases, and the 
extractive industries. But perhaps there are alternative 
ways (other than size or response frequency) to select 
special-interest subjects, which in turn would lead to 
markedly different results. 
Also, keep in mind that influence attempts were 
measured at only one point of the legislative process: 
namely, written responses to DMs. Shifts and reversals 
can certainly occur at other points, most notably public 
hearings and issuance of Exposure Drafts. These would of 
course not be captured by the present study. 
Several limitations are inherent to the primary 
statistical technique which was employed. MDS has minimal 
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assumptions in place; there are no restrictions as to 
sample size, functional relationships among the variables, 
or the underlying shape of their distribution. But the 
tradeoff comes in the fact that it has no statistic 
associated with it whose underlying distribution is known 
and tabulated. Therefore, no hypothesis testing is 
possible with MDS. In particular, the goodness of fit 
statistic is a matter of judgment. Users must rely on 
published guidelines which are rough rules of thumb at 
best. This is in marked contrast to using chi-square test 
statistics as goodness-of-fit measures in linear 
structural relations, for instance. 
While MDS does not require lack of collinearity among 
its variables, it produces orthogonal dimensions as 
output. This implies that the issues underlying these 
axes are independent. But even a cursory glance at the 
policy questions in Table 2 suggests otherwise. Recall 
that the first two questions for leases deal with 
capitalization and associated liability recognition. Or 
note the relationship between the issue on capitalizing 
leases and their subsequent amortization if^ they are 
capitalized. 
Perhaps an even more basic limitation lies with the 
amount of judgment required to interpret each scaling. 
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Both the number of dimensions to be retained, and the 
interpretation of the underlying dimensions, are basically 
a subjective exercise. 
There are certain other ways of looking at the 
primary research questions raised in this study. Some of 
them would circumvent the present limitations, through 
study design and/or methodology employed. A few of these 
will be mentioned in the following section. 
Extensions of the Study 
Throughout the interpretation of the nine DMs which 
were analyzed, a common theme repeatedly emerged. This 
was the need for the FASB to identify a sound conceptual 
framework prior to attacking accounting issues on a 
piecemeal basis. In fact, there were a number of fairly 
common threads running through supposedly diverse 
questions. Note, for instance, that oil and gas, R and D, 
and leases basically dealt with asset recognition. The 
choice of measuring unit was the main theme of GPL 
changes; yet it reappeared in pensions, debt 
restructuring, and foreign currency translation. Separate 
disclosure was an item of interest in segment reporting, R 
and D, and leases. 
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Factor analysis, or some other multivariate data 
reduction techniques, could be employed to uncover such 
recurring themes for various sets of interrelated 
accounting policy issues. Once such a list of underlying 
attributes has been determined, the FASB could stratify 
its constituents and sample their perceived similarities, 
as well as their preferences, for the inclusion of these 
characteristics in future financial reporting 
requirements. 
This sort of research would provide a more direct 
gauge of which reporting objectives are salient to, or 
preferred by, sub-groups of the general public. Since it 
directly takes into account interdependencies in the basic 
issues, it would help the FASB predict both consensus and 
dissent on possible items within its proposed conceptual 
framework. This would no doubt expedite the legislative 
process. 
In terms of the present study design, however, a 
number of less drastic modifications come to mind. For 
one thing, the unit of analysis could be reduced to just 
one DM, and all of the questions scaled within it for a 
set of respondents. This would eliminate the judgmental 
factor of having to choose only a sample of questions 
contained therein. As a result, the differential impact 
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of Brown's questions vs. the additional set would be 
completely removed. 
Perhaps certain characteristics of respondents are 
associated with their opinions on policy issues. A 
chi-square automatic interaction detection (CHAID) could 
be performed, given additional information such as 
industry, number of product lines, length of time in 
business, number of employees, etc. If sub-group splits 
can be attained on such respondent characteristics, the 
results could be a more detailed and precise definition 
of"special-interest groups" than the simple size surrogate 
employed here. (Note: because the sample size must be at 
least several hundred for a reasonably stable solution, 
this sort of analysis would best be performed within a 
given DM with a large data base. Leases and debt 
restructuring would certainly have sufficient numbers of 
responses; R and D, on the other hand, would not.) 
Earlier it was reiterated that the FASB 
policy-setting process consists of several distinct 
stages. Would the relative patterns of alignment 
discovered here remain the same if letters to Exposure 
Drafts were analyzed instead? Or the minutes of public 
hearings? 
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We noted dramatic FASB reversals in two DMs studied 
by Brown: foreign currency translation and accounting for 
the extractive industries. A new DM, pensions, was added. 
Yet it too is in a state of flux at present, particularly 
with the recent issuance of DMs 21 and 22. If and when 
the latter two documents culminate in final FASB 
Statements, the present analysis could be repeated, to 
reposition subjects' opinions relative to the new and 
different FASB rulings. 
In the discussion of sample selection, it was noted 
that there was no single set of respondents who wrote 
letters to all nine DMs. But suppose a constant 
non-accounting sub-sample could be identified for a 
related subset of DMs (e.g., R and D, Oil and Gas, and 
Leases as surrogates of the concept "Asset Recognition"). 
If possible, this would open up a range of tests that 
could not be utilized in the present study. For example, 
is there an interaction effect between type of respondent 
(accounting vs. special-interest) and type of accounting 
issue (e.g.. Brown's vs. mine; or "basic" vs- 
implementational," as discussed earlier)? Given a 
constant set of all sampled subjects across all included 
DMs, a repeated-measures ANOVA could be performed in order 
to answer this question. Or suppose that no significant 
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interaction exists; but accounting and corporate subjects 
do differ in alignment with the FASB. Having the luxury 
of a constant non-accounting sample would enable the 
researcher to acknowledge statistically the 
interdependence among questions. He could do this by 
calculating Hotelling's T to test for differences. 
Because it does not require independence among its 
variables as a basic assumption, it does not understate 
the p-value in the same manner as in repeated application 
of the two-group t-test to a list of intercorrelated 
measures, according to Dillon and Goldstein. This means 
that the chances of Type I error are diminished by its 
use. 
Concluding Comments 
Political influence attempts are an unavoidable 
occurrence— regardless of the particular setting. This 
study has re-examined prior assumptions of undue 
accounting influence within an established channel of 
communication in the FASB's legislative process. It has 
also extended the search for this effect by including 
non-accounting, special-interest subjects in its total 
sample. While certain conclusions agree with those of 
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prior work (no overall FASB-accounting alignment), a 
couple of important moderating variables ("topic area" and 
"subset of issues within each") were shown to affect this 
result significantly. Possible offshoots of this study 
were just discussed. Given the ongoing interest in the 
accounting policy-making process (most notably, the 
Dingell hearings), any and all potential indicators of 
undue influence deserve to be vigorously investigated in 
various alternative forms. 
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APPENDIX 1 
List of Sampled Subjects 
Note: Assigned number identifies each subject's plot(s) 
in the perceptual spaces which appear in Figures 8 
through 42. 
Subject Number 
Arthur Andersen 1 
Arthur Young 2 
Coopers and Lybrand 3 
Ernst and Ernst 4 
Haskins and Sells 5 
Price Waterhouse 6 
Peat Marwick and Mitchell 7 
Touche Ross 8 
American Accounting Association (AAA) 9 
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accounts (AICPA) 10 
Financial Executive Institute (FEI) 11 
Financial Analysis Federation (FAF) 12 
National Association of Accountants (NAA) 13 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 14 
Marriott 15 
G. D. Searle 16 
Eli Lilly 17 
American Telephone and Telegraph (A.T. & T.) 18 
Masonite 19 
Rockwell 20 
General Mills 21 
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) 22 
Texas Instruments 23 
International Harvester 24 
Edison Electric 25 
TransAmerica 26 
TRW Corporation 27 
Inland Steel 28 
Gillette 29 
Continental Oil 30 
Commonwealth Edison 31 
Alfred University 32 
Texaco 33 
Gulf Oil 34 
Ford Motor Corporation 35 
Standard Oil of Indiana 36 
Dow Chemical 37 
Sun Oil 38 
Atlantic Richfield 39 
289 
APPENDIX 1 (continued) 
Subject Number 
PepsiCo 40 
Chrysler Corporation 41 
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) 42 
Ingersoll-Rand 43 
Fireman's Fund 44 
American Insurance Association 45 
Traveler's Insurance 46 
Lincoln National Insurance 47 
American Society of Insurance Management 48 
American Academy of Actuaries 49 
Insurance and Financial Analysts 50 
Aetna 51 
Caterpillar Tractor 52 
Honeywell 53 
Monsanto 54 
L.T.V. Corporation 55 
C.P.C. International 56 
Procter and Gamble 57 
Mobil Oil 58 
Hoover Corporation 59 
Howard Johnson's 60 
Ashland Oil 61 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P) 62 
Storage Technology 63 
Frontier Air 64 
Eastern Air 65 
Sunoco 66 
International Multifoods 67 
Union Oil of California 68 
Ingram Corporation 69 
American Life Insurance 70 
Prudential Insurance 71 
Union Carbide 72 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 73 
Liberty National Insurance 74 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 75 
U. S. Steel 76 
Marcor 77 
Municipal Finance Officers Association 78 
Manufacturers Hanover 79 
Chase Manhattan 80 
J. P. Morgan • 81 
Security Pacific Bank 82 
Mutual Bankers Association 83 
Bankers Trust 84 
Irving Trust 85 
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APPENDIX 1 (continued) 
Subject Number 
American Bankers Association 86 
First National Bank of Chicago 87 
Continental Bank of Chicago 88 
Bank Administration Institute 89 
New Jersey Bankers Association 90 
Security Pacific Corporation 91 
Southern Natural Resources 92 
Pennzoil 93 
Conoco 94 
Getty Oil 95 
Texas Gas Transmission 96 
Interstate Natural Gas Association 
of America (INGAA) 97 
Standard Oil of California 98 
Inexco Oil 99 
Shell Oil 100 
Exxon Oil 101 
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APPENDIX 2 
List of Policy Questions 
Discussion Memo 1 
Accounting for Research and Development Costs 
Brown's questions: 1,2,3,and 5 
1. Should there be broad guidelines with respect to 
R and D, as opposed to more detailed (per company 
or per industry) prescriptions? 
2. Should R and D include only direct costs? 
3. Should R and D costs be expensed as incurred? 
4. Should R and D costs which are not initially 
expensed be systematically amortized? 
5. Should R and D items be separately disclosed in 
the financial statements? 
Discussion Memo 2 
Reporting the Effects of General Price Level Changes 
Brown's questions: 1,4,5,6,7,8, and 9 
Should reporting of the effects of general price 
level changes be required as supplemental 
information to the conventional historical-cost 
financial statements? 
1. 
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2. Is financial information which has been restated 
for changes in the general price level useful? 
3. Do the benefits of making price level adjusted 
accounting information available outweigh the 
costs involved? 
4. Should a requirement for presentation of price 
level adjusted financial information apply to all 
entities? 
5. Is the GNP Price Deflator the most appropriate 
measure of changes in the general purchasing 
power in the U.S.A.? 
6. Should amounts in the general purchasing power 
financial statements be stated in terms of 
dollars of purchasing power at the end of the 
current accounting period (as opposed to some 
other base period)? 
7. Are the criteria for distinguishing between 
monetary and non-monetary items, as set forth in 
APB Statement No. _3 appropriate? 
8. Should all general purchasing power gains/losses 
which result from holding monetary 
assets/liabilities be included in the 
determination of current net income? 
9. Should general purchasing power financial 
statements of earlier periods be restated in 
terms of current-period purchasing power, when 
such earlier statements are presented for 
comparative purposes? 
Discussion Memo 3 
Foreign Currency Translation 
Brown's questions: 1,2,3,5,6,7,8, and 9 
1. Should the parent company's reporting currency be 
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the appropriate unit of measurement for the 
financial statements of its foreign entities? 
2. Should exchange adjustments be recorded 
immediately (as rate changes occur)? 
3. Should gains and losses be accrued on 
forward-exchange contracts entered into to 
eliminate the risk on assets and liabilities of 
foreign entities? 
4. Should the translation of accounts be affected by 
changes in the exchange rate subsequent to the 
end of a period, but prior to the issuance of 
financial statements? 
5. Should inventories of foreign entities be 
adjusted for changes in exchange rates between 
the local currencies of the foreign entities and 
the reporting currency of the parent company (or 
use current rates)? 
6. Should fixed assets of foreign entities be 
adjusted for changes in exchange rates between 
the local currencies of the foreign entities and 
the reporting currency of the parent company (or 
use current rates)? 
7. Should deferred income taxes of foreign entities 
be adjusted for changes in exchange rates between 
the local currencies of the foreign entities and 
the reporting currency of the parent company (or 
use current rates)? 
8. Should preferred stock (of a permanent nature) of 
foreign entities be adjusted for changes in 
exchange rates between the local currencies of 
the foreign entities and the reporting currency 
of the parent company (or use current rates)? 
Should long-term liabilities of foreign entities 
be adjusted for changes in exchange rates between 
the local currencies of the foreign entities and 
the reporting currency of the parent company (or 
use current rates)? 
9. 
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Discussion Memo 4 
Accounting for Future Losses 
Brown's questions: 1,6,7,8, and 9 
1. Should losses be accrued in advance of their 
occurrence? 
2. Should accruable future losses be measured by the 
effect on the results of operations (both 
periodic and irregular charges, as applicable)? 
3. Should accrued future losses be classified as 
liabilities in the balance sheet (as opposed to 
using an asset valuation account or a special 
category)? 
4. Should standards be set for the disclosure of 
accruable future losses in the financial 
statements? 
5. Should future losses not meeting the criteria for 
accrual be disclosed? 
6. Should accrual of future losses from 
expropriation by foreign governments be allowed 
in advance of their occurrence? 
7. Should accrual of future catastrophe losses of 
property and casualty insurance companies be 
allowed in advance of their occurrence? 
8. Should accrual of future losses from pending or 
threatened litigation be allowed in advance of 
their occurrence? 
9. Should standards be set for the disclosure of 
non-accruable future losses in the financial 
statements? 
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Discussion Memo 5 
Financial Reporting for Segments 
of a Business Enterprise 
Brown's questions: 1,5,6,7,8, and 9 
1. Should information about segments be included in 
the financial statements? 
2. Are additional disclosures necessary, other than 
those within the statements? 
3. Should previously reported segment information 
(which is presently in the current period for 
comparative purposes) be retroactively restated? 
4. Should segment information be included in interim 
financial reports? 
5. Should the FASB specify guidelines for 
segmentation (as opposed to the entity 
determining the 'best' segmentation)? 
6. With respect to the income statement, should some 
measure of segment income be reported (as opposed 
to only 'revenue' information)? 
7. With respect to the balance sheet, should 
selected segment information (e.g., property, 
inventories, etc.) be reported? 
8. Should selected segment information with respect 
to the Statement of Changes in Financial Position 
be reported? 
Should a requirement for inclusion of segment 
information in financial statements be made 
applicable to only certain profit-oriented 
business enterprises? 
9. 
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Discussion Memo 7 
Accounting for Leases 
Brown's questions: 1,2,4,8,9,10,11, and 12 
1. Should leases which are in substance "installment 
purchases" be capitalized? 
2. Should leasing agreements whose terms give rise 
to debt (in the strict legal sense) be recorded 
as liabilities? 
3. If leases are capitalized, should the effect on 
net income differ from that otherwise resulting 
from the pattern of lease rental payments? 
4. Does footnote disclosure represent a satisfactory 
alternative to lease capitalization in fulfilling 
users' needs for information concerning lease 
transactions? 
5. Assuming no change in the present requirements 
for lease capitalization, should disclosure of 
the present values be required for certain 
non-capitalized lease commitments? 
6. Should disclosure of the effect on net income, 
had these leases (previous question) been 
capitalized, be required? 
7. If some leases are capitalized, does this obviate 
the need for disclosing information in footnotes 
concerning these leases? 
8. Should leases which are the equivalent of "sales" 
be accounted for as such by the lessor? 
9. Should accounting for leases by lessees and 
lessors be symmetrical? 
. Should "manufacturer" or "dealer" lessors be 
permitted to recognize a proportionate share of 
their profit with respect to some leases which 
are not the equivalent of sales? 
10 
297 
11. Should leases which are considered to be 
financing arrangements for the purchase of 
property be identified by the same criteria as 
those which are considered equivalent to 'sales 
of property'? 
12. Are leveraged leases unique, in the sense that 
special accounting standards are required to 
recognize their economic effects? 
Discussion Memo 9 
Accounting and Reporting for 
Employee Benefit Plans 
Brown's questions: none 
1. Should the accounting and reporting entity be the 
plan (vs. the fund)? 
2. Is the accrual basis of accounting the most 
appropriate one for preparing the financial 
statements? 
3. Should historical cost be the measurement base? 
4. Should some measure of the obligation for pension 
benefits be presented as a liability or equity 
interest in the financial statements (as opposed 
to footnote or other disclosure)? 
5. Should the FASB specify how assets and 
liabilities should be classified in the financial 
statements of the pension plan? 
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Discussion Memo 10 
Accounting by Debtors and Creditors 
When Debt Is Restructured 
Brown's questions: 5,6,7, and 8 
1. Should the matters covered by a Statement be 
limited by the exclusion of specific types of 
debt restructurings? 
2. Because debt of state and local government units 
may be considered by some to be different from 
that of other entities, in a restructuring of 
debt of a state or local government unit: should 
the attribute measured differ from that which is 
measured by some other entity (e.g., a business 
corporation)? 
3. If a present value attribute is measured by the 
creditor to determine the amount of the 
receivable resulting from a restructuring, should 
contingent interest payments be included in that 
measurement? 
4. If a present value attribute is measured by the 
debtor to determine the amount of the debt 
resulting from a restructuring, should contingent 
interest payments be included in that 
measurement? 
5. When there is satisfaction of a receivable or 
debt by forgiveness, should the remaining balance 
be accounted for at historical entry value (as 
opposed to some form of current value) by both 
the creditor and debtor? 
6. When there is satisfaction of a receivable or 
debt in whole or in part by transfer of 
receivables, real estate, or other assets, should 
the remaining balance be accounted for at 
historical entry value (as opposed to some form 
of current value) by both the debtor and 
creditor? 
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7. When new evidence of debt is issued for 
outstanding (old) debt and there is a change in 
the stated maturity amount of the debt, should 
the new debt be valued at the historical value of 
the old debt by both the debtor and creditor? 
8. When there is a change in the amount or timing of 
cash payments of outstanding debt without a 
change in the stated maturity of the debt, should 
the restructured debt be valued at the historical 
value of the old debt by both the debtor and 
creditor? 
Discussion Memo 13 
Financial Accounting and Reporting 
in the Extractive Industries 
Brown's questions: 1,7,8, and 9 
1. Should the degree of association between a cost 
and minerals discovered and developed (a 
cause/effect association) affect the 
capitalization/expense decision? 
2. Should the degree of risk (uncertainty), the 
stage of operations during which a cost is 
incurred, and the concept of conservatism affect 
the capitalization/expense decision? 
3. Should the type (e.g., IDC, geological, 
geophysical) or nature (e.g., tangible or 
intangible) of the cost incurred affect the 
capitalization/expense decision? 
4. Should the medium or method of expenditure (e.g., 
company's own personnel vs. outside contractors) 
affect the capitalization/expense decision? 
Should management's mode of operations, or the 
way • in which it plans the acquisition and 
development of reserves, affect the 
5. 
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capitalization/expense decision? 
6. Should the size or nature of the cost center 
affect the capitalization/expense decision? 
7. Should the FASB adopt accounting policies 
conceptually 'similar to successful efforts 
costing (as opposed to full costing)? 
8. Should Statement No. , "Accounting for Income 
Taxes—Oil and Gas Producing Companies," be 
re-addressed in connection with the current 
project? 
9. Should the traditional historical cost basis 
financial statements be supplemented by financial 
statements in which reserves are valued on some 
basis other than historical cost? 
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APPENDIX 3 
MDS Stress Values 
# of Dimensions 
DM Source* 1 2 3 4 
1 B 0.3134 0.0776 0.0410 0.0098 
1 C 0.3564 0.1542 0.0472 0.0222 
2 B 0.4050 0.2081 0.1174 0.0683 
2 M 0.4110 0.1520 0.0702 0.0354 
3 B 0.3459 0.1754 0.1138 0.0718 
3 C 0.3639 0.2137 0.1165 0.0700 
4 B 0.3113 0.1455 0.0564 0.0323 
4 M 0.3167 0.1373 0.0177 0.0148 
5 B 0.3899 0.2249 0.9800 0.0486 
5 M 0.3235 0.1081 0.0406 0.0309 
7 B 0.3420 0.1651 0.0940 0.0590 
7 M 0.2471 0.0800 0.0216 0.0090 
9 C/M 0.3404 0.1540 0.0728 0.0340 
10 B 0.1880 0.1023 0.0676 0.0455 
10 M 0.2776 0.0583 0.0296 0.0097 
13 B 0.3490 0.1565 0.0674 0.0127 
13 M 0.4125 0.1642 0.0905 0.0536 
= Brown's subset 
= Mary D's subset 
= complete set 
*B 
M 
C 
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DM 
No. Title Date 
No. of 
Letters 
1 Accounting for Research 
& Development & Similar 
Costs 
12/28/73 75 
2 Reporting the Effects of 
General Price Level Changes 
in Financial Statements 
2/15/74 133 
3 Accounting for Foreign 
Currency Translation 
2/21/74 90 
4 Accounting for Future Losses 3/13/74 85 
5 Financial Reporting for 
Segments of a Business 
Enterprise 
5/22/74 141 
7 Accounting for Leases 7/2/74 305 
9 Accounting & Reporting 
for Employee Benefit Plans 
10/6/75 103 
10 Accounting by Debtors & 
Creditor when Debt Is 
Restructured 
5/11/76 895 
13 Financial Accounting & 
Reporting in the 
Extractive Industries 
12/23/76 140 
Figure 3. List of included DMs. 
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1 2 3 
Discussion Memo 
22 
Respondent 
Shell Oil / / 
Deloitte Haskins 
& Sells / / / / 
Columbia Univ. / 
etc. 
General Electric / / 
Figure 4 Cross-classification matrix: respondents by DMs 
C
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Respondent #1* 
Yes 
Neutral or 
No Response No 
Yes Very Similar 
(1) 
Intermediate 
(5) 
Very Dissimilar 
(9) 
Neutral or 
No Response 
Intermediate 
(5) 
Very Similar 
(1) 
Intermediate 
(5) 
No Very Dissimilar 
(5) 
Intermediate 
(5) 
Very Similar 
(1) 
*one of these being the FASB 
Figure 5. Paired-comparison matrix for data aggregation. 
from Brown, 1981, pg. 238 
Yes 
No 
Response Neutral No 
Yes (1) (3) (5) (7) 
No Response (3) (1) (3) (5) 
Neutral (5) (3) (1) (3) 
No (7) (5) (3) (1J 
Figure 6. Paired-comparison matrix 
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Cluster 1 
Figure 7. A sample two-dimensional MDS solution. 
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Accounting vs. Brown vs. 
Special-Interest Add't Questions 
Levene's Test: 1.56 1.80 
p-value 0.2118 0.1809 
d.f. 1.403 1.376 
Moses Test: 2.459 2,165 
p-value 0.8092 0.0973 
Figure 45. Tests of equality of dispersion parameters. 
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Type 
Accounting vs. 
Special-Interest 
Brown's Question 
vs. Mine 
Mann-Whitney 
y 
Test Statistic 18,816.50 19,511 
p-value 
(2 sided) 0.1588 0.0553 
t 
(trim pooled) -0.90 2.02 
p-value 
(2-sided) 0.3685 0.4444 
d.f. 399 372 
Figure 46. Tests of equality of subgroup means. 
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DM Source• 
Mann-Whitney 
V 
2-Tailed 
P 
1 C 54.00 0.0715*** 
2 B 114.00 0.2640 
2 M 104.50 0.5121 
3 C 87.50 0.8650 
4 B 61.50 0.1515 
4 M 131.50 0.0479** 
5 B 87.50 0.8651 
5 M 83.50 0.7152 
7 B 38.50 0.0108** 
7 M 59.00 0.1149 
9 C/M 47.50 0.0345** 
10 B 153.00 0.0026* 
10 M 97.00 0.7674 
13 B 83.00 0.7313 
13 M 81.50 0.6444 
* s • at a = 0.01 
**s. at a = 0.05 
* * * s. at a = 0.10 
• B = Brown 
M = Mary D. 
C = complete 
Figure 47. Mean differences 
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DM Source 
Significant at* 
a level of: 
1 C 0.05 
4 B 0.10 
7 B 0.01 
7 M 0.10 
9 C/M 0.025 
*Using tabled values in Daniel (1978). 
Calculated values of Mann-Whitney y are 
listed in Figure 47. 
Figure 48. Subsets for one-sided tests: Accounting > 
Special Interest. 
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Significant at 
DM Source a level of: 
4 M 0.025 
10 B 0.01 
Figure 49. Subsets for one-sided tests: 
special-interest > Accounting 

